hetq.am Our investigation of the 44-day war also includes interviews with various experts, commanders, and combatants? This time we talked about the war with the former Minister of Defense of the Republic of Artsakh, and former Chief of the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces, Colonel-General Movses Hakobyan.
- I want to start with the question of why we reached this state, what was the reason we lost this war?
- Thank you for the invitation, let’s try to analyze it briefly, of course, this is quite a big job that the specialists should carry out in order to conclude how we got such a result. First let me say that we should not have had these results, we could have had better results. It is a simple truth that war starts as a result of the failure of diplomacy, and we must state that diplomacy has failed, as a result of which we have had war. But it does not mean that we should have lost with this situation. The prerequisites for winning a war are: you must be ready for war, in advance, not during the war. The next thing is that at the beginning of the war you must be able to put your forces and resources to work properly, I will try to analyze in detail in individual points, and during the general war you must be able to manage. We have had gaps in all these factors.
On the eve of the war, we were quite poorly prepared for war. At first it was the lack of financial resources, then it was the hope that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue could be resolved through negotiations, then the change of power, with the new hope that democracy will protect you and the Armenian People of Artsakh.
The other block that comes out of this is the military, which is easier for me to explain. It is the formation of the structure of the armed forces, which should be in line with the current challenge, the Republic of Azerbaijan, possible support from the Republic of Turkey. Here, two components should work in parallel: foreign relations with your ally, what kind of actions should you plan in the presence of Turkey’s influence and what kind of actions should you plan without Turkey’s participation, and all this was planned before, and work was done in that direction. The structure must be formed in such a way that you can withstand your potential opponent, it is clear that our structure, which in turn implies first the number of personnel and then the number of weapons, cannot meet our potential combat problem, that is, we have a certain, limited amount armed forces, and the rest of the personnel must be recruited in time of war or on the eve of war when such danger exists. Here is the big problem: under the name of structural “reforms” of the army, people were not prepared for war, but these reforms were made to please people. The leadership staff was doubled, the fighting staff was reduced quite a lot, and this was called a reform. Moreover, as a result of the “reform”, the governing body was reduced, which should be ready to receive and expand the mobilization resource during the war.
The next block concerns the acquisition of weapons and military equipment. We had a development plan in the past, where, according to me, the weapons that we would have to face during a possible war were planned: the specific anti-aircraft system and the long-range artillery, so that we could counter the enemy’s long-range artillery. For some reason, that plan was not implemented, on the contrary, they acquired such weapons, with which no operations were carried out during the war. I reserve the right to say this, because I said this not only on November 20, 2020, but in 2018, after the change of government, when I learned about the acquisition of military equipment and while sitting in the cabinet of the head of our country, I said , that it is a crime that is committed and cannot be done. I resisted acquiring SU-30s and ASAs.
This is the acquisition of common armaments. What was planned in the previous plan, I planned the weapons and the structure with which I should fight and at least not lose, according to me, I should not lose this war too, if I carried out what I planned.
The other action of preparing for the war, seriously damaging morale and psychological work in the army and turning the army into an organ of materialism, where the material determines the fighting spirit of the soldier.
- What do you mean by the spirit of materialism?
- Wages, food, clothes. Let me briefly touch on what morale is. That is, when a soldier is sure that he is stronger than his opponent, then his morale will be higher than that of his opponent. For that, a soldier needs to be properly armed and trained, and he needs food and clothing only to be able to endure that training, not to enjoy eating. Clothes should not be beautiful, clothes should be comfortable
- be on the battlefield. Serious mistakes were made here as well, these are small things, but when you lead the army on material things and as if you should encourage them with material things, you fail. We are not such a country economically and we are not such a people to be satisfied with material things. Our nation always strives for more, the more the better, it is an incentive to keep working, and our state simply cannot afford to raise the material of our army to such a level that it says, I am satisfied and elsewhere. I won’t do anything except serve the motherland in the army. In my opinion, this is a wrong thesis, the state is obliged to take care of the serviceman, the serviceman should live the best, be the most secure, but it is not necessary to talk about it, it is not necessary to promote it among the military, it is harmful, not useful.
- To keep morale high, troops must train. You have the weapon, you have the man, you have the structure, you have to train. I am sorry to say this, to this day the media shows the footage when I was the head of the defense army and conducted military exercises. You don’t have other personnel, or what they did, I gave an assessment of it at the time, it doesn’t suit the army on its scale and level. Regimental exercises, battalion tactical exercises, operational tactical exercises, not on paper, but involving concrete troops, were not done or poorly done. The army is poorly trained.
- It becomes like a monologue.
- You asked the question, I have to finish, why am I talking so much, so that we can prepare for the next war, so that it doesn’t seem like the next war is far away? To give you an example, 1000 of the best trained soldiers in the world put together will not have the same potential as a platoon of 28 or 31 trained and trained soldiers. Harmonization is very important here, both of the existing units and those that must be added to the army in time of war, and the structure should be built in such a way that this harmonization can be done easily, in a shorter period of time. Structural changes have been made in such a way that harmonization is impossible. They did not engage in preparation, the preparation was formal in nature to report.
- The volume problem. For better or worse, there was a plan for expansion in the Armed Forces that was not fully implemented. The first leadership points were not released on time, and there are leadership points that were not released at all that were very important. The Armed Forces were not fully deployed, it was written in the plan who should be where when declaring war.
- Why wasn’t it developed, why wasn’t it done?
- The next issue was the lack of leadership. Mobilization was not carried out, mobilization is false, the presence of volunteer personnel. I always get criticized, but one thing is that I will always voice it. Volunteerism is harmful in wartime. In the case of an authoritarian country like Russia, see what harmful activities Wagner is carrying out in Russia, and for our society, imagine how much volunteerism has done to the army. You were there personally, you saw it, on the 30th of the month (September 2020, ed.) we had 5,000 people, volunteers, who refused to do the task, and this not only does not help, but 5,000 people are needed in order not to create panic. to feed them, you have to put people on them, because there are weapons in their hands, so they don’t do harm elsewhere, and you have to waste your resources on it. War is a complex business, it is not easy, it is a series of actions that you must constantly follow and perform, and you must not bypass the difficulty, but overcome it. Who says mobilization doesn’t work, it was bad, that’s why I decided to do volunteering, it’s not a reason to be excused, but a crime that you didn’t do your thing and did another thing that caused more damage. I have analyzed a lot and I will say a short sentence: if they had not mobilized, with the existing forces and resources of the army, we would have been in a better situation than with mobilization. I want to emphasize what damage this volunteer mobilization caused to the army.
- I partially agree, in some places they succeeded, they stood by the soldiers. It wasn’t widespread, maybe there were organized groups.
- I am one of the journalists who have been involved in this since the first day of the war until today. There is a mobilization that has been carried out. Why did the enemy not succeed in breaking through in the second, and partially failed in the third, Askeran, Martakert? Do you know why, because they are the only regions where the mobilization was carried out? Mobilization pays off, every reservist you ask says he volunteered, he didn’t volunteer, he was mobilized, he was called up and he went, I bow to them because they are us. to benefit, but the one who avoided mobilization, went to join some squad, came as a volunteer, all of them should be shot, what I said will be emotional, just don’t accept it. I want to draw conclusions for the next war, because I see action to give again
- Who cares about it, it must be opposed.
- Does something like this happen now?
- I will look into it now, if necessary. In particular, hearing the word “militia” terrifies me. Moreover, this saying is not new, they tried to introduce it in my time, even before me, and I have always used this expression, I said that when I hear that word, I get scared. They fight with a regular army, not paramilitary structures.
- We have met the militias, in fact now they have a lot of territories under their control. I don’t know why the management went for it. There are positions, the militias are holding them, why is the army not holding them?
- The army is not holding back because they are making wrong, populist decisions again. If you make populist decisions in the war, I definitely know that you have lost. They will have to mobilize, they are making the three-month assembly for 24 days, what will they solve with it, it is still a formality to say that we are preparing the army.
- We’re moving forward, let’s go back. The expansion of the army, command points, military units was not carried out. No new formation units were formed during the war. Fictitious crowdfunding, quantity provided. Harmonization is the most important, I repeat again: one harmonized, trained platoon of 31 people has more potential than the best 1000 soldiers in the world. When the leadership says: I have sent so many people, I am horrified by those words. a unit that is 80 percent combat effective, a unit that is 90 percent combat effective, because you have no right to send a unit with less than 70 percent combat effectiveness, you have to replenish, harmonize, send a new one.
- And who decides the percentage of combat ability?
- The experience of the world is that if 30 percent of the unit is a loss, it cannot complete a task, because the absence of that 30 percent has a negative effect on 70 percent.
- Do you mean replenishment?
- The percentage of combat ability is both weapons, and personnel, and training. If a general unit comes under heavy shelling, has a 30 percent loss of personnel, a loss of 20 weapons, it is clear that the unit will not be able to accomplish the task elsewhere because it is depressed, and the number of personnel and weapons will not be sufficient to accomplish the task. These are world norms that I didn’t set, and Russia didn’t set them, because they will attribute that he is a general of the Russian army, that’s why they say their norms, but these are the norms of the NATO army, there they forbid anything less: 80 In the case of interest, they do not allow to include wartime.
- Let me add one thing, in the course of our research, which we are still doing, we see that in the army, in almost no place, the battalions and divisions were not equipped, the crews were not complete. Why was that? For example, there was a platoon of 7 people.
- -If you add 2 people to a harmonized platoon of 7 people, it is ready, those 2 will be harmonized quickly, and if 5 out of 9 people are not there, if you add 5 to 4, you can’t, you need time for harmonizing, at least 1 week, so that those people at least remember each other’s name, last name, know their character, because they have to fight with each other.
- It was left over from the first war, when they were deciding who should go to intelligence, for example, they say, no, I won’t go to intelligence with this one, because he went once, he knows how to behave, that is, he needs to fight drive to know who you trust.
- If there is no battle, then you should see how he behaves on the battlefield during military exercises at the shooting range.
- Now that we are talking about our volunteers, there were really people who had never shot.
- I think that I am a normal soldier, if you gather 1000 people like me in one place and send them to the battlefield, we will all harm the army, the weapons that you give us, you will take to the hot Turks, I brought the example to you so that you understand. Alignment is important, assigning people who should do what and training. Alignment means who should do what on the battlefield, and you have to train, teach, repeat, explain, train again, repeat again, it’s called preparation.
- Let’s return to the point from which the conversation deviated, the development.
- There was no increase in volume, I give one example why we failed. 90 percent of the public at the Jabrayil military unit, so to speak, are upset that the breach took place there. Why was he there, why was he in Mataghis? The battalion from which they broke through, that battalion killed three times as many people as their battalion, destroyed twice as much equipment as their military unit, that battalion alone, in addition to that, it also suffered losses during the battle, it is clear, and since no replenishment was carried out, could no longer withstand that pressure, and the enemy during the attack, when he decided the direction of the main attack, when he suffered losses, constantly updated and introduced new forces. And where he has some success, he begins to develop, why 9th?
- the defense region because the military unit was not replenished.
- I will add a little more about that battalion, they were really fighting fiercely for 6 days in the first week. They had many casualties, they retreated, took positions, tried to recapture once, recaptured several positions. They were able to resist and when they came out on October 3, they didn’t retreat, they pulled themselves out because they were almost exhausted.
- The main part of the command staff of that battalion, the leadership staff, was killed.
- It’s really unfair, Jabraeil was targeted, that breach, but in reality, when we study, we see that the fiercest battles took place in that area.
- Let me give one more example, I said, if there was no mobilization, we would have shown a better result than in the case of mobilization. Enemy losses officially published as 2,800, I believe, 2,000 of them up to October 3rd. I say not to blame anyone, but for the future, to draw the right conclusions. Why after the 3rd or 7th of the month we started having failures, this also has reasons. Scaling was not carried out – the correct distribution of mobilization and available units by combat mode, according to combat tasks.
- Now let’s come to the stage of the actual war. Everyone decided they had to lead a battle they didn’t have the ability to do.
- “Everyone, who do you mean?”
- I think only the cleaners didn’t want to be at the command point of the army, everyone else wanted to enter the bunker, the infamous bunker, because it seemed that the information in the form of Mr. Artsrun’s “We will win” tricked the people, the leadership team was probably tricked. they didn’t even know that we were losing. They did not listen to the official information, by the way, I must say that it was reported inaccurately, but they listened to Artsrun that we will win, everyone wanted to hold the flag of that victory, be seen and take pictures. This doesn’t matter to me, but do you know what harm it does to have outsiders at the helm?
- On October 8, I also thought that the leadership did not know what was happening, I even thought that they, listening to Artsrun, believed the lies: the Chief of Staff, the Minister of Defense.
- To be honest, I asked the military leadership, I said, do you report the real situation to the leadership, they told me, yes, in all cases, I forced the Defense Army to report in writing every day, documented, about our losses. of course there could be some deviations and we were supposed to report on our condition every day at 7 or 5 o’clock.
- Let’s continue talking from the bunker.
- The management bodies have not been freed, the Chief of Staff of the Defense Army, who is a management body, has no right to be a millimeter away from the management point, for some unknown reason, a person in charge appears in some military unit, which is not allowed. Same here headquarters. The general headquarters should have been released in Goris, the organ of management and leadership of units in the southern direction, but it was not released. Within one to 24 hours, he had to be released in order to manage the various divisions of the southern direction. We knew that the Defense Forces alone would not be there. Moreover, after 24 hours, the 9th Defense District should not be subordinated to the Defense Army, it should be subordinated to the commander of that group. It is clear that this direction was going to be difficult, on the one hand, the problem of the commander of the Defense Army would be a little easier, secondly, so that our Armenian armed forces would concentrate all efforts in that direction, and the general management body would be freed there. It was never released there.
- The units were sent from Armenia unassembled. Now my speech is more directed to the military, let them listen. You are not allowed to send a battery to do any task, at least you have to send a division, and you have to send the division complete with its communications platoon, its everything, its support units. When I heard what they were sending, for example, 8 cannons, I was still terrified by those words, they don’t say we sent a division, a division with eight cannons. A division is a harmonized unit, eight guns are scrap metal if not a harmonized unit. The units that were included in the direction of that section were not completed. Moreover, one unit can have a problem in different directions. For example, there was a military unit that had problems in three places. Well, let’s manage or secure, and this has led to the disharmony of units, the neighbor does not know who is next to him, the interaction is not organized, I say this briefly, there were quite a lot of shortcomings. I told them how it could be done during this war, but they did not follow what I said, God be with them.
- Let’s go back to the bunker. You were in the bunker from the beginning of the war, that is, you went quietly to your post, then at some stage you were told that you shouldn’t go.
- I don’t want to talk about it. I have already mentioned, God be with them, my soul is calm, at that time I tried to be useful in something.
- October 8
- Nikol Pashinyan dismissed the director of the National Security Service, Argishti Kyaramyan. At the time, it was said that the reason was that the special forces under his command did not carry out the order. But I found out that you are the reason, he did not fulfill Nikol Pashinyan’s order to arrest you.
- I’m not sure, because I don’t know for 100 percent, I can’t say that it happened that way. I can say that Argishti Kyaramyan was in Artsakh from the time he was released from his post until the end of the war, and he was the only discreet, well-educated person from Armenia, those nuances are very important to me.
- Let’s talk about the weapons we have, which I don’t know if they were enough, if we were able to use our potential to resist at that stage.
- Don’t use big words, war is an art, for example, construction is not an art, it is a craft, painting is an art. Art is a higher thing, war is an art you must control. An artist creates such a picture with one brush that millions of people, looking at that picture, admire. Masters of the art of war fight in a small group in a battle that brings thousands of enemies to their knees. The examples are vivid, some of them you know. Let me give one example from the first war.
- I’m giving the example, just reminding you. Do you remember the direction of Machkalashen, Fizul, how many tanks were coming at us? 40 tanks, let me remind you, so many BMPs, maybe 2000 soldiers, and how many of us were there? I’ll give you an example, do you remember how many tanks we hit, let me remind you: we hit 12 tanks, 6 BMPs. We only had one Bassoon and one tank.
- Correct positioning, correct combat, correct control leads to victory.
- Now let me tell you why I bring these examples. When the Chief of the General Staff reports the implementation plan, and very late, which is an unacceptable phenomenon, it turns out that the armed forces did not have an implementation plan for almost a year. They turned that whole report into material again, I reflected, I asked for a word there and said that they will not win with material and gave several examples, I just gave our example, if you don’t like it, because you were not a participant in that war, that example it’s foreign to you, take for example the worst, the example of ISIS, take the example of the people of Afghanistan, take the Chechens. When you want to win, you win. What remains is the correct distribution of forces and means. We had more than we had in the first war, I say relative to our opponent. In the first war, the ratio of our enemy’s forces and means was in favor of the enemy, greater than in September 2020, that is, it cannot be excused, and I tell you, the enemy could not break through until we started to dismantle the army.
- During the war, we had units that really fought heroic battles, but this cannot be seen in the widespread criticism and blaming everything on the army. came out, but they don’t even talk about it in the media, as if it was purposefully not to talk about it, that we also had brilliant units.
- I know one thing: when something doesn’t work out for you, it’s your problem, the exes are not to blame. Now there is no need to look for the guilty, we need to draw conclusions, because I say that the war is not far away, there will be anti-terrorism in Artsakh, and the danger of losing territories for Armenia hangs over our heads.
- Well, why don’t they understand that?
- To understand, you must have knowledge and desire. The rest is easy.
- Are there no such people among these rulers?
- I don’t communicate with them.
- It is obvious from our studies that before the attack, both in the south and in the north, it was reported from different places that there are accumulations of equipment. Even on September 25, in one of the positions, when the commander of the battalion we studied was on duty, he reported that they were ready to take action, the advance of the enemy was obvious, but they refused. It was so obvious where the attack was going to start, but you see, they hardly prepared for defense. What was the reason?
- There are two reasons: knowledge and desire. You need knowledge to assess the situation, collect information, compare it with existing actions and understand that the war will be here, tomorrow, at this time and with what means. Moreover, I would like to say that the intelligence data was falsified and provided to the leadership.
- I still don’t understand why the Chief of Staff didn’t come to the battlefield, didn’t come to see what was happening, why didn’t Onik Gasparyan come to the battlefield?
- -Being on the battlefield is not mandatory for the Chief of Staff, but being in the direction of the main strike is mandatory.
- I don’t mean the first line, why didn’t he come to Artsakh? You were once close to him.
- I am still close, but ask him that question.
- That’s all for today, maybe there will be another opportunity to talk about this topic, many questions worry me, there are still missing people, whom we sometimes identify instead of the state.
- I am not an emotional person
- I’m a dry soldier, I’m not interested in that at all, I’m interested in the past to the extent that it is necessary to draw conclusions from there. Its positive and negative, so that you can develop the positive and eliminate the negative. Why am I speaking, knowing that they will not write anything but blasphemy under the media, such an institution has been created that they blaspheme whoever they like, they do not write anything. That being said, I am compelled to speak because the negotiation process will not bring us success and the threat of war is very real.
- And what should we do?
- You have management bodies, the state, the General Staff, I tell them they are not doing it, we will crown another defeat, we will say we have won or we will win.
- Let’s finish the conversation, thank you.
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