Kurdistan Erdogan cash cowK
www.gagrule.net For last 10 years we have been exposing Erdogan fooling Iraqi Kurdistan leader Barzani and Kurdistan become Erdogan Cash cow but Barzani pretended Erdogan is brotherly friend now someone is telling the truth read bellow.
A convoy carrying heavy weapons belonging to Kurdish Peshmerga forces, crosses into Turkey from the Habur border crossing on Turkish-Kurdistani border in Sirnak province of Turkey, on October 29, 2014. The Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq then sent its forces to fight alongside the Kurdish groups against ISIS militants in the Syrian town of Kobane under a special arrangement with Turkey. Photo: Ahmet Bolat/AA
It is no secret that Turkey has been part of the regional punitive measures taken in cooperation with Iraq to bring the Kurdistan Region to its knees. It is also a fact that strong economic and security relations between Erbil and Ankara—At least from the Turkish point view—never meant the recognition of the Kurdistan Region. It was all profit-driven which gained Turkey tens of billions of dollars in trade exchange. Therefore, perhaps it is now time for the Kurdistan Region to get back at Turkey where it hurts—trade, though this requires the Peshmerga to keep a hold on Fish Khabur.
Turkey does not have land border with Iraq with whom it wants closer economic relations, especially after the defeat of ISIS and where an estimated $100 billion is going to be the cost of reconstruction. Turkey wants a big, if not the lion’s share, in contracts in these destroyed cities and trade with the rest of Iraq.
Turkey would not have any problem keeping Ibrahim Khalil as its main route into Iraq had Erbil and Baghdad enjoyed good relations. But with Baghdad determined to cross every red line including marching into undisputed KRG territories, Ankara now suggests that Iraq goes all the way to Fish Khabur and bypass the Kurdistan Region. This is where Iraqi and Kurdish oil is exported to the world market, and where the borders of Kurdistan Region, Turkey and Syria meet. This means there is also a Syrian Kurdish layer to this story.
With Ankara’s blessing Baghdad has now established an extra checkpoint between the Turkish and Kurdish sides of Ibrahim Khalil gate. It could, in theory, tax goods and services heading to the Kurdistan Region, and deprive Erbil of further revenues, and spike prices in KRG markets, too. But this also leaves Erbil with an advantage.
Knowing that Turkey wants a share of Iraq’s economy post ISIS, and given the fact that Erbil is in control of all border areas with Turkey, Erbil can introduce high tariffs on goods originating from Turkey and destined for Iraq-controlled areas, making it economically unviable. This will inflict billions of dollars of damage of Turkish trade with Iraq. While such a measure may prompt Iraq and Turkey to impose a blockade, it is unlikely as it will hurt Turkey—the exporter—even more because consumers in the Kurdistan Region have already lost much purchasing power due to an ongoing crisis. It will deny Turkey itself the Iraqi market where Turkish goods will be in demand.
All these, demand that the Kurdish Peshmerga are not going to cede control of any border area or territory along the Turkey border regardless of the cost militarily. It may cost the Kurdistan Region many lives, difficult times, and even kill any chance of peace with Baghdad, but in the end it is a price that should be paid. This is speaking the kind of language Turkey understands. The language of risks to its trade. The above scenario will deny Turkey the piece of the pie it hopes to win by siding—As a Sunni-majority country—with a Shiite-majority state.
Ankara will wait and see if the Iraqi military and the Hashd al-Shabai will be able to open a border with Turkey, or the Peshmerga will put the brakes on it all. Turkey will at the end of the day deal with whoever holds the key to that gate.