Thus, many things became very simple and open. For that, it was necessary to reach Brussels. In fact, the discussions on communications are not in the realm of pragmatism և economic benefits, but in the realm of political expediency. This is also normal, but at the same time, there must be a clear idea of who is paying for what and with what. If communication solutions do not bring economic benefits to at least one of the parties, then they acquire only political significance. The Armenian side began to mention the Yeraskh-Ordubad-Meghri-Baku-Russia railway project under discussion more often in the context of entering the Iranian railway, rather than in the context of favorable transit to Russia. At the same time, we must understand that the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict նոր new, own, more optimal ways of communication with Iran (railway,In the absence of new high-speed highways (etc.), we are again dependent on the whims of Azerbaijan, which can always stop cargo transportation from Armenia through its territory. We can discuss the unblocking of communications with Azerbaijan, but in parallel, we must advance our communication agenda in the North-South framework.
The “Corridor for Corridor” resolution is flawed in nature and inadmissible, as it will ultimately alienate the conflicting parties from the global political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where the most important issue is the right of the Artsakh people to self-determination and the final status of the Artsakh Republic. Let me remind you of the three main components of the settlement: status, strong ties with Armenia, and guarantees for the security of the population. And then, the topic of the corridor is already the topic of Armenia itself, its territorial integrity և sovereignty.
But today the reality is that the future solution of the Artsakh issue is no longer in the domain of the Armenian authorities, all the main resources are now concentrated in the hands of Russia. Judging by the course of the negotiations, the Transnistrian model seems to be the most optimal Russian way out of the current situation. This means leaving the political solution to the conflict to the judgment of future generations, and before that, dialogue, cooperation between the conflicting parties, and maintaining the Armenian-populated situation in Artsakh, the security of whose population must be protected by peacekeepers. The potentially visible result of the long-term status quo will be the “Russianization” of Artsakh, the political end of which will be the Russian protectorate. It is clear that the Turkish coalition will resist this prospect.
We must be ready for the fact that we will soon be informed that within the framework of demarcation and demarcation of interstate borders, we will have to cede a number of territories in Azerbaijan.
Until it is understood that the consistent policy of reducing the number of Armenians living South Caucasus in the South Caucasus is being implemented globally as the most optimal solution to the so-called Armenian question, we will only lose or lose. We must realize that the decisions made today will shape the history and perspective of our people and state, not the years, but the coming decades. It will be very difficult to change them later, if at all possible. Decision-makers must realize that responsibility for them will not be limited to the term of office of the current government or political majority. Such decisions and responsibilities have no historical statute of limitations; they are difficult to erase from the national memory. In this context, that one should be careful about the agenda of peace in the region և cooperation agenda, which in the public consciousness can minimize the historically conditioned threats to the security of the Armenian people և, consequently, the need to ensure it by allies or other countries, ie the role of Russia.
And, by the way, about a possible new war. It is clear that this topic is only to justify the possible losses and concessions. Now the war is not favorable except for Armenia, but also for Russia. For Russia, the new war is the inevitable fulfillment of allied obligations within the framework of bilateral relations և CSTO. It is also the first line of contact of Artsakh. Such a war is an inevitable loss by Russia Ադրբեջանի for Azerbaijan as an arbiter, for the prospects of its involvement in integration projects, Հայաստանի for Armenia’s ally. The failure in terms of non-fulfillment of obligations is the basis for the sharp increase of anti-Russian sentiments, the inevitable repetition of the Georgian scenario of expelling Russia from Armenia. For the anti-Russian circles, this will be the continuation of the topic: who finally handed over Karabakh?
At the same time, there will be no problems with gas, as Azerbaijan will already provide it. Armenians will trade intensively with the Turks, import cheap gasoline, eat Turkish tomatoes and mandarins. We will be promised large sums of oil and gas transit. And this prospect can secretly attract many residents of our country, who, in all probability, will not turn from a mercantile mortal into a patriotic citizen in the coming years. And many of them do not care whether they will live in a dignified “independent state” and therefore subconsciously vote exclusively for the invisible prospect of their own well-being. And the vast majority are sitting at home waiting for their desired leader to appear. And he does not appear yet, because it is very different for everyone.
Armen Gevorgyan
, RA National Assembly and Regional Integration Committee of the Eurasian Union , President
Anahid says
Azerbaijan just attended a big NATO meeting in Europe.
No sign that Russia is worried about this.
Meanwhile, Putin punishes ally Armenia for supposedly reaching out to the West, while at the same time Putin cozies up to NATO member Turkey and NATO candidate Azerbaijan.
Does Putin know that Russia is losing to Erdogan and Azerbaijan?
Probably not.
Putin is too busy hating and punishing Armenia for no good reason.