Resmi Gazete, which publishes the state orders of Turkey, has published the order on Serdar Kilic, who was appointed by Turkey as its envoy in the process of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations.
According to the Resmi Gazete, by the decision of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Kilic has been appointed Turkey’s special representative for Armenia.
Until now, Serdar Kilic had been called an “envoy” of the Turkish side.
Serdar Kilic was Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States, from 2014 to 2021, and has been active in the denial of the Armenian Genocide. He actively participated in the organizing of the activities to thwart Armenian resolutions in the US Congress, as well as in the organizing of anti-Armenian events and actions in the US.
Perhaps some interesting advice for Yerevan to use in its negotiations with Ankara:
Risk mitigation and threat assessment ARMENIA:
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According to geopolitical shifts, observations and sources, there are opportunities for Armenia.
Bearing in mind that no value judgement is made here, only a reversal of possible developments. An open mindset.
The upcoming talks between Armenia and Turkey concern the reopening of the border closed by Turkey and the free movement of goods between the countries. This could provide a counterweight to the Syunik discussion and the corridor to Nakhichevan desired by Azerbaijan.
The EAEU developments and in the desired direction by Russia. Armenia is a member of this bloc and it is suggested that Azerbaijan be involved. As an economic counterweight to nip hostilities between Yerevan and Baku in the bud.
The intentions of India and Iran to establish a trade route through Armenia offers interesting perspectives for both the EU and Russia. Azerbaijan is not included in these plans.
The recently approved Turkmenistan oil and gas transport from the Caspian Sea over Iranian territory and again Azerbaijan does not fit into this picture.
The possible phasing out of Azerbaijani oil and gas imports by Italy. Not yet confirmed, but plausible given the reputational question. Italy is Baku’s biggest customer.
The unstable political and financial situation in Turkey at present is causing concern in Azerbaijan.
The over-dependence on oil and gas exports, which have also been declining for some time. The golden years have dimmed somewhat and the price fluctuations on the futures market do not cheer up the situation in Baku either.
The latent domestic unrest regarding price increases of all kinds of daily commodities in Azerbaijan creates an unstable environment for foreign investors and already present foreign parties. This picture has also been realised in Turkey before and will not be missed.
The continuous threefold war against Armenia is causing more and more resistance, because this is an attack on a sovereign country and not, as in the past, the (politically and militarily) incorrectly used argument that Aliyev was hiding behind Armenia’s taking back of (supposedly) occupied Artsakh territory.
To sum up, the above points do not bode well for Baku in the realisation of its (and Ankara’s) dream of a direct passage (Turkic World objectives).
The above are the reasons for Aliyev to continue his war rhetoric and hostilities. He sees his chances diminishing.
The pressing question now arises again, what will Pashinyan and the rest of the band in Yerevan decide. Will they do the right thing and create mutual interests in the Caucasus area or will they fail?