Armenia is among 18 countries with free internet, according to a Freedom House report Freedom on the Net 2015 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2015, while Azerbaijan is in the list of the partly free countries.
Azerbaijan got 56 scores out of 100 in the report, where 100 is the worst score.
According to the report, despite the Azerbaijani government’s continued insistence that the internet in Azerbaijan is free and that the authorities do not engage in censorship, there is a stark difference between this characterization and the reality for many internet users in Azerbaijan who have witnessed an increasing crackdown against activism in the country, both online and offline. Pro-government trolling continues to distort political discussions, and arrests and intimidation tactics used against netizens and their families over the last few years have threatened online activism. Fearing a spillover of protests from the Euromaidan events in Ukraine, authorities jailed over thirty high profile Azerbaijani citizens between May and December of 2014, some of whom were targeted for their online activism.
“There has been little improvement to the internet infrastructure in Azerbaijan over the past year, and internet access remains expensive for the majority of the population,” Freedom House notes. Citing a recent World Bank report, the organization indicates that 29 percent of all households are connected to the internet via mobile phone connections, but further investigation reveals that the average household in Azerbaijan’s lower income bracket (lowest 40 percent of the total population by income) needs to allocate 21 percent of their monthly disposable income to afford the cheapest mobile broadband package. In addition, over 80 percent of all landlines are concentrated in the urban areas, with 47 percent of all fixed landlines located in Baku. This gap has not changed over the last decade. There are parts of the country where only one rural family out of twelve has a telephone line.
The Ministry of Communication and High Technologies (MCHT) continues to hold a significant share in a few of the leading ISPs, and the government is authorized to instruct companies to cut internet service under very broadly defined circumstances, including war, emergency situations, and disasters. Despite the fact that over 30 ISPs operate in the country, the state-owned companies control over 56 percent of the market share.
The intimidation and arrest of internet users on trumped-up charges, resorted by the government to limit freedom of expression online, are leading to self-censorship. The government does not engage in extensive blocking or filtering of online content, instead relying primarily on legal, economic, and social pressures to discourage critical media coverage or political activism. There is still no established process through which affected entities can appeal in cases where opposition websites or other materials have been blocked, and there is still no information on the total number of blocked websites in Azerbaijan. Decisions to block online content are not transparent, and when users try to access blocked websites they simply receive an error message, rather than information stating that the site has been blocked. There is no law that includes an exact definition of what stipulates the reasons for blocking or shutting down websites, Freedom House points.
“In addition to sporadically blocking websites, the government has succeeded in removing several social media pages that produce political satire or are otherwise critical of the Aliyev government. In general, authorities rely on pressure and threats (rather than court orders or other takedown procedures) to remove unwanted content: some activists who are administrators of social media websites targeted by the government have subsequently deleted their pages after having been arrested or detained for questioning,” the group reports highlighting that some online journalists, commentators, and ordinary internet users have resorted to self-censorship, especially if they are employed by state media outlets or progovernment platforms. The limits imposed on independent or opposition media outlets make it extremely difficult for them to maintain enough stable advertising to sustain the platform. Often, large businesses and companies shy away from working with these outlets for the fear of losing their business license or receiving other unwanted pressure from the government.
Additionally, new amendments regulating the foreign funding of NGOs have made it easier for the government to target local organizations and media outlets that receive grants from outside sources. Outlets such as Mediaforum.az, Obyektiv TV, Channel 13, and Zerkalo/Ayna all had to cease operations in light of the new restrictions. The vast majority of existing online media outlets publish news in favor of the government, the right group notes.
“In advance of the launch of the European Games, which were held in Azerbaijan in June 2015, international criticism of the country’s rights record grew. While nearly all progovernment media outlets were actively engaged in refuting any claims about the country’s deteriorating human rights record, a group of progovernment youth was deployed to troll international media outlets and foreign and local critics in online spaces, particularly on Twitter. These trolls and bots refuted any antigovernment and anti-Aliyev articles, comments, and statements online, often using violent or degrading language. A brief look at the profiles of these Twitter users showed some of them were students of the Baku State University, Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy, University of Languages, and Slavic University. Others were members of such progovernment youth movements as AGAT (Integration of Azerbaijani Youth to Europe) and the youth branch of the ruling party, Yeni Azerbaijan,” Freedom House notes in the report.
Additionally, the organization mentions a Facebook page called “Refuse being a volunteer at the European Games,” a new campaign drawing attention to the corruption behind the upcoming European Games, and exposing the ongoing crackdown. While it generated much attention, especially among university students who were forced to volunteer in return for grades and exam passes, it did not lead to significant protests. “It is likely they were afraid of losing their spots in school or feared repercussions from participating in such a protest action,” Freedom House notes.
According to the report, government surveillance and monitoring of social media accounts continues be an issue in Azerbaijan: many activists and opposition party members who are arrested or detained report that police have referenced their online communications during interrogations. Libel is the most common criminal charge used by the authorities against journalists in Azerbaijan. Online activists and journalists are most often prosecuted based on trumped up charges, including drug possession, hooliganism, and more recently, treason, tax evasion, abuse of authority and embezzlement. A number of website administrators and bloggers in Azerbaijan are in jail for their online activities. The government of Azerbaijan also uses travel bans against activists and human rights defenders, as well as members of non-governmental organizations.
“A number of opposition news websites continue to be subject to cyberattacks, resulting in temporary shutdowns. These include the news websites Yeni Musavat, Azadliq and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty local service, Azadliq Radiosu. The majority of attacks occurred during politically sensitive events, such as elections. As a result, opposition papers subject to attack have speculated that the cyberattacks were launched by the Ministry of Defense. The ministry, however, denies these allegations,” the report says.
Notably, Freedom House gave 28 scores to Armenia. According to the report, the internet penetration rate in Armenia has continued improving over the past few years, alongside improvements in the stability of the internet’s infrastructure. Citizen groups and NGOs have made use of online communication tools to promote and organize campaigns, particularly surrounding the protests in Yerevan against hikes in electricity prices in mid-2015.
In practice, the Armenian government and the telecommunication regulatory authority, the PSRC, do not interfere with or try to influence the planning of network topology. Operators plan and develop their networks without any coordination with either the government or the regulatory authority. Moreover, the regulatory authority requires service providers to indicate any technological restrictions in their public offers. Armenian internet users enjoy access to internet resources without limitation, including peer-to-peer networks, voice and instant messaging services, Freedom House highlights.
The group also points out that the Armenian government does not consistently or pervasively block users’ access to content online. The most common incidents of censorship of online content relate to blocking and filtering of platforms and websites by the Russian regulatory authority, which affects access to the same content for some internet users in Armenia, since Armenia receives its web traffic from Russia. However, these cases are promptly resolved by internet service providers once reported by users.
The Armenian government and the ruling political elite have not applied extralegal measures to prevent political opponents or independent internet resources from publishing online content. “Indeed, there is a wide diversity of opinion in social media, and virtual battles between supporters and opponents of the government are often observed. A variety of independent and opposition web resources provide Armenian internet audiences with politically neutral, or oppositional opinions,” the rights group points out.
No cases of imprisonment or other criminal sanctions or punishments for online activities were recorded over the past year; cases of violence or intimidation directed at online journalists, either. Anonymous communication and encryption tools are not prohibited in Armenia; however, the use of proxy servers is not that common due to the fact that since 2008, internet users have not faced problems with website blocking or traffic filtering, according to the report.
“Technical attacks against government websites and civil society groups continue, with most of the attacks originating from the ‘Anti-Armenia’ group based in Azerbaijan. In addition, Turkish hackers from the Turk Hack Team group claimed that they launched DDoS attacks against websites of the Armenian government, as well as Armenian business and media sites, causing disruptions on April 24, the Armenian Genocide commemoration day. However, there were no interruptions recorded by these entities,” Freedom House says.
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