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Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah survives assassination attempt in Gaza

March 13, 2018 By administrator

Rami Hamdallah survives assassination

Rami Hamdallah survives assassination

The prime minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA) was scheduled to speak at a waste plant opening in Gaza when the incident ocurred. One PA leader has accused rival Hamas of responsibility.

Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah survived an apparent assassination attempt on Tuesday after a roadside bomb went off near his 20-vehicle convoy, shortly after entering the Gaza strip.

Hamdallah, who is a member of the internationally-backed Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, continued his trip into Gaza following the blast to give a speech at the opening ceremony of a waste treatment plant.

Nobody immediately claimed responsibility for the attack, which left three vehicles damaged and two bodyguards injured. Hamdallah immediately returned to the West Bank after delivering the speech.

Responsibility unclear

PA President Mahmud Abbas accused rival Palestinian group Hamas of responsibility. But his security chief, Majed Farraj, said it was too early to say whether the militant group had been involved.

Hamas itself condemned the attack and said it was investigating three suspects.

Gaza, which is separated from the West Bank by Israeli territory, has been controlled Hamas since the militant group ousted the PA in 2007.

Hamas’ troubles

Since then, Hamas has fought three wars with Israel and Gaza has suffered from a devastating Israeli and Egyptian blockade.

 

 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: assassination, Rami Hamdallah, survives

Michael Rubin, Americans in Turkey face possible assassination

January 30, 2018 By administrator

American diplomats and military personnel in Turkey are in increasing danger as Turkish officials incite violence that can quickly spin out of control. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)

American diplomats and military personnel in Turkey are in increasing danger as Turkish officials incite violence that can quickly spin out of control. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)

by Michael Rubin,

Assassinations of American diplomats are thankfully rare. So too are attacks on American troops in friendly host countries. However, that may all be about to change.

American diplomats and military personnel in Turkey are in increasing danger as Turkish officials incite violence that can quickly spin out of control.

Bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States have been in precipitous decline since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ascended to power. The Iraq War, of course, was deeply unpopular among Turks, although much of the anti-Americanism surrounding it was gratuitous and deliberate.

In July 2003, anti-Americanism in Turkey soared after members of the U.S. Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade intercepted a Turkish special operations unit in Iraqi Kurdistan, zip-tying and hooding the Turkish operatives until their identities could be established.

Turkey was in the wrong in that incident. The unit was aiming to assassinate local leaders to sow discord. Nor were they there legally. Indeed, after all the polemics, Turkish defense journalists say none of those involved were ever promoted. Then-Prime Minister Erdogan used the incident to whip up anti-Americanism. What could have been quietly resolved was instead leaked widely to the Turkish press for that purpose only.

The following years, Metal Storm took Turkey by storm. It’s a novel about an American invasion and attempted partition of Turkey. The Turkish heroes, however, counter by stealing an American nuclear bomb and destroying Washington, D.C. After American troops seize Istanbul, Turkish resistance bogs them down in urban combat. Russia and China rally around Turkey, and the United States is forced to retreat.

Nor was Metal Storm alone. In 2006, Turkish directors Serdar Akar and Sadullah Senturk released “Valley of the Wolves: Iraq,” a fictionalized film about a Turkish commando unit tracking down the American commander responsible for “the Hood event.” The film, which starred Gary Busey, included a subplot embracing Jewish blood libel. Senior members of Erdogan’s political party financed the film, and Erdogan’s wife endorsed it.

Erdogan has long found anti-Americanism a useful tool: It is far easier for him to blame his failings on some external plot than either acknowledge failure or confess to corruption. But he has used two recent events to take anti-Americanism to a new level.

The first was the abortive “coup” of July 2016. While evidence points to the coup being more of a Reichstag Fire-type plot than a serious plot, Erdogan blames former ally Fethullah Gulen (a Pennsylvania-based theologian) and has demanded his extradition. Gulen is no angel, but none of the evidence provided by Turkey shows direct links between Gulen and the events of that evening. Thus, the American judiciary has refused to send Gulen back to Turkey, much to Erdogan’s annoyance. He has taken the refusal of the U.S. courts to abide by his demands as evidence of U.S. complicity.

Second, he has accused the United States of sponsoring terrorism because it has partnered with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia with close ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a group which has waged an insurgency inside Turkey since 1984. Here, Erdogan has a right to be angry.

The PKK is designated by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist group (although that designation had much to do with diplomatic nicety at a time Turkey was an ally). But then again, he and his supporters should ask why the Pentagon, after decades of working with Turkey and assisting its counterterror operations, decided to work on an albeit limited basis with the YPG. Here, the fault is Turkey’s. The overarching American regional goal between 2015 and 2017 was to defeat the Islamic State. Yet, rather than work with the Americans to do so, Erdogan worked against the United States. He allowed the Islamic State free transit across Turkey’s territory and held the Pentagon’s use of the Incirlik Air Base hostage at key times. It was against this backdrop that the United States began its partnership with the YPG as a last resort.

The Turkish military, long partners of the United States, has also made a deliberate decision to fan anti-Americanism and, more broadly, anti-NATO sentiment. The three most influential figures for the Turkish military are Dogu Perincek, Adnan Tanriverdi, and Hulusi Akar.

Perincek is a former Maoist turned staunch Turkish nationalist who sees Turkey’s future with Russia and seeks an exit from NATO. He is perhaps the most influential figure among top Turkish brass today.

Meanwhile, Erdogan has hired Tanriverdi, a former brigadier general fired in 1997 for his links to Islamists, to be his military counselor. Tanriverdi has worked assiduously to transform SADAT, his Islamist private security company, into a Turkish equivalent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Iran. On the evening of the 2016 coup, for example, witnesses suggest it was SADAT, and not Gulenists or low-level soldiers, responsible for many of the civilian deaths.

Akar, for his part, has subordinated the principles to which he once swore for personal ambition. He is a weak, indecisive figure who seeks not to lead but only to ingratiate himself to Erdogan.

Perincek and Tanriverdi especially spin wild conspiracy theories about plots hatched by U.S. and NATO forces at Incirlik as well as NATO plots against Turkey. Perincek’s newspaper, for example, last week called for the arrest of American personnel in Turkey’s NATO facilities.

Others, sensing Erdogan’s desires, pile on. Egemen Bagis, a former minister and top Erdogan advisor, for example, has declared that Turkey is fighting American forces, and not just the YPG, in Afrin.

For Turks who only receive their news from Turkish outlets controlled by Erdogan, this makes Americans in Incirlik or walking down the street in Istanbul legitimate targets.

Incitement matters. When U.S. Navy ships have docked in Turkey for port calls, Turkish nationalists have attacked U.S. sailors. Russia’s experience in Turkey also illustrates: In December 2016, against a steady drumbeat of incitement against Russia at the time, a young Turk raised on Turkish propaganda shot the Russian ambassador several times in the back, killing him (Erdogan calls the Turkish suspect a Gulenist, but this is a common tactic to eschew responsibility and there is no credible evidence to support Erdogan’s charge).

At present, the United States does not have an ambassador in Turkey, relying instead on a charge d’affaires. Frankly, it would be unsafe to send a new ambassador. U.S. ambassadors must often rely not only on their own immediate security details but also on host country security. On this issue, Turkey can no longer be trusted. Nor are Ankara or Istanbul safe for American personnel.

If Erdogan or Perincek ordered a mob into Incirlik, Turkish forces would stand down and the base would be overrun. To be assigned to Turkey as an American diplomat or military officer is increasingly as dangerous as being asked to reside in Libya.

Simply put, if President Trump doesn’t want his own Benghazi to tar his legacy, it may be time to scale back the diplomatic presence and transfer U.S. forces out of Turkey and into Jordan, Romania, and other regional countries.

Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.

Filed Under: News Tagged With: Americans, assassination, possible, Turkey

PKK releases Turkish agents’ ‘confessions’ about Paris murders of three female members

January 11, 2018 By administrator

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – The murders of three female members of the PKK in Paris five years ago were planned by Turkey’s intelligence service and would have received “high ranking” approval, according to statements attributed to two Turkish agents being held by the PKK in the Kurdistan Region.

Sakine Cansiz, Fidan Dogan, and Leyla Soylemez were killed in Paris in January 2013. The PKK has accused Turkey of being behind their deaths.

The only suspect, a Turkish citizen named Omer Guney, died in custody in December 2016, just a month before going to trial. He had denied involvement in the killings.

On Wednesday, the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), the PKK umbrella body, released statements from two Turkish intelligence (MIT) agents in their custody saying that the murders were committed by the MIT and received high level approval.

Approval would have to come from the director of the agency, captured MIT agent Erhan Pekcetin said, according to a statement published by ANF, a PKK-linked media outlet.

“I don’t think that he will decide himself, he will ask the president. Because these actions can create international problems,” he said, noting that peace talks between Ankara and the PKK were ongoing at the time of the murders.

Pekcetin also stated that Guney was involved.

Pekcetin and Aydin Gunel, “senior officials” from MIT were seized by the PKK in the Kurdistan Region last summer. The PKK released their photographs and details last week.

Thousands of Kurds held a march in Paris on Saturday demanding “truth and justice” for the deaths of the three women. Some also changed slogans against Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who had met French President Emmanuel Macron in the city the day before.

Source: http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/10012018

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: assassination, MIT, PKK, Turkish

Who instigated the Killing of Russian Ambassador Erdogan or Gulen if not then who?

December 21, 2016 By administrator

The Russian ambassador was killed because the Turks have been willingly Islamized over the past several years. He was killed because the dominant state ideology produces a “minister” who said that,

“We are all candidates to be martyrs.

I hope I become a martyr.

I hope you all become martyrs, too.”

It was not a coincidence that the police officer who shot the Russian ambassador dead also wanted to become a martyr.

Who alienated and insulted the Sunni police officer who killed the Russian ambassador? Wrong diagnosis, again. A survey earlier this year found that 13.6 percent of Turks (nearly 11 million) do NOT view ISIL as a terrorist group; and 22 percent (nearly 18 million) do NOT view it as a threat to Turkey (unsurprisingly, the percentages are higher among those who vote for the ruling Justice and Development Party).

The Russian ambassador was killed because of a 14-century-old schism not even sparked by a theological dispute although that, too, came into the picture later, along with various political deliberations of different times. This is a feud started by rival clans in the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe, the Quraysh, and has survived so violently beyond their imagination.

Source: words from BURAK BEKDİL Article http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/uh-oh-we-are-so-awfully-shocked–again.aspx?pageID=449&nID=107545&NewsCatID=398

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Ambassador, assassination, Russian, Turkey

Turkey: Five more gendarmerie officers arrested in Dink probe

August 11, 2016 By administrator

dink-probFive former gendarmerie intelligence officers have been arrested while there others were freed on probation as part of the probe into the 2007 assassination of Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, the Hurriyet Daily News reports.

The arrested suspects, all of whom were on duty in the northern province of Trabzon at the time of Dink’s murder, are also facing charges of attempting to abolish the constitutional order and membership of an armed terrorist organization, as the Istanbul Peace Court stated Volkan Şahin, Şeref Ateş, Okan Şimşek, Hüseyin Yılmaz and Gazi Günay had contact with the prime suspect in Dink’s killing and some had been spotted around Dink’s home and office some four months before the incident, despite the fact none of them had any documents showing they had been assigned to a post in the area.

In its arrest decision, the court also said that the suspects, along with others, acted with common ideas and despite knowing that the crime was going to be committed, acted to serve the murder in line with the aims of the organization which was to seize the duties and cadres of the Istanbul Police Department’s Intelligence Chief Bureau.

The arrests brought the number of gendarmerie officers arrested as part of the probe to nine. Previously, Specialized Sgt. Abdullah Dinç, former Specialized Gendarme Yusuf Bozca, former Trabzon Gendarmerie Intelligence Chief Bureau Officer Ergün Yorulmaz and former Sgt. Emre Cingöz had been arrested.

With the recent arrests of gendarmerie and security officers in the probe, prosecutors also brought charges against the suspects related to the Fethullahist Terror Organization (FETÖ), as the prosecutor of the probe, Gökalp Kürkçü, said in one of his arrest demand letters that it would be “far from a legal definition” to identify the acts of the suspects as only membership or leadership of an armed terrorist organization and participation in deliberate murder at the point reached in the wake of the failed July 15 coup attempt, and that the Dink murder was the “first bullet fired” in the process which led to this attempt.

Dink, 52, was shot dead with two bullets to the head in broad daylight outside the offices of Agos in central Istanbul on Jan. 19, 2007.

Ogün Samast, then a 17-year-old jobless high-school dropout, confessed to the murder and was sentenced to almost 23 years in jail in 2011.

But the case grew into a wider scandal after it emerged that security forces had been aware of a plot to kill Dink but failed to act.

Relatives and followers of the case have long claimed government officials, police, military personnel and members of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) played a role in Dink’s murder by neglecting their duty to protect the journalist.

Turkey’s top court in July 2014 ruled that the investigation into the killing had been flawed, paving the way for the trial of police officials.

Filed Under: Articles, Genocide Tagged With: assassination, dink, prob, Turkey

Turkey: Nine years on: No solid steps taken in Hrant Dink assassination

January 19, 2016 By administrator

AA Photo

AA Photo

İsmail Saymaz – ISTANBUL,

No solid legal steps have been taken in the nine years since Armenian-origin journalistHrant Dink was assassinated outside his office in Istanbul on Jan. 19, 2007, as thousands of people gathered to commemorate the late Agos editor-in-chief on the anniversary of his death.

The large crowd filed past the military museum in the Şişli district at around 1:30 p.m. on Jan. 19 to walk toward the Agos office building to read a statement at the site where Dink was shot dead by triggerman Ogün Samast nine years ago.

Accompanied by water cannons and armored vehicles, police took intense security measures along the route of the march as well as around the office of weekly Agos in Şişli’s Osmanbey neighborhood.

A poster reading “we are here Ahparig, with longing, anger and determination!” was placed on the outer walls of the office building. “Ahparig” means “my brother” in Armenian.

In legal terms, only one lawsuit has been filed into Dink’s assassination, while an ongoing investigation was launched separately against 26 public officials into negligence at the time of the killing. None of the 26 probed officials, including former and current police chiefs, have yet been tried.

Relatives and followers of the case have claimed government officials, police, military personnel and members of Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency (MİT) played a role in Dink’s murder by neglecting their duty to protect the journalist.

When Dink was murdered, the 26 officials were on duty in police departments in Istanbul, Ankara and the Black Sea province of Trabzon, from which Samast came to Istanbul before shooting the prominent journalist in the head nine years ago. Samast was sentenced to 22 years and 10 months in prison after being tried in a juvenile court as he was 17 at the time of the shooting death of Dink.

Samast’s killing of Dink was incited by Yasin Hayal, who in 2004 carried out a bomb attack with collaborator Erhan Tuncel targeting a McDonalds restaurant in Trabzon on the grounds that it was selling food during the Islam-holy month of Ramadan.

Hayal, who like Tuncel is a former member of a far-right political party and a right-wing nationalist youth group, was sentenced to life in prison for inciting Dink’s murder. Tuncel had been appointed as an Assistant Intelligence Officer at the Trabzon Police Department and informed police a year before Dink’s murder that Hayal had been planning to murder him. This information was then conveyed to the three police departments in Istanbul.

The investigation launched into the negligence of public officials at the time of Dink’s murder is still ongoing, with 26 current and former police officers stated as suspects in the indictment. The indictment prepared by Gökalp Kökçü, an Istanbul prosecutor who has also been in charge of terrorism-related investigations, was approved by the Istanbul 14th Court for Serious Crimes after it was presented on Dec. 9, 2015.

However, Kökçü was appointed to a department dealing with non-terrorism-related criminal activities as part of his job rotation system within the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, meaning that he was not able to head the investigation into the negligence of public officials in Dink’s murder.

The Istanbul Chief Prosecutor’s Office had returned the indictment to Kökçü in early November last year, arguing that “evidence that some of the suspects committed ‘deliberate murder’ could not be proven.”

Lawyers representing the Dink family reacted against the indictment returned to Kökçü, which meant that cases will likely not be opened against the suspects.

Hakan Bakırcıoğlu, a Dink family lawyer, said on Nov. 4 last year that not opening a case against former police chiefs Ahmet İlhan Güler, Celalettin Cerrah, Reşat Altay, Engin Dinç and other suspects, would exclude their integral responsibility in Dink’s murder.

Recalling the first two versions of the indictment, the latest one drafted in late October last year, Bakırcıoğlu said the two indictments charged former police chiefs Ali Fuat Yılmazer, Ramazan Akyürek, Tamer Bülent Demirel and Osman Gülbel each with “deliberate murder,” Engin Dinç, Reşat Altay and Ahmet İlhan Güler each with “deliberate murder with negligence,” and Sabri Uzun and Celalettin Cerrah each with “malpractice on public duty.”

“Despite resistance and barriers in front of the interrogation and investigation of public servants who took part in Dink’s murder, they were interrogated and investigated by the prosecutor [in charge of the case],” Bakırcıoğlu said.

January/19/2016

Filed Under: Genocide, News Tagged With: assassination, Hrant dink, İstanbul

Turkey: Police chief: Intelligence for Hrant Dink’s assassination was sent to İstanbul police

September 14, 2015 By administrator

urkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was shot dead by an ultranationalist teenager outside his office in İstanbul on Jan. 19, 2007. (Photo: Today's Zaman)

Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was shot dead by an ultranationalist teenager outside his office in İstanbul on Jan. 19, 2007. (Photo: Today’s Zaman)

Engin Dinç, the head of the National Police Department’s Intelligence Unit who led the Trabzon Intelligence Unit at the time of the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, said in recent testimony to the İstanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office that the intelligence on Dink’s murder was passed to the İstanbul Police Department in February 2006.

Today’s Zaman learned that Dinç, who is a key suspect in the murder trial of Dink, gave his testimony before the İstanbul Public Prosecutor’s Office secretly and revealed that they received the intelligence for a probable assassination of Dink in Trabzon, which was sent to the İstanbul police in a letter numbered 027248 on Feb. 17, 2006. “I also phoned the chief of the Intelligence Unit of the İstanbul Police Department about the intelligence,” Dinç said in his testimony.

However, former İstanbul Police Chief Celalettin Cerrah and former İstanbul Police Department Intelligence Unit Chief Ahmet İlhan Güler stated in their testimonies before the court during the trial in December 2014 that they had not received any intelligence about Dink’s assassination before the murder in 2007.

Three police officers — Ercan Demir, Özkan Mumcu and Muhittin Zenit — who worked under Dinç in the Intelligence Unit of the Trabzon Police Department were arrested in January as part of an expanded probe into Dink’s murder. All three police officers had said in their testimonies that Dinç was the highest authority at the Trabzon Police Department’s Intelligence Unit, adding that the intelligence reports about Dink had been prepared by Dinç.

Former Trabzon Police Chief Reşat Altay, summoned by Prosecutor Yusuf Hakkı Doğan to testify in Dink’s murder trial in December 2014, named Dinç during his testimony. According to media reports, Altay said Dinç had never presented intelligence reports which warned that a possible attack would target Dink, before the reports were sent to the National Police Department. Altay reportedly said, “Apart from the reports, I also do not remember Dinç ever briefing me with any intelligence that Yasin Hayal was preparing to attack Dink.”

Despite a collection of testimonies pointing the finger at Dinç and requests from the lawyers of the family of murdered journalist Dink, the prosecutor conducting the ongoing murder probe decided not to summon Dinç to testify. He was also promoted and has been the chief of the National Police Department’s Intelligence Unit since April 2013.

Dink was shot and killed by an ultranationalist teenager in 2007. The hitman, Ogün Samast, and 18 others were brought to trial. Since then, the lawyers for the Dink family and the co-plaintiffs in the case have presented evidence indicating that Samast did not act alone. Another suspect, Yasin Hayal, was given life in prison for inciting Samast to commit murder.

The retrial started in September 2014, when the İstanbul 5th High Criminal Court complied with a ruling from the Supreme Court of Appeals in May 2013 overturning a lower court’s ruling that acquitted the suspects in the Dink murder case of charges of forming a terrorist organization. This decision paved the way for the trial of public officials on charges of voluntary manslaughter.

Referring to Erhan Tuncel, an informant and a key suspect who is accused of initiating efforts to have Dink murdered, Dinç said he met Tuncel in his office in Trabzon and asked him to convince Hayal to give up the idea of the assassination.

Separate investigations related to Dink’s murder, including investigations in İstanbul and Trabzon, had previously not been merged in spite of the demands of the Dink family’s lawyers. The investigations were finally combined toward the end of last year.

As part of the same investigation, two former heads of the National Police Department’s Intelligence Unit — Sabri Uzun and Ramazan Akyürek — and a former police chief, Ali Fuat Yılmazer, have testified as suspects.

Filed Under: Articles, Genocide Tagged With: assassination, Hrant dink, Turkey

Iraqi defense minister escapes assassination attempt

September 7, 2015 By administrator

Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi (C) delivers a speech during a press conference in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on September 6, 2015. (© AFP)

Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi (C) delivers a speech during a press conference in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, on September 6, 2015. (© AFP)

The Iraqi defense minister has escaped an assassination attempt in the country’s embattled northern province of Salahuddin, where unidentified militants opened fire on his convoy.

A source in the Iraqi Defense Ministry, requesting not to be named, told Arabic-language al-Sumaria satellite television network that Khalid al-Obeidi was on a visit to the Tal Abu Jarad area, which lies north of the provincial capital city of Tikrit, on Monday, when a sniper opened fire.

The source added one of Obeidi’s guards was wounded in the assault, but the minister himself was unharmed.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attacks. However, Iraqi officials usually blame such assaults on Daesh Takfiri terrorists.

Obeidi was touring the area to watch over military operations in the oil-rich city of Baiji, located some 210 kilometers (130 miles) north of the capital, Baghdad.

Daesh kidnaps over 100 Iraqi children

Meanwhile, members of the Daesh Takfiri militant group have abducted more than 100 children from various districts of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul.

The spokesman for the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Mosul, Saeed Mamouzini, said Daesh extremists have kidnapped 127 minors, aged between 11 and 15, over the past few days in the city, located some 400 kilometers (248 miles) north of Baghdad.

He added that the Takfiris have shifted the abductees to their training camps on the outskirts of Mosul, where they are being forced to undergo training to carry out acts of terror.

Separately, Daesh militants abducted 35 civilians in al-Khan village, located on the outskirts of Hawijah city, on Monday, alleging that they had burnt the terrorists’ black flag and called on Daesh elements to leave the area.

The terrorists later moved the abductees to an unknown location, and there is no information about their fate and whereabouts.

Gruesome violence has plagued the northern and western parts of Iraq ever since the Daesh Takfiris launched an offensive in June 2014, and took control of portions of Iraqi territory.

The militants have been committing vicious crimes against all ethnic and religious communities in Iraq, including Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and others.

Units of army soldiers and volunteer fighters are seeking to win back militant-held regions in joint operations.

Source: presstv.com

Filed Under: News Tagged With: assassination, Defense Minister, escape, Iraqi

Operation Nemesis The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide Book

June 3, 2015 By administrator

4c62efa0c758e89af1884ec6e3907ccbBy Eric Bogosian (Hardcover Book, 2015)

Book review by Lucine Kasbarian

Seven years after starting his research about one of the most dramatic episodes of 20th century Armenian history, actor, playwright, and novelist Eric Bogosian has written Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide (Little, Brown & Co.; April 21, 2015).

Much was expected of this widely publicized book whose author is fairly well-known to the American public.  Many Armenians hoped that the work would bring into focus the fact that a group of Armenian patriots executed Turkish leaders who had escaped court-ordered death sentences for planning and carrying out the Armenian Genocide.

However, while serious students of the Armenian Genocide may be merely disappointed in this book, others could be misled.

Bogosian’s account of Operation Nemesis—the post-WWI Armenian execution of Talaat and other Turkish genocidists—does not start until one-third of the way into this 300-page book. Readers first learn about the events that led up to the Genocide. Much later in the book, the author provides information irrelevant to Nemesis.  Even if this was ostensibly done to provide context, the title Operation Nemesis: The Assassination Plot that Avenged the Armenian Genocide is misleading because it gives the impression that the book is solely about Operation Nemesis.  

Moreover, “Assassination Plot” implies a sinister or unjust political motive, which is definitely not the case for the Armenians of Nemesis. Call me fastidious, but a more appropriate title for these events would be Operation Nemesis: The Secret Plan to Execute the Guilty Perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide.

His bibliography indicates that an incredible amount of research material was at Bogosian’s disposal to produce this book. But the selectivity he exercised in the use of that material is apparent. Bogosian’s choice of words, phrasing, style, tone, and reasoning—as well as certain insertions and omissions of information—will often bewilder and disorient knowledgeable readers as well as those new to this history.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the result obfuscates the significance of the Nemesis operation and the gravity and persistent dangers of Turkish ultra-nationalism.  One winces reading many of the author’s passages. In our opinion, this book disingenuously brings the Turkish reputation up a few notches while subtly bringing that of Armenians down at least that many. Having read both the pre-publication and published editions, we have noticed that a few of the more egregious passages have been modified or removed in the published edition.

Perhaps Bogosian is following today’s so-called ‘conflict resolution’ paradigm.  That is, in exchange for Turkish acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide, the victim group must sacrifice truthful aspects surrounding this crime against humanity and concede that the Ottoman Turkish Empire simply found itself under siege in WWI, had an anxiety attack, and, unfortunately, struck out against ‘rebellious’ Armenians.

Following are some passages from the book and our comments.

  • P. 17: “At their peak, the Ottomans displayed a culture and scientific sophistication equal to the greatest pre-modern civilizations.”

To the extent that this may, in part, be true, can Bogosian prove that this was the doing of the Ottoman Turks themselves rather than that of the empire’s subject peoples?

  • P. 18: “Aside from their respective religious faiths, the two peoples [Turks and Armenians] are in many ways congruent in their culture and style.”

Most Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, as well as visitors to the Ottoman Empire during the periods Bogosian writes about, would disagree.

  • P. 30: “A slave girl from the most remote corner of the empire could become mother to a sultan.”

True, but the phrasing implies that a girl’s captivity in the imperial harem was somehow an honor. Turks abducted or captured thousands of non-Muslim women to live as the sultans’ harem sex slaves and servants. Only five pages later does the author say that harem women were sometimes executed or drowned when no longer deemed useful.

  • P. 31: Bogosian takes a page to describe Europeans’ allegedly erroneous view of Ottoman Turkey (“an impressive civilization”) as being composed of “outlaws who abducted women into their harems, castrated young boys, or enslaved the crews of captured ships.”  Europeans, writes Bogosian, also had “lush fantasies” about harems “filled with naked slave girls and fierce eunuchs.”

Could it be that Europeans had a more accurate view of the Ottoman Turks than does Bogosian?

  • P. 33: “Religious minorities were tolerated under what was called the millet [community] system, in contrast to the violent suppression of ‘heretics’ common in Europe.”

This is very much a generalization. Was the Ottomans’ forced Islamization of many Christians “tolerant”?

  • P. 34: Turks seized Christian boys to become Ottoman soldiers—Janissaries (literally ‘new troops’): “The most attractive teenagers were collected under the process of devshirme [systematic collection], often with the consent of their families, because to be invited into the sultanic milieu was a great honor and opportunity.”

However, in those many cases where families did not consent, did these boys and their families really consider it a “great honor and opportunity” to be forcibly converted to Islam and never see their families again?

  • P. 54: Bogosian has apparently bought into some pro-Turkish historians’ contempt for ‘nationalism’: “The Serbs, the Greeks, the Arabs, and the Armenians also began to think of themselves as ‘nations’” and some successfully broke away from the Ottoman Empire. But for Armenians “nationalism would have tragic consequences.”  

It was Turkish ultra-nationalism, however, rather than Armenian nationalism that brought about the Armenian Genocide. Armenians mainly desired to not be oppressed and massacred. Moreover, are people forever condemned to live in multi-national empires ruled by Turks and others? For example, should the various peoples of North America, South America, and Africa still be ruled by European empires?

  • P. 59: “With the assault on the Bank Ottoman [1896] and now the attempts on [Sultan] Abdul Hamid’s life [1905], the Tashnags [Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or ARF] were establishing themselves as a truly dangerous terrorist organization.”

While the use of the word “terrorist” (also see p. 50) may be appropriate in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and while the ARF at the time used it, in 21st century America it implies something deliberately sinister and inhumane and misleads readers early on. Only in a footnote (#6) buried on p. 318 does Bogosian concede that the ARF did not generally target “innocent civilians.”

  • P. 62: “A series of attacks against Armenians erupted in the vilayet of Adana in 1909, leaving some twenty to thirty thousand dead.” 

True. But these significant massacres are mentioned in only four or so other sentences in the entire book. Had Turkish massacres of subject nationalities become so commonplace that they came to appear normal to Bogosian? Would the author have devoted more pages to these massacres had Armenians been the perpetrators and Turks the victims?

  • P. 68: “And it was under the cloak of this war between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies that the Armenian Genocide proceeded with little detection.”

This is a strange assertion that an editor should have caught.  In May 1915, as Bogosian knows (he mentions it in footnote #34, chapter 3), Allied governments warned Turkey that they will “hold personally responsible for these crimes all members of the Ottoman government, as well as their agents who are implicated in such massacres.” There were also hundreds of contemporary worldwide newspaper reports of the Genocide in 1915 and later.

  • P. 71: “The Central Committee of the CUP [Committee of Union and Progress, also known as the “Young Turk” party] quickly came to believe that the Armenian population represented a mortal threat to the dying Ottoman Empire.”

If the empire was “dying” anyway, how could Armenians—particularly women and children—represent a “mortal threat”? And why omit that scholars have found considerable evidence that the Genocide was pre-meditated, not something decided, as Bogosian puts it, “quickly”?

  • P. 97: Before the Genocide, Armenian “revolutionaries, hard to distinguish from the bandits who roamed the countryside [of eastern Ottoman Turkey] with impunity, made it their life’s work to pester the local authorities.”

Bogosian’s wording is confounding. Since when is fighting back against a government that was massacring Armenians “pestering”?

  • P. 107: During the Genocide, “Muslim fighters were well aware of acts of atrocity that the Russian army had committed against their [Muslim] Bulgarian brethren during the Balkan wars only a few years before.

Even if true, this could not justify killing Armenians. The average reader might also conclude that were it not for the Balkan wars Turks would not have massacred Armenians. Yet Turkey had massacred Armenians in the 1890s and 1909, years before the Balkan wars of 1912-13.

  • P.108: In May 1915, the Armenians of Van, “certain they were about to be attacked by the Ottoman army … fortified their city and prepared for battle. These preparations incited the [Turkish] military to attack.”

Armenians “incited” Turks? It was the other way around: the Turkish massacres incited the Armenians of Van to defend themselves.

  • P. 110:  “In the early days” of the Genocide, forced Armenian conversion to Islam “meant real salvation—literally, a means of saving one’s neck.”

We doubt it was that simple. Did Bogosian mean to editorialize that it was preferable to convert than to die for remaining loyal to one’s chosen beliefs?  Moreover, Bogosian does not immediately make it clear that for females ‘conversion’ was often just another word for abduction and rape. Armenian women—some already widowed from the massacres—and girls were subsequently forced to bear the children of their Turkish captors.

  • P. 126: After the Allies won WWI, they “memorialized their thousands of fallen brethren by stomping on Turkish pride.” What is Bogosian’s evidence for the alleged “stomping”? French Marshal Louis Franchet d’Espèrey entered Constantinople “riding a white horse, a symbolic gesture of victory harking back to the Crusades … greeted by cheering crowds of Armenians and Greeks” and occupied the palace of genocidist Enver Pasha; Allied ships anchored in the harbor; and the city was “crowded with thousands of foreign troops.”

Should the Allies, instead, have handed out pakhlava to the “proud” Turks, provided them grief counseling, and told them that they really didn’t lose WWI?

  • P. 128: Apparently referring to the pre-WWI period, Bogosian writes, “The Armenians themselves did not constitute a majority in most of the territory considered a potential territory for them.”

Of course, it really depends on the particular regions being considered and is, therefore, a somewhat misleading demographic generalization. Bogosian also fails to note the massive toll that many pre-Genocide massacres, forced Islamizations, abductions, deportations, and the deliberate Turkish importation of non-native peoples had taken on the Armenian population. Moreover, in some locations Turks were in the minority while Armenians combined with non-Turks constituted the majority.  And what about the Greeks and Assyrians in those regions?

  • P. 131: “As the war was winding down, [British] Prime Minister Lloyd George, a great champion of the Greek nation, encouraged the former Ottoman possession, which had been independent from Turkey since the early nineteenth century, to invade the Turkish lands along the coast in an attempt to ‘reclaim’ its ancient littoral. To the Greeks, this made sense, because there still existed large Greek populations in the city of Smyrna, in villages along the coast, and in the Aegean islands. This ill-considered move would result in the tragic destruction of the city of Smyrna in a devastating fire.”

Occupied and dispossessed peoples such as Greeks are called invaders, victims are to blame, and the Turkish destruction of Smyrna is excused.  Bogosian does not mention the expulsion of Greeks—natives for 3,000 years in the Pontus region—along the Black Sea and the fact that Turkey persecuted, deported, and murdered its Greek citizens during WWI.  Did not Greece have any right to protect the remaining Greeks in Turkey, or were they all to be left to the bloody whims of Kemal Ataturk? Bogosian (p. 250) accuses the Greeks, after Greece’s army landed in Turkey in 1919, of “atrocities against Turkish citizens.” “The Greek invasion was a crime against their [Turkish] humanity.” Again, Bogosian fails to mention that this “invasion” came only after an earlier, years-long genocidal campaign by the Young Turks against Greeks during WWI.  Do only the Turks have the right to, as Bogosian calls it, “invade”?

  • P. 131: In Constantinople in 1919, says Bogosian, “the war crimes trials” of Turks accused of the destruction of Armenians “added insult to the injury of defeat.”

We are sorry that Turks considered it an “insult” that their esteemed leaders were being tried and found guilty for war crimes against Armenians.  As for “injuries,” Armenians had been injured far more than Turks. Is the world expected to reward the bad behavior of mass-murderers?

  • P. 139: Regarding the post-war Treaty of Sèvres (1920) signed by the Allies and Armenia: “Had such a plan gone into effect, there would have been little left of the Ottoman Empire but a fraction of its former self.”

True. Aggressive empires that lose a major war inevitably forfeit territory. Should it be otherwise? Let’s recall that Turkey tried to destroy the Republic of Armenia during and after WWI. Kemal Ataturk ordered his generals to “destroy Armenia politically and physically.” Bogosian (p. 262) says that Sevres “conceded territory to the Armenians and distributed the rest of Anatolia to Greeks and Kurds.” Not quite true. The treaty actually left Turks considerable territory in central Asia Minor.  Had the Turks won the war, they would not have been so generous to their enemies. When all was said and done, Turkey got 100% of Asia Minor, including the Armenian Plateau, while Armenians, Assyrians, Greeks, and Kurds got nothing whatsoever.

  • P. 150: Bogosian says that Soghomon Tehlirian, Talaat Pasha’s assassin and Nemesis member, followed “in the footsteps of the first assassins” when he killed Talaat in Berlin in 1921.  The word assassin, explains Bogosian, refers to the followers of Hassan-i Sabbah, an 11th century Muslim “extortionist” who “vengefully sent out followers to murder his enemies.” Bogosian also harkens back to the Turkish sultans who assassinated their brothers to gain the Ottoman throne.

This may be interesting history, but Tehlirian followed in no such historical “footsteps,” was not an extortionist, and aspired to no throne. He and other members of Nemesis carried out entirely justified executions. Talaat and others had already been sentenced to death in absentia by post-war Turkish tribunals. After his acquittal by a German jury, Tehlirian married and lived a modest, unassuming life in San Francisco.

  • P. 155: Bogosian compares the ARF to the CUP. Each had “no compunctions about deploying violence” and “a shared code of violence.”

Whatever one thinks of the ARF, it is clearly inaccurate to compare a political party whose goal was to defend Armenians against oppression and massacre to one that tried to expand an oppressive empire via genocides.

  • P. 281: Bogosian lauds mass-murderer Kemal Ataturk. The latter was “ruggedly handsome,” “one of the most quoted men in history,” (p. 277) “a born leader of rare genius,” (p. 134), and “a resilient and an able foe” (p. 178) who had “tremendous vitality and charisma” (p. 283).  

It is unusual for a truly informed writer to praise Ataturk, though Bogosian sometimes (p. 282-283) describes him in less flattering terms. That Ataturk annihilated Armenians who had survived the Genocide is largely passed over. That he inducted many Young Turk genocidists into his new government is given one sentence (p. 301).

  • P. 290: “Within each community [of the Armenian diaspora] were thousands of survivors who had mixed feelings about Tashnags [ARF]. Some sided with the ARF, believing that in the years leading up to and including World War I, the only appropriate Armenian response to Turkish violence was strong revolutionary, often violent action. Others (and among these I would include my own grandparents) felt that the politically activist Armenians were troublemakers who willingly courted violence.” Note: The book’s pre-publication version had ended that sentence with “and had possibly triggered the Armenian Genocide.” 

The oppression and massacre of Armenians by Turks spawned Armenian revolutionaries rather than the other way around. Moreover, in hopes that Turkey would reform, the ARF largely cooperated with the CUP/Young Turks before and after the 1908 Young Turk revolution. Those who blame Armenian revolutionaries must ask themselves why Turks also committed genocide against Christian Assyrians and Greeks, who had not formed such revolutionary groups. Continuing in this vein (p. 305), Bogosian writes: “The Armenian Genocide is part of that [the Ottoman Empire’s] history, but so is the story of Armenian revolutionary groups and their actions.” Is Bogosian following in his grandparents’ footsteps by giving credence to the false idea that the ARF brought the Genocide upon the Armenian people? 

  • P. 301: Bogosian questions the legality of the executions committed by the Armenians of Operation Nemesis: “Though the perpetrators [of the Armenian Genocide] were convicted by a court of law in Constantinople, those convictions were later thrown out by the new Ankara government.” 

To which we must ask, since Bogosian does not: Did the new “Ankara government” of Kemal Ataturk have the legal right to do so? Bogosian (p. 302) concedes that the “men and women of Operation Nemesis did what governments could not. They were appealing to a higher, final justice.”  Fine, but Bogosian’s questioning the legality of the Nemesis executions is rather breathtaking considering the millions of crimes committed by thousands of individual Turks against Armenians that went, and have gone, completely unpunished to this day, and for which Bogosian seems to want, at best, a mere acknowledgment.

  • P. 302-303: Bogosian spends two pages meandering, equivocating, and asking himself if and why the Genocide may be important today. “Memory lies at the center of the Nemesis story. It is the engine of an intense bloodlust. We remember, but we remember differently. Our respective narratives lead to different actions. Thus the conundrum of history” and so on.   

Does Nemesis really inspire “bloodlust” in Armenians?  Or do Armenians simply seek justice for the Genocide and its concomitant dispossession of culture and homeland?  Bogosian fails to mention a major reason why the Genocide is important today: Turkey’s pan-Turkic ambitions in Azerbaijan and Central Asia—now supported by the power of the US, Europe, and NATO—remain a threat to Armenia.  An unrepentant, snarling, and self-admitted neo-Ottomanist Turkey is an obvious danger, but there is no indication that Bogosian understands this or wishes to let readers know this.

  1. 305: Bogosian rarely gives much credit to the Nemesis group or to Armenians.

Only in the Postscript’s final sentence does Bogosian bother to describe the Nemesis participants as “this brave group of men possessed of remarkable will and courage.” This is too little, too late. 

  1. 339: The large bibliography, some 450 references, includes many excellent books on the Genocide but also many Genocide denial books by authors such as Kamuran Gurun, Bernard Lewis, Guenter Lewy, Justin McCarthy, Hugh Pope, and Stanford Shaw.

We hope that they have not filled Bogosian’s head with falsehoods. Is he trying to hit a “happy medium” between the facts of the Genocide and its denial?  

After reading Bogosian’s book, one comes away thinking that the literary, educational, and political establishments of the West would be very pleased if young people, including Armenians, who read Operation Nemesis, conclude that Armenians are partly responsible for the Genocide, and decide that it is best to leave the past alone.

In publishing this book, an opportunity was squandered to let the world know that the Armenians got a raw deal after their attempted annihilation; that valiant Armenians stepped in only after the 1919 Turkish Military Tribunals did not follow through on their verdicts; and that a century later the legacy of a great unpunished crime against humanity begs to be resolved.

Perhaps Bogosian will consider the above issues if he publishes a second edition of this book.

Three other books about Operation Nemesis have recently been released:

  • Special Mission – Nemesisby J.B. Djian and Jan Varoujan; illustrations by Paolo Cossi; translated into English by Lou Ann Matossian (Editions Sigest; Sept. 2014). Covers the events before, during and after the execution of Talaat. A good primer for all ages, produced in graphic novel format.
  • Sacred Justice: The Voices and Legacy of the Armenian Operation Nemesisby Marian Mesrobian MacCurdy; Edited by Gerard Libaridian (Transaction Publishers; March 2015).  A combination of Armenian, community, and family history as it relates to MacCurdy’s grandfather, Aharon Sachaklian, a member of the Nemesis group. Not reviewed at press time.
  • Operation Nemesisby Josh Blaylock; illustrations by Hoyt Silva (Devil’s Due Publishing; May 2015). An interpretation of Tehlirian’s life, the Talaat execution, and the subsequent trials in Berlin. The attire and use of language featured are not entirely authentic to the times nor of the peoples they depict. Presented in graphic novel format.

 

For those interested in other accounts of Operation Nemesis, visit:  http://www.operationnemesis.com/further_reading.html

Filed Under: Articles, Books, Genocide Tagged With: Armenian, assassination, avenged, Genocide, Nemesis, operation

Istanbul the Capital of assassination, 21 unsolved murders in last 12 months

March 8, 2015 By administrator

By FAZLI MERT / ISTANBUL

citizen of Turkmenistan was found dead on Saturday night in İstanbul's Beyoğlu neighborhood. (Photo: Cihan)

citizen of Turkmenistan was found dead on Saturday night in İstanbul’s Beyoğlu neighborhood. (Photo: Cihan)

There have been 21 unsolved murders and assassinations in the last 12 months in Istanbul, bringing the issue of security in Turkey’s most crowded city back to the agenda.

Sources within the police say that the prevalence of unsolved murders and shootings has increased ever since thousands of police officers were reassigned or dismissed from their duties after a major corruption and bribery investigation that implicated some high-ranking state officials and pro-government businessmen on Dec. 17 of 2013.

The same sources also claim that the security vacuum that was created after the reshuffle of police officers following the probe is the main reason behind the fact that İstanbul has been hit by increasing numbers of unsolved murders and deaths. The sources add that experienced police officers were replaced with ineffective and inexperienced officers as part of the witch hunt being conducted by the government against officers allegedly linked with the Gülen movement — also known as the Hizmet movement — inspired by the teachings of Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. The government has been conducting a large-scale defamation campaign against the movement by accusing it of being behind the major corruption probe.

Some of the unsolved murders that have taken place in İstanbul in the last 12 months are listed below.

In the latest murder incident, a citizen of Turkmenistan was found killed in his house in the Beyoğlu neighborhood of İstanbul on Saturday night. The man, who was identified as “Aslan” by his neighbors, was found lying in a pool of blood when the police found his body. The police have launched an investigation to find the perpetrators.

In a recent high-profile incident, an outspoken critic of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon was killed by an unknown assailant on a street in İstanbul’s Fatih district on Thursday night. Umarali Kuvatov had been living in exile in Turkey and was the head of the Group 24 opposition movement. Kuvatov was shot once in his head. The unknown attacker, who witnesses said was wearing a balaclava, fled the scene, Turkish media reported on Friday.

The İstanbul Police Department’s anti-terrorism unit and homicide unit have been jointly handling the investigation into the killing of 47-year-old Kuvatov, who had been eating dinner at a house in the area before the killing. Kuvatov was already dead when medics arrived at the scene, and police then searched the area for evidence.

Kuvatov’s “Gruppa 24” movement was declared an “extremist organization” and banned by Tajikistan’s Supreme Court last October. Tajik law enforcement authorities wanted him for a number of crimes, including extremism, corruption and hostage-taking, but Turkey had declined to extradite him. This murder was reminiscent of the recent murder of two Chechens and an Uzbek citizen in İstanbul.

Abdullah Buhari (38), known as “the Uzbek imam,” was killed on Dec. 11, 2014 in front of the building of the İhsan Scientific Services and Fraternal Association in İstanbul’s Zeytinburnu district where he was giving religious classes. The perpetrators have not still been found, despite three months having passed.

Kaim Saduev, who had fought against Russia in the Chechen region, died in suspicious circumstances on Feb. 28, 2014 when he became sick after eating food sent by his relatives. According to media reports, the relatives sent a parcel of food to Saduev, who was living with his family in İstanbul’s Başakşehir district. Family members became sick on Feb. 28 and Kaim Saduev died in an ambulance on the way to hospital that evening. Saduev’s wife and child, who were also poisoned, survived.

In yet another incident, Vedat Şahin, the brother of suspected gang leader Sedat Şahin, his friend Ferdi Topal and Şahin’s bodyguard Evren Aydın were shot by unidentified individuals while walking in İstanbul’s affluent Nişantaşı neighborhood on Dec. 24, 2014. The gunmen fired automatic rifles, according to witnesses.

In another shooting incident in the city, Ali Ekber Akgün, a real-estate company owner, was shot multiple times by two unidentified assailants while he was waiting at a red light in his car in İstanbul’s Sarıyer district, again on Dec. 24, 2014. According to witness reports, two people got out of the car behind Akgün and fired bullets through the windshield. After shooting Akgün, the two men fled the scene in their vehicle. Akgün was taken to the hospital, where he died.

Former Motherland Party (ANAP, now ANAVATAN) deputy Adnan Yıldız was attacked by two armed men in İstanbul’s Bakırköy district on the morning of April 15 in a shooting incident in which his wife and daughter as well as one of the attackers were killed, while Yıldız, his son and the other assailant were injured and taken to hospital. Yıldız and his family had just entered their car, which was parked outside their home, at 9 a.m. when two men on a motorbike with no license plate started shooting at them. Yıldız’s relatives, who were also present at the scene, fired shots back at the attackers, killing one of them. No identity documents were found on the assailants.

More than 400 police officers have been detained nationwide since July 22 of last year. These officers had carried out major operations in the Dec. 17, Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases as well as operations against the Iran-backed Tawhid-Salam group (also known as Tevhid-i Selam or the Jerusalem Army) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Many of them were later released by the courts because there was no evidence they had participated in criminal activity.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: assassination, İstanbul, Turkey

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