The peace agreement that Azerbaijan will sign only if Armenia recognizes its territorial integrity, which in its opinion includes Karabakh, will fix the final loss of Nagorno Karabakh.
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia (1998-2008) Vartan Oskanian provided the media with his article on the Artsakh issue. It is presented below.
“Currently, there are two worrying tendencies in the Artsakh issue that must be stopped and reversed if Armenia ever wants to hope to restore, albeit partially, its tangible losses, to reaffirm its place and role in the region,” at the negotiating table. The first dangerous tendency is that there is a smooth transition from Artsakh, being a priority issue on the agenda, to a purely Armenia-Azerbaijan bilateral agenda. As a result, new stereotypes harmful to us are being formed in the capitals of the main actors influencing the final outcome of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, which are based on three arguments. a) The Nagorno-Karabakh issue is resolved, b) Karabakh is an Azerbaijani territory inhabited by Armenians, և their human rights issues can be listened to, c) it is time to look to the future. This is the prevailing general mood of the Western powers, the United States, the European Union, and in part Russia. At present, the difference between the positions of the West and Russia is that the West wants a solution to the issue as soon as possible,
so it offers generous financial assistance to the Armenian side to sweeten the deal, while Russia is in no hurry to reach a solution. It’s just that Russian President Vladimir Putin is a little constrained here, as he has, willingly or unwillingly, taken on the role of “mediator” and guarantor of the implementation of the provisions of the November 9 ceasefire declaration. In that sense, it is possible to do so. The second tendency is that Azerbaijan is trying to impose its agenda on Armenia. In order to implement this agenda as soon as possible, Baku uses all possible levers, taking advantage of Armenia’s weakened defense and negotiating positions. The first is the possible document of delimitation, which will deal with the issue of enclaves.
The second is the issue of the road from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan, which is a provision of the November 9 statement. The third is the issue of signing a possible agreement on the establishment of Armenian-Azerbaijani peace and good-neighborly relations. All three are very serious challenges for Armenia. They will inevitably contain provisions that will not be in the interests of the security of the Republic of Armenia in general. Moreover, the peace agreement that Azerbaijan will sign only if Armenia recognizes its territorial integrity, which in its opinion includes Karabakh, will fix the final loss of Nagorno Karabakh.
The fact that Artsakh is Armenia is an undeniable fact. Neither I, nor Pashinyan, nor those who voted for him or the opposition, decide the fate of Artsakh. The fate of Artsakh is predetermined: it is our heritage, our history, the spark of our independence, our land and water, our blood, our identity. Since the armistice of May 12, 1994, all the administrations of Armenia, regardless of the diplomatic language they have chosen in the status negotiations – independence, self-determination, or entered into a “de facto de jure” pun, the ultimate goal has always been: that one day Artsakh will de jure return to Armenia. I think it is imperative today that Nikol Pashinyan stand in front of the new parliament and announce from a high tribune, “let us agree that no matter what, we will not sign a document or an agreement in which Artsakh will be a part of Azerbaijan.” This will immediately change the national mood, send a clear message to Azerbaijan, to the international community, about our rights and our determination to defend the country. But in order to give credibility and viability to this position, Armenia must have a clear roadmap for its next steps և policy. First, given the global and regional developments,
the so often conflicting interests of the West towards our region, Armenia, maintaining its strategic partnership with Russia and, if necessary, deepening it, must return to a complementary policy. Today Armenia cannot afford not to use all the opportunities provided to advance its national problems, even if the relations between those issues are very tense. Second, Armenia must unequivocally affirm that the November 9 statement is a reflection of the situation created as a result of the hostilities in Nagorno Karabakh and the surrounding areas at that time. Its content is not the expression of the will of the Republic of Armenia, but the expression of the situation imposed by military force. The status quo created by hostilities can never serve as a basis for lasting, lasting peace in the region, as well as good-neighborly relations between neighboring countries.
for approval. Third, Armenia should declare that it generally accepts the idea of concluding a peace treaty with Azerbaijan only if it includes the following provisions:
1) Withdrawal of all Azerbaijani forces in the sovereign territory of Armenia,
2) Immediate and unconditional return of all Armenian captives in Azerbaijan, including those currently on trial,
3) Recognition of the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region as a political entity; which as such has been in all settlement documents submitted by the international community since the signing of the 1994 ceasefire;
4) the resumption of negotiations within the Minsk Group to resolve the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The failure of diplomacy leads to war, but when you lose the war, the need to put diplomacy on a new level becomes imperative. The combat effectiveness of the Armenian army is extremely important. But its usefulness is limited by its ability to deter Azerbaijani aggression.
Today the army will not solve, it cannot solve the priority problems we face. This can only be done through effective diplomatic efforts. “Everything is not lost, many things can be restored.” Iravaban.net: