Interiew: Discover the major financial Armenians of the Ottoman Empire with Onnik Jamgocyan
Guest of the cultural association “Arménia” Onnik Jamgocyan give a lecture on “Prince-Traders Armenians of the Ottoman Empire” Friday, February 5 at 20:30 at the Library Gateway Bourg-Les-Valence (Drôme). It also sign copies of his two books “The Bankers sultas” and “The Time of the reforms. The Ottoman Armenia “published in editions of the Bosphorus.
Krikor Amirzayan / Armenian News Magazine: Mr. Onnik Jamgocyan, we know that the Armenians were very large traders and even big bankers. No one had yet taken the measure of the importance of this phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire before your work. How do you explain that this story has remained so long “ignored”, although in the minds of many of us? .
Onnik Jamgocyan: This story was known to our elders. Many authors have spoken or written about the importance of our ancestors in the great trading and the high bank. H. Mrmrian, Patriarch Ormanian, T. Azadian, H. Dj. Sirouni saved from perdition snippets of this story and handed on to future generations. This topic was forgotten from the 1970s contemporanéistes Armenian historians or researchers chose to focus on the study of the Genocide of 1915. In Turkey, Turkish historians of the Ankara School, wish to nationalists did their side everything possible to bring down this phenomenon into oblivion.
Armenian News Magazine: How did you come to study this important issue for the economic, financial and banking of our people?
Onnik Jamgocyan: The late Hagop Barsoumian has taken the first that torch. Unfortunately it disappeared in Lebanon events, kidnapped and probably murdered. Fernand Braudel, the master par excellence of economic and trade modern history, understood the omnipresence of Armenians in the Mediterranean. At the end of my studies in History at the University of Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne, Braudel asked me to dedicate myself to this. Research companies were now under the leadership of Jean-Claude Perrot, Professor at the Sorbonne and Director of the Institute of Social and Economic History. The great French historian gave me space to my work and guided me to the defense of my doctoral thesis in 1988. This was described by Raymond Barre as “a major contribution to the economic and financial history “.
Armenian News Magazine: The reader finds your books a more considerable research. Can you tell us how such a search?
Onnik Jamgocyan: These searches were to begin the Archives of the Presidency of the Council of Istanbul where I went with a recommendation letter from Professor Perrot, my Director of Research. I was welcomed by the Archives staff, but the agreement of the authorities of the country was slow in coming. This was the policy of silence, neither agree nor refusal. I returned to Paris a little desperate. My master then advised me to go around Europe Archive knowing Ambassadors and Consuls of foreign powers near the Sublime Porte were reporting to their governments. We also found there the letters of merchants, trials before commercial courts, the wills of notaries. Over five years I was able to strip more than 4,000 boxes of the Archives Riksarkivet (Stockholm), the Public Record Office (London), the Archivio di Stato (Venice), the Archivio di Stato (Trieste), the National Archives and Archives of the Quai d’Orsay (Paris). Ardaches Kardashian and Raymond Kevorkian also made me the best welcome in their time Nubar Library in Paris.
Armenian News Magazine: What is the outcome of this research?
Onnik Jamgocyan: This research show that the Armenians controlled the largest international trading and mastered the high finance mechanism on all European markets. The rate of profit on capital amazes historians. These Amiras maintained the imperial Ottoman Institutions two centuries without resorting to foreign debt. They were the great patrons of our nation, the custodians of our culture and traditions of the years 1650-1850, the date of their disappearance.
Interview by Krikor Amirzayan
Krikor Amirzayan © armenews.com
Turkish Author Elif Shafak: ‘In Turkey We’ve Forgotten How to Laugh’ Interview
Interview by Juliane von Mittelstaedt and Christoph Scheuermann,
Turkish author Elif Shafak sees her country as a “wobbly democracy,” increasingly authoritarian, polarized and depressed. And she is disappointed by European silence.
SPIEGEL: Ms. Shafak, you are from a country where one wrong word could land you in court. Do you still dare to say and write what you think?
Shafak: Words are heavy in Turkey, and every writer, every poet and every journalist knows that, because of a word, because of a sentence, because of a tweet or even a retweet, you can be sued, you can be demonized by the media and you can even land in prison. So when we write, we write with this knowledge in the back of our minds. And if someone says: I am not affected by this, I would not believe that person. The truth is: nobody can escape this pressure. And as a result, there is a lot of self-censorship. When I am writing political op-eds, yes I do think carefully about the impact of my words. When I am writing fiction, it’s a different story. In my fiction I am more reckless. I don’t care about the real world until I am done with the book.
SPIEGEL: In 2006, legal proceedings were initiated against you because of what one of the main characters in your book, “The Bastard of Istanbul,” said about the Armenian genocide. Even though you were ultimately acquitted, it shows that even fiction can be dangerous.
Shafak: Yes, it was a very, very surreal experience, because a work of fiction was put on trial for the first time. For me, that was a very unnerving experience. Not only because of the trial, but there were ultranationalist mobs on the streets protesting against me, spitting on my pictures, swearing at me. But the feedback from my readers was amazing. They supported me, even though they come from all different sorts of backgrounds — there are conservatives and proponents of secularism, feminists and liberals. So I have seen both sides: I have seen that you can get in trouble with your books in Turkey, but that at the same time books really matter.
SPIEGEL: Ten years later, “Reporters without Borders” now ranks Turkey 149th out of 180 countries with regard to press freedom and several journalists have been arrested. Most recently, two editors with Cumhuriyet were taken into custody for publishing material incriminating the government. Is press freedom under threat?
Shafak: Yes, it is under great threat. I am afraid we have gone backwards, in terms of freedom and diversity of media. Different views are not tolerated anymore. Critical minds are suppressed, intimidated. And it’s not just going backwards. It’s sliding backwards very, very fast. It’s not only arrests and trials. The other issue is a widespread depression among the liberal-secular part of society. I remember a time when it was ok to make fun of politicians and powerful people. Now, it’s not ok anymore. We’ve forgotten how to laugh.
SPIEGEL: Many in Europe are unsure how to view Erdogan. Is he an authoritarian ruler, an Islamist, a nationalist or a failed democrat?
Shafak: I would call him an authoritarian politician who is very divisive. This is a society of the baba, the father, the patriarch. It starts in the family, continues at school, in the family, on the street. In every aspect of life, including football, the Turkish society is baba-oriented. And our mentality in politics is not that different. I think this is a big part of the problem: Our politics is very masculine, very aggressive, and it’s very polarizing. And the pace of this development has increased in recent years. Erdogan is, in my eyes, the most polarizing politician in recent Turkish political history.
SPIEGEL: Can you see the results of that polarization within your family or among your friends?
Shafak: Yes, I am seeing it in my close circle of friends. Among us are some who support the government and there are others who are very critical. But the fact that we speak and discuss with each other is almost an exception in Turkey. Why? Because the society has become divided into ghettos with glass walls. Everybody is on their own island, and doesn’t talk with the people on the other island. And it’s a society of anger, mistrust, paranoia and conspiracy theories.
SPIEGEL: Where did this extreme polarization come from?
Shafak: It has a complex background, but one of the answers can be found in a recent Pew study. In 38 countries, the research center asked people if it was legitimate to criticize the government vocally and publicly? In Lebanon, 98 percent of the people said yes, it’s ok. In Jordan, the number drops to 64 percent. In Pakistan, it’s 54 percent, and in Turkey, it’s 52. That means that almost half of the Turkish population believes it is not legitimate to criticize the government. Interestingly, this correlates with the number of supporters of Erdogan’s government.
SPIEGEL: And yet, of the countries you just mentioned, Turkey is actually the most democratic. How can that be?
Shafak: This is a new phenomenon — and yes, it’s a big paradox. Mainstream media constantly says they are enemies everywhere, both inside and outside — and anyone who speaks critically is stigmatized as “traitor.” So the conclusion people draw is that they should not criticize the government. As ridiculous as it may sound, I have been accused of being directed by an “international literature lobby.” The claim is that there is a big lobby somewhere abroad and from every country they chose two or three authors and they use them to criticize their governments. There are a lot of people in Turkey who believe in such crap.
SPIEGEL: Did this only start with Erdogan and his AKP party, or are his politics merely reinforcing societal insecurities that were there before?
Shafak: For sure, this has to do with our history. Many analysts compare Turkey with countries in the Middle East, but I think we need to compare it with Russia. Both countries come from a tradition of empire, and also from a tradition of the strong state. In a normal democracy, you protect the individual from the excessive power of the state. In Turkey, power elites try to protect the state — as if this state were fragile and needed protection — when in fact, it’s too powerful already. This is where we started from, though — in the last five years, Turkey has become more and more authoritarian.
SPIEGEL: If Turkey is like Russia, are there also similarities between Erdogan and Vladimir Putin?
Shafak: Erdogan has changed a lot since he came to power. In the beginning, he used to talk about being all-embracing. No longer. It’s no secret that he wants to change the constitution in order to have a presidential system, and I am sure he will do everything he can to get there. I am very worried about this concentration of power, and it’s not only because of Erdogan. We have the ballot box, but we don’t have the culture of democracy. The government says: You see, we have the majority, we’re entitled to do anything we want. But that’s not democracy, that’s majoritarianism.
SPIEGEL: Does that mean you wouldn’t call Turkey a democracy?
Shafak: I wish we had more nuanced words to define democracy. Obviously, Turkey is not a typical authoritarian regime, and obviously it’s very important that there are free elections. But it’s also obvious that this is not a liberal, mature democracy. This is why I call Turkey a wobbly democracy. At any time, it can tip over and fall down.
SPIEGEL: Last Sunday, the European Union invited Turkey to a summit in Brussels for the first time in a long time — and promised €3 billion, visa freedoms and a revitalization of the EU accession process. Human rights and freedom of speech weren’t even mentioned, despite the fact that the Cumhuriyet journalists had been arrested only a short time before. Did this sudden political upgrading of Erdogan surprise you?
Shafak: These two journalists wrote a letter from prison to the EU leaders saying: Do not forget freedom of speech, do not forget democracy. But that’s exactly what happened. Yet if we forget (those values), more journalists will be fired or arrested and lose their voices. Human rights and freedom of speech are vital, urgent issues and they are non-negotiable.
SPIEGEL: European leaders are now essentially begging Turkey to help slow or stop the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe. Is Turkey able to do such a thing?
Shafak: Turkey has taken more than 2 million Syrian refugees and cannot be made responsible for the refugee crisis alone — the biggest humanitarian crisis since World War II. Any solution has to be a joint, international one, but that’s not what is happening. Instead, the EU’s approach has been: Ok, we’ll pay you so the refugees stay in Turkey.
SPIEGEL: Which is why the EU is willing to support Erdogan and refrain from criticizing him despite human rights violations in Turkey.
Shafak: Facing all these crises, more and more people are favoring stability over democracy, in Turkey and in the West. The EU, it seems, wants stable regimes, and therefore it’s not emphasizing human rights any more. They have become postponable issues. But these are not postponable issues! There can be no stability without democracy.
SPIEGEL: You sound disappointed.
Shafak: You know, sometimes I feel I have more faith in European ideals than some of my British or French friends. For them, it’s a financial burden. For me, Europe is primarily about values, about fundamental rights, freedom, women’s rights. The message from last week’s summit, however, was: Europe has put its values on hold.
SPIEGEL: Do you still think Turkey should become a member of the EU?
Shafak: I was and still am a big proponent of Turkey’s membership. In 2005 and 2006 it seemed almost possible. It’s a huge tragedy that this historical moment was missed because of the short-sightedness of populist politicians on all sides. As an EU member, the government couldn’t have become so authoritarian. There would be better checks and balances. Look at what happened since: Turkey turned its back to Europe and walked the other way. But what is more beneficial for us: A Turkey that is part of Europe, part of the liberal democratic world and the sphere of free speech — or a Turkey that sides with more authoritarian states?
SPIEGEL: Do people in Turkey still want to become a member of the EU?
Shafak: At the height of the EU debate a few years ago, up to 82 percent of the people wanted to be in the EU. We grew up reading Balzac and Goethe, we feel European. But after it didn’t happen, the mood changed very fast. The support for EU membership has now dropped to 20 percent. It’s almost a childish reaction: If Europe doesn’t want us, we don’t want Europe. We are emotional people. Emotions are subject to change.
SPIEGEL: Might the refugee crisis be enough to bring Turkey and Europe back together again?
Shafak: I would like the refugee crisis to become a new beginning in the Turkish-European relationship. But it would be very problematic if, during this process, human rights were forgotten. Democracy needs to be the priority.
SPIEGEL: Do you believe that there might one day be another protest movement like the Gezi protests in 2013?
Shafak: I don’t think so. Not only because of fear, but also because of this collective depression. People think nothing will change when they take to the streets. I see two opposite tendencies in Turkish society: people feel demoralized, they lose the interest in politics and retreat to their private lives; or they become very angry and even more politicized, and radicalized. Both trends are troublesome.
SPIEGEL: Turkey just recently shot down a Russian jet. In reaction, Putin called Turkey an “accomplice of terrorists” for helping Syrian extremist groups. Is he right?
Shafak: Nobody knows what is happening, that is the sad truth. There are a lot of conspiracy theories floating around, and I don’t want to get into them. But the fact that we cannot ask those questions is an indication that our political system is in disrepair. Turkey in general became too involved with what is happening in Egypt and in Syria. Some politicians with neo-Ottoman dreams developed this idea of being a major player in the Middle East, which hasn’t gone as expected.
SPIEGEL: The Middle East is not the only troubled area. Within Turkey as well the situation has escalated into fighting between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the government. Do you believe it is possible to restart the peace process?
Shafak: It’s not very promising. The peace process was taken hostage by hawkish people on both sides, caught between the violence of the PKK and Turkish ultra-nationalism. We could have had a coalition after the election in June with representatives of many parties, including the Kurds. Had that happened, the situation would be different today. But Erdogan did not want to. He wanted an absolute majority, which is why he wanted new elections. Since then, more than 600 people have died in the fighting and attacks.
SPIEGEL: You sound quite weary. Is there no more hope for political change in Turkey?
Shafak: I’m half pessimistic and half optimistic. Or like the author Antonio Gramsci would say, I believe in optimism of the will, pessimism of the intellect. But my hope is the people, the society, which is ahead of the government. Turkey has a very young, dynamic, curious population. In Europe, Facebook and Twitter are mostly about sharing daily experiences while for Turkish people, social networks are political platforms. The more the media lost its freedom, the more politicized social media became. The government tried to ban Twitter, but it was not successful. The digital world is developing with such force and such a pace that you simply can’t ban or control it. People want to be globally connected. There is hope there.
SPIEGEL: What will Turkey look like 10 years from now? Will Erdogan still rule the country?
Shafak: I don’t know, but we are at a critical juncture. It can’t go on like this. The polarization is so deep now. In the past, there were people who could bridge these sides, both liberals and conservatives. We don’t have these bridge builders anymore. After the Ankara bombings on October 10, people were asked to hold a minute of silence, but many refused. Our society can’t even unite in grief to honor the victims. We’ve lost our empathy. That’s maybe the worst.
Source: spiegel.de
Ex-US Intelligence Chief on Islamic State’s Rise: ‘We Were Too Dumb’
Interview Conducted By Matthias Gebauer and Holger Stark SPIEGEL ONLINE
Without the Iraq war, Islamic State wouldn’t exist today, former US special forces chief Mike Flynn openly admits. In an interview, he explains IS’ rise to become a professional force and how the Americans allowed its future leader to slip out of their hands.
Michael Flynn, 56, served in the United States Army for more than 30 years, most recently as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, where he was the nation’s highest-ranking military intelligence officer. Previously, he served as assistant director of national intelligence inside the Obama administration. From 2004 to 2007, he was stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where, as commander of the US special forces, he hunted top al-Qaida terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one of the predecessors to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who today heads the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. After Flynn’s team located Zarqawi’s whereabouts, the US killed the terrorist in an air strike in June 2006.
In an interview, Flynn explains the rise of the Islamic State and how the blinding emotions of 9/11 led the United States in the wrong direction strategically.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: In recent weeks, Islamic State not only conducted the attacks in Paris, but also in Lebanon and against a Russian airplane over the Sinai Peninsula. What has caused the organization to shift its tactics and to now operate internationally?
Flynn: There were all kinds of strategic and tactical warnings and lots of reporting. And even the guys in the Islamic State said that they were going to attack overseas. I just don’t think people took them seriously. When I first heard about the recent attacks in Paris, I was like, “Oh, my God, these guys are at it again, and we’re not paying attention.” The change that I think we need to be more aware of is that, in Europe, there is a leadership structure. And there’s likely a leader or a leadership structure in each country in Europe. The same is probably similar for the United States, but just not obvious yet.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: You mean something like an emir or regional leadership?
Flynn: Exactly. In Osama bin Laden’s writings, he elaborated about being disperse, becoming more diffuse and operating in small elements, because it’s harder to detect and it’s easier to act. In Paris, there were eight guys. In Mali, there were 10. Next time, maybe one or two guys will be enough.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Can an attack of that scope even take place without being coordinated and authorized by the IS leadership in Syria?
Flynn: Absolutely. There’s not some line-and-block chart and a guy at the top like we have in our own systems. That’s the mirror imaging that we have to, in many ways, eliminate from our thinking. I can imagine a 30-year-old guy with some training and some discussion who receives the task from the top: “Go forth and do good on behalf of our ideology.” And then he picks the targets by himself, organizes his attackers and executes his mission.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Islamic State’s leader is the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What kind of leader is he?
Flynn: It’s really important to differentiate between the way Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri represent themselves when they come out in public and how al-Baghdadi represented himself when he declared the caliphate. Bin Laden and Zawahiri sit in their videos, legs crossed, flag behind them, and they’ve got an AK-47 in their laps. They are presenting themselves as warriors. Baghdadi brought himself to a mosque in Mosul and spoke from the balcony, like the pope, dressed in appropriate black garb. He stood there as a holy cleric and proclaimed the Islamic caliphate. That was a very, very symbolic act. It elevated the fight from this sort of military, tactical and localized conflict to that of a religious and global war.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What would change if al-Baghdadi were killed?
Flynn: We used to say, “We’ll just keep killing the leaders, and the next guy up is not going to be as good.” That didn’t work out that way because al-Baghdadi is better than Zarqawi, and Zarqawi was actually better than bin Laden.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: So killing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wouldn’t change much?
Flynn: Not at all. He could be dead today, you haven’t seen him lately. I would have much preferred to have captured bin Laden and Zarqawi because as soon as you kill them, you are actually doing them and their movement a favor by making them martyrs. Zarqawi was a vicious animal. I would have preferred to see him live in a cell for the rest of his life. Their logic is still hard to understand for us in the West.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What differentiates al-Baghdadi from Zarqawi, who led al-Qaida in Iraq between 2003 and 2006?
Flynn: Zarqawi tried to bring in foreign fighters, but not in the way that al-Baghdadi has been able to do. At the peak of Zarqawi’s days, they may have been bringing in 150 a month from a dozen countries. Al-Baghdadi is bringing in 1,500 fighters a month, from more than 100 nations. He’s using the modern weapons of the information age in fundamentally different ways to strengthen the attraction of their ideology. The other thing is how they target. Zarqawi was absolutely brutal — he randomly killed guys lining up for jobs in downtown Baghdad. Al-Baghdadi is much smarter and more precise in his target selection, but still very vicious.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Who is running the military wing of the Islamic State?
Flynn: I think that al-Baghdadi or the current leader of the Islamic State is very hands-on when it comes to parts of the military, but it’s a very flat, networked organization. Inside Syria and Iraq in the Levant area, my belief is that he has a couple of subordinates who are responsible for military operations, logistical, financial, etc.; they represent a combination of Egyptians, Saudis, Chechens or a Dagestanis, Americans and Europeans. We know from debriefings that they have actually broken Raqqa down into international zones because of language barriers. They have put interpreters in place in those international zones in order to communicate and get their messages around. For example, the Australians alone have about 200 people. There’s even an Australian sector in Raqqa, and they’re tied into the other English speakers because not everybody shows up speaking Arabic. This requires a military-like structure with military-like leadership.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: How does IS treat people who volunteer?
Flynn: They document everything. These guys are terrific about it. In their recruiting and in interviews, they ask “What’s your background? Are you good with media? With weapons?” It’s this kind of well-structured capability they have that then evolves into a very, very unconventional force.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: How should the West fight this enemy?
Flynn: The sad fact is that we have to put troops on the ground. We won’t succeed against this enemy with air strikes alone. But a military solution is not the end all, be all. The overall strategy must be to take away Islamic State’s territory, then bring security and stability to facilitate the return of the refugees. This won’t be possible quickly. First, we need to hunt down and eliminate the complete leadership of IS, break apart their networks, stop their financing operations and stay until a sense of normality has been established. It’s certainly not a question of months — it will take years. Just look back at the mission we created in the Balkans as a model. We started there in the early 1990s to create some stability and we are still there today.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is the Balkans mission a model for the current war?
Flynn: We can learn some lessons from the Balkans. Strategically, I envision a breakup of the Middle East crisis area into sectors in the way we did back then, with certain nations taking responsibility for these sectors. In addition, we would need a coalition military command structure and, on a political level, the United Nations must be involved. The United States could take one sector, Russia as well and the Europeans another one. The Arabs must be involved in that sort of military operation, as well, and must be part of every sector. With this model, you would have opportunities — Russia, for example, must use its influence on Iran to have Tehran back out of Syria and other proxy efforts in the region.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: For that to happen, the West would have to cooperate fully with the Russians.
Flynn: We have to work constructively with Russia. Whether we like it or not, Russia made a decision to be there (in Syria) and to act militarily. They are there, and this has dramatically changed the dynamic. So you can’t say Russia is bad, they have to go home. It’s not going to happen. Get real. Look at what happened in the past few days: The president of France asked the US for help militarily (after the Paris attacks). That’s really weird to me, as an American. We should have been there first and offered support. Now he is flying to Moscow and asking Putin for help.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: A Western military intervention runs the risk of being seen as a new attempt to invade the region.
Flynn: That’s why we need the Arabs as partners, they must be the face of the mission — but, today, they are neither capable of conducting nor leading this type of operation, only the United States can do this. And we don’t want to invade or even own Syria. Our message must be that we want to help and that we will leave once the problems have been solved. The Arab nations must be on our side. And if we catch them financing, if they funnel money to IS, that’s when sanctions and other actions have to kick in.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: In February 2004, you already had Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in your hands — he was imprisoned in in a military camp, but got cleared later as harmless by a US military commission. How could that fatal mistake happen?
Flynn: We were too dumb. We didn’t understand who we had there at that moment. When 9/11 occurred, all the emotions took over, and our response was, “Where did those bastards come from? Let’s go kill them. Let’s go get them.” Instead of asking why they attacked us, we asked where they came from. Then we strategically marched in the wrong direction.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: The US invaded Iraq even though Saddam Hussein had nothing to do with 9/11.
Flynn: First we went to Afghanistan, where al-Qaida was based. Then we went into Iraq. Instead of asking ourselves why the phenomenon of terror occurred, we were looking for locations. This is a major lesson we must learn in order not to make the same mistakes again.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: The Islamic State wouldn’t be where it is now without the fall of Baghdad. Do you regret … Flynn: … yes, absolutely …
SPIEGEL ONLINE: … the Iraq war?
Flynn: It was huge error. As brutal as Saddam Hussein was, it was a mistake to just eliminate him. The same is true for Moammar Gadhafi and for Libya, which is now a failed state. The historic lesson is that it was a strategic failure to go into Iraq. History will not be and should not be kind with that decision.
Interview: In 1915, the Swiss knew all the Armenian genocide through the press
One hundred years, the Swiss were very knowledgeable of the deportations and massacres perpetrated by the Young Turk regime against the Armenians. They provided generous assistance to survivors. The press of the time testifies.
Interview by Pascal Fleury
There are a century, the Swiss already knew everything that suffered the atrocities of Armenians in Turkey. “This is nothing less than the systematic destruction of a people, with the intention of establishing arrested in the Turkish Empire the exclusive domination of Islam,” wrote “Freedom” on the front page its edition of October 13, 1915. Why Switzerland Is is shown similarly secured at the time? And why, a century later, she has still not recognized the Confederation officially the genocide? The explanations of the historian Hans-Lukas Kieser, professor at the University of Zurich and specialist of Ottoman world.
In 1915, the Armenian tragedy was recounted in detail in the Swiss press. How do you explain such an interest in this distant conflict, in full World War?
Hans-Lukas Kieser: To understand this media focus, to remember history in 1915. drama Twenty years ago, the large-scale massacres had been perpetrated against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. It was between 1894 and 1896, under Sultan Abdülhamid regime. Emergency committees have launched solidarity actions. Their petition to the Federal Council to intervene with the major powers was signed by a record number of 450,000 people in a national humanitarian impulse that has far exceeded partisan or religious considerations. The Federal Council has not really changed, but private initiatives are then multiplied. Swiss missions were opened on the ground. In 1915, this vast support network, which was still in place, was reactivated. The public has been sensitized.
How the Swiss have they been informed of the atrocities suffered by the Armenians in 1915?
The most reliable information on the massacres and deportations were provided by missionaries of relief organizations on the ground. The best known of these eyewitnesses was the Appenzell Jakob Künzler who with his wife, was serving a mission hospital in Urfa in south-eastern Turkey today. Very active in the humanitarian movement, he provided valuable reports to relief committees in Switzerland and Germany. Other Swiss have played the same role as the director of an orphanage, Beatrice Rohner at Marash and Aleppo, who knew the area very well and languages. Information has also been submitted by the Armenian diaspora in Switzerland, informed, and by Ottoman Muslims opposed to the dictatorship of the Young Turks.
“The correspondence was sent by trusted people with mail being strictly censored. Codes were sometimes used, such as the German expression “Weapon” (poor) to “Armenian”. Some reports have gone through the German diplomatic channel, Switzerland does not have a diplomatic representative in Turkey at the time.
The Swiss showed great solidarity vis-à-vis the genocide survivors, as recently recalled the Armenian Catholicos Aram I. What help have they made on the ground?
Swiss aid concerned especially widows, orphans and young women who escaped slavery and forced marriage. Initially, it was to hide and feed. The rescue was very improvised, operating through networks of Muslim friends. The missionaries also hidden men, taking enormous risks to their own lives. In Urfa, for example, Künzler couple sheltered in the hospital under false identities. It provided them with clothes Bedouin smugglers that can lead them to safer areas in the south.
“From 1917, when the dictatorship was more tolerant once completed destruction of shelters have been opened. In Aleppo, the orphanage Beatrice Rohner welcomed more than a thousand children from 1916. In the same city, the Swiss trader Emil Zollinger has even hosted 2,000 refugees. Thanks to the huge financial support came from Switzerland and the United States, the victims were also able to receive food, clothing and medical services.
Humanitarian operations were also conducted in Switzerland …
During the war, mutual aid was limited primarily to clinics. Then, Switzerland has welcomed hundreds of orphans. The best-known work is that of the Waldensian pastor Antony Krafft-Bonnard, who founded an orphanage in 1921 in Begnins (VD), and the following year opened a center in Geneva. Some Swiss politicians have called for a “national home” for the Armenians in the Middle East. Federal Councillors Gustave Ador and Giuseppe Motta spoke in this direction before the League of Nations. But the action was limited in Switzerland. She however continued on the ground, Aleppo and Lebanon, with the management of orphanages and assistance in refugee camps, in collaboration with international organizations such as Near East Relief. Assistance to survivors lasted until the eve of the Second World War thanks to the loyalty of this “humanitarian Switzerland”.
In 1915, reading newspapers, the Swiss already knew all about the scale of atrocities suffered by the Armenians. How is it that a hundred years later, the Confederation still has not officially recognized the genocide?
This can be explained by the character of the international policy of Switzerland. For a century, in this case, it remains on its reservation, opting for a policy of interest. She willingly praises this “humanitarian Switzerland” which has taken a clear stand against genocide and crimes against humanity, but in terms of diplomacy, behaves just like a natural disaster had happened, refusing to take on the Historical facts. But do not put it in the long run, is to deny the …
“Swiss withholding such was observed this year, during the commemorations of the centenary of the genocide, as the pope or the German president will not chew their words. Such lack of courage could be against-productive in the long run. Especially as the historical problem of major crime is now denied accentuates the Middle East and that crimes against humanity are repeated, with new massacres and pushed people into exile.
“A recognition of the genocide by the government would also strengthen the criminal standard against racial discrimination. Is Switzerland wants to keep the universal perspective of this law? The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights does not require sacrifice. But it is for Switzerland to affirm, while putting the best value.
***** The live Armenian drama in “Freedom”
The French-speaking press has dealt extensively and in detail of the “systematic annihilation” perpetrated against the Armenians in 1896 and 1915. If the term “genocide” does not appear – this neologism was created in 1944 – all criteria crime against humanity described therein black on white. Excerpts from “Freedom” of the time.
“… The Armenian question, which has and will do so much bloodshed, was created by the Sultan himself, who wanted to foment a violent hatred between Muslims and Christians, as it fears nothing as the Topics union between different religions … “
“The responsibility of the Sultan,” August 21, 1896
Mr. Schwarz, a pastor in Freiburg: “… We had no example of such a slaughter organized against an unarmed people, already oppressed for many generations. This people, accustomed by long servitude to have no more confidence in himself, was barbarously decimated; 150,000, maybe 300,000 people perished in the torture or suffering from dismal poverty to which they are reduced, but there was their fault … “” For Armenians, “September 23, 1896
“… Since the beginning of the war (World War, ed), Turks, taking advantage of the general confusion, sate their bigotry in the blood of innocent women, children, old people, nothing found favor in their eyes. News, absolutely reliable sources, tell us the horrors that are committed in the dark recesses of a dying empire, and we dare say that the horrors of European warfare are nothing compared to the atrocities of the barbaric peoples n have not yet been influenced by Christian ideas … “” The Armenian question “, 6 August 1915
“… The deportation of Armenian families in arid deserts, even assuming that these unfortunate arrive at their destination, is a disguised killing and those who go so miserable flock of women and children, under the kicks and butts Ottoman gendarmes, through the deserts of Mesopotamia, are worse off than those who were massacred in their homes and whose bullet or bayonet has finished one stroke anguish and suffering. (…) It is estimated that nearly one million the number of those who have been affected by the massacres and deportations … “
“The extermination of the Armenians”, 12 October 1915
“… The Christian Switzerland, facing these painful elements will do his duty. This is certain death to save the remains of this unfortunate Christian nation. We refuse our Armenian brothers our moral and material support? No ! More than ever, let’s be generous! … “
“Call to Switzerland”, November 23, 1915
> Panel discussion “Tomorrow there are a hundred years: genocide seen by the Swiss press,” Sarkis Shahinian (Switzerland-Armenia Association) and Gilles Soulhac, journalist, this Sunday, October 25th at 18: 30 pm, at the St-Gervais Theatre Geneva, close of the exhibition “Fragments”.
***** A taboo genocide
In Turkey, the use of the word “genocide” is still punishable. But increasingly many voices for the Turks found the memory. Like the grand-son of Jemal Pasha, the “butcher” of Armenians. See RTS2 on Sunday in “Armenian Genocide, the 1915 spectrum”.
http://www.laliberte.ch/news/dossiers/histoire-vivante/en-1915-on-savait-deja-tout-du-genocide-303932#.ViqM8yveJY-
Stéphane © armenews.com
Jemma Israyelyan: Accomplished Silicon Valley venture capitalists will work with Armenian entrepreneurs
Ms. Israyelyan, tell us about CEED. How have entrepreneurs benefited from your programs so far?
Founded in 2012, CEED Armenia aims to drive economic growth by developing, connecting and mentoring entrepreneurs to strengthen their businesses so they can create jobs and in turn accelerate economic prosperity. CEED Armenia is part of an international network with presence in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the U.S. CEED centers were founded by the Small Enterprise Assistance Funds (SEAF), an investment management group that works with small and medium enterprises in emerging markets.
Over the course of its operations, CEED Armenia has implemented a range of programs to help entrepreneurs and their executive teams grow and to support entrepreneurship in the broader society. CEED’s Top Class program, for example, has been empowering entrepreneurs through trainings led by accomplished business leaders from Armenia, U.S., Russia and other parts of the world, mentorship by experienced entrepreneurs, and networking events in Armenia, Israel, Jordan, Poland, Croatia, Morocco and other countries. CEED has also created opportunities for its program participants to learn from a co-founder of Skype, an early investor in Twitter, a co-founder of princeline.com and many other prominent business leaders.
Where does the idea to organize the Perfect Pitch to Investors Workshop come from? How were you able to engage such experienced Silicon Valley investors?
We have been fortunate to have Roger Strauch, Co-founder and Chairman of the Roda Group, a seed stage venture capital group based in Berkeley, California, as a speaker and mentor in our programs for several years. Due to the fact that Roger is both an experienced venture capitalist and an accomplished business executive, he understands both perspectives and has provided our entrepreneurs with valuable advice, the positive impact of which they have shared with us. In one of our conversations with Roger, it became clear that we both considered effective pitching to be a critical factor that could instigate further growth of Armenian startups. We wanted to create an opportunity for our entrepreneurs to learn from the best and were fortunate that Ron Weissman, an extremely competent and well-regarded Silicon Valley investor, was willing to join our efforts. Ron Weissman worked extensively with Steven Jobs and has served on the board of directors of more than 25 companies. We are honored to partner with Deem Communications and the Central Bank for this initiative. I’m glad we have an opportunity to offer this workshop to our entrepreneurs.
How can entrepreneurs apply to participate? Who will be the target audience?
Those interested are welcome to visit the program webpage and submit an application form. Participants will be selected based on the merit of their applications. The group will be rather small in order to create an opportunity for the participants to work with the instructors closely and to obtain customized feedback on their business initiatives from these accomplished experts.We expect the core of the group to be entrepreneurs who have solid ideas that can be discussed with potential investors. This means that the participants will have made the initial steps in validating their business ideas, talking to potential customers, and thinking about their business model. However, entrepreneurs at an earlier stage can also greatly benefit from this workshop as it will include sessions dedicated to these and other business topics to help entrepreneurs develop their initiatives more effectively.
What should the participants expect to learn?
In addition to discussing the above mentioned business concepts, the participants will learn about the way venture capitalists think and the way they evaluate entrepreneurs’ pitches. The metrics used by venture capitalists will be discussed. The participants will work on developing a 20-minute investor presentation and receive feedback from the instructors and the group. They will also learn to develop an elevator pitch, a short summary which communicates the essence of their business idea and captures the listener’s attention. Those interested in further program details are welcome to view the agenda on the program webpage.
How can our entrepreneurs reach out to potential investors outside of Armenia? Are you planning any programs that will facilitate this process?
Having worked with entrepreneurs for almost a decade, CEED centers globally have developed a range of programs to help entrepreneurs at every step of their entrepreneurial journey. One of our recent offerings, CEED Global Club, brings together entrepreneurs from around the world to share experiences, explore new markets, and meet potential partners and investors globally. Just a week ago, CEED Global Club members that represented different countries, including Armenia, visited London where they met with experienced investors and business executives and discussed opportunities for collaboration. A similar trip to New York was organized this summer. Our annual global conferences also provide an opportunity to meet investors at the designated “investor corners”. In offering the Perfect Pitch to Investors Workshop, our goal is to ensure that entrepreneurs are prepared for these conversations and can fully leverage the opportunities to meet with investors.
Prominent genocide researchers: What is your next step? Are you going to kill 15-20 million Kurds now?
By Fatih Gökhan Diler
One of the most prominent genocide researchers in the world, Ronald Grigor Suny was in İstanbul for “Critical Approaches to the Armenian Genocide Conference” that is organized by Sabanci University. We made an interview with Suny; he shared his evaluations on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and his views on the events in Kurdistan from the perspective of the Armenian Genocide.
What were your expectations concerning 2015 and were they met?
Generally, I am an optimistic and positive person and I can say that I feel quite content with the developments that happened this year. We made progress, it was important to hold this conference in İstanbul. Also, the reference books on the genocide are translated into Turkish and this is also important for me. Two of my books will be published by Aras Publishing. “A Question of Genocide” which was prepared by me, Fatma Müge Göçek and Norman Naimark, translated into Turkish by The Turkish Historical Society. These are very big steps. If someone who lives in Turkey or who can read Turkish want to learn what happened in 1915, if they want to do some serious reading about the deep and dark periods of the foundation of Turkish Republic, they can find the material they need now. You have to deal with this issue honestly and you have to spare a lot of time, but now you have the material. 15 years ago, this was out of question. In the last 15 years, there has been an intense interaction among Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian scholars. The history of the western Armenians is being integrated into late Ottoman history and early Turkish Republic history, though those people were wiped away from the country. This is a part of the history… Without discussing the WW I and the Armenian question, you cannot understand Ottoman frontier. These are the parts that cannot be separated.
What did 100th anniversary change in the world, in Armenia and in Armenian Diaspora?
I think it was like going public. There were TV shows and interviews on the radio; some articles were published in the newspapers. Today, there is more awareness compared to the times when I was young like you. This is progress. However, as I was observing from outside, Turkey went to the opposite direction. Last year, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s letter of condolence was a step forward, but now look at the things that is happening in Kurdistan this year; the Kurds are “accused” of being “Armenian”. Being Armenian is considered like a curse. Prime Minister Davutoğlu says that they should be careful about the Armenian Diaspora again. The country goes through bad times now. Maybe the country will overcome these bad times and begin to move forward again, but for now, I cannot be very optimistic.
Many people say that the Kurds have replaced the Armenians. What do you think about this?
Do you know what is really interesting? 100 or 150 years ago, the most rebellious society in the Ottoman Empire was Kurds. Kurds were rebelling constantly and the Ottoman Empire was trying to oppress them. Russian and British armies were also trying to influence them. Compared to the other problems, Armenians were a minor issue. Armenian self-defense teams might have revolted in some places, but most of the time they were objections against high taxes and exaggerated as “rebellion”. The Armenian question was “solved” by genocide; this is the most horrible way to do it. This solution created another problem: the Kurdish question. In Turkey, millions of people don’t live as equal citizens. They cannot offer education in their mother tongue. They don’t have the right of autonomy. This is interesting: while some Kurds prefer armed struggle, HDP tries to solve this issue in a legal and peaceful way. This situation is parallel to II. Tanzimat Era after 1908; at that time, most of the Armenian political activists abandoned their revolutionary objectives and demanded reforms in order to be recognized in the constitutional system. They demanded their rights and wanted autonomy to some extent and protection from the assaults of the Kurds. In short, they wanted their own canton in the Ottoman Empire. Of course, there were some Armenians who didn’t abandon armed struggle, but they were the minority. On the other hand, Ottoman government claimed that all the Armenians are rebels and separatists, especially after 1913. They told that all Armenians demand an independent state and this led to the genocide. And today, it is much harder, because millions of Kurds live there. The society in Kurdistan is organized and united. There are a lot of Kurds in the west too. Istanbul became the city with the highest Kurdish population. Today, Kurds are allies of the US in Syria and they are the only force that we can count on in terms of fighting against ISIS in Iraq; as you can see, this is an issue with many different aspects. The government tries to make people believe that all Kurds are PKK guerillas and to start a war, instead of solving this issue with HDP by making a credible and reasonable organization; this is a really wrong decision.
You have probably heard the police announcement during Cizre blockade; they were saying, “Armenians love you, you are all Armenians.”
Interestingly, the most horrible thing they can say is “Armenian”. For those people, being Armenian is below being Kurdish. For many years, they have been trying to solve the problems not by reconciliation, but by resorting to violence and this is the heritage they have now. But you know what? This cannot work. What is your next step? Are you going to kill 15-20 million Kurds now? Turkey and Turks will be damaged because of what is happening now, because an oppressive and authoritarian state emerges and they are losing their chance to constitute a modern democracy.
“I think there is link between the Kurdish question and the Armenian Genocide. The police who shouted, ‘Armenians love you. You are all Armenians’ obviously draws this parallelism.”
Do you think that the current insight would be different, if Turkey were ready to confront 1915 like HDP?
Absolutely. Hrant Dink was always saying that if Turkey could manage to become democratic, there wouldn’t be any problems left about the Armenian Genocide. A democratic Turkey would recognize the Armenian Genocide anyway. The struggle that is carried by a part of the Turkish society, which consists of people supporting progress and libertarianism, for a pluralist and democratic Turkey is same with the struggle for making the Armenian Genocide recognized. In this sense, though the Armenian Genocide is only an item on the list, it is at the center of the struggle for democracy. There is another issue with Kurdistan now and it is related to the Armenian Genocide. Of course, some people don’t want these two to be related. They say, “No, the Armenian Genocide is about the past and we are dealing with it. But the Kurdish question is an issue concerning the present. Don’t make them intermixed.” I think there is link between the Kurdish question and the Armenian Genocide. The police who shouted, ‘Armenians love you. You are all Armenians’ obviously draws this parallelism.
What will happen after the 100th anniversary?
We are almost at the end of 2015 and we can say that the Armenian Genocide is broadly discussed this year. But time passes. What will happen after the 100th anniversary?
Of course, we are losing the momentum. This is inevitable. But I think that we achieved many things. Now, there is sufficient amount of books, films and documentaries on the genocide. Many countries recognized the genocide. We now have a solid foundation that we didn’t have 15-20 years ago. For instance, New York Times uses the word “genocide” without hesitating. There are still some states that hesitate to do it, but some big steps were taken. All these production will continue, though not with the same speed. The Armenian Genocide will continue to be a part of the history of those lands.
Popular figures like Kardashian family, Kanye West, George Clooney and System of a Down were active in 2015. What do you think about that?
Kardashians’ visit to Armenia created a major effect. In those days, the Pope also put out a declaration. The impact of the popular figures is beyond argument. When SOAD writes a song about the genocide, it creates a bigger effect than the works of the scholars. In fact, this is also good for us. We began to offer classes not only on Holocaust, but also on the Armenian Genocide.
Source: Agos
Syrian leader Bashar Assad ‘West crying for refugees with one eye, aiming gun with the other’ (INTERVIEW)
By RT Corespondents
Question 1:Mr. President, thank you from the Russian media, from RT, from Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Channel 1, Russia 24, RIA Novosti, and NTV channel, for giving us all the opportunity to talk to you during this very critical phase of the crisis in Syria, where there are many questions that need to be addressed on where exactly the political process to achieve peace in Syria is heading, what’s the latest developments on the fight against ISIL, and the status of the Russian and Syrian partnership, and of course the enormous exodus of Syrian refugees that has been dominating headlines in Europe.
Now, the crisis in Syria is entering its fifth year. You have defied all predictions by Western leaders that you would be ousted imminently, and continue to serve today as the President of the Syrian Arab Republic. Now, there has been a lot of speculation recently caused by reports that officials from your government met with officials from your adversary Saudi Arabia that caused speculation that the political process in Syria has entered a new phase, but then statements from Saudi Arabia that continue to insist on your departure suggest that in fact very little has changed despite the grave threat that groups like ISIL pose far beyond Syria’s borders.
So, what is your position on the political process? How do you feel about power sharing and working with those groups in the opposition that continue to say publically that there can be no political solution in Syria unless that includes your immediate departure? Have they sent you any signal that they are willing to team up with you and your government? In addition to that, since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, many of those groups were calling to you to carry out reforms and political change. But is such change even possible now under the current circumstances with the war and the ongoing spread of terror in Syria?
President Assad: Let me first divide this question. It’s a multi question in one question. The first part regarding the political process, since the beginning of the crisis we adopted the dialogue approach, and there were many rounds of dialogue between Syrians in Syria, in Moscow, and in Geneva. Actually, the only step that has been made or achieved was in Moscow 2, not in Geneva, not in Moscow 1, and actually it’s a partial step, it’s not a full step, and that’s natural because it’s a big crisis. You cannot achieve solutions in a few hours or a few days. It’s a step forward, and we are waiting for Moscow 3. I think we need to continue the dialogue between the Syrian entities, political entities or political currents, in parallel with fighting terrorism in order to achieve or reach a consensus about the future of Syria. So, that’s what we have to continue.
https://youtu.be/U7hCtLARbZQ
Source: RT.com
Confronting Challenges: To Be an Armenian Feminist in Turkey
By Hrant Galstyan
An Interview with Lerna Ekmekcioglu
Lerna Ekmekcioglu is McMillan-Stewart Associate Professor of History and Women and Gender Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). She earned her bachelor’s degree at Boğaziçi University in Turkey and master’s and PhD degrees from New York University. Lerna has authored a range of articles about ethnic and religious minorities, genocide, Armenian community in post-genocide Turkey, concentrating on the gendered perspective. In 2006, she co-edited “A Cry for Justice: Five Armenian Feminist Writers from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic (1862-1933)” in Turkish, with Melissa Bilal. At the end of this year her second book, “Recovering Armenia: Limits of Belonging in Post-Genocide Turkey” will be published.
In August, during her stay in Yerevan, Lerna participated in a panel organized by the AUA and presented her work on the Ottoman Turkish policies of transferring women and children from Armenian to Muslim contexts and the post-war Armenian policies in Constantinople towards retrieving the kidnapped women and their children born of rape. Hetq spoke with L. Ekmekcioglu about her work on genocides and feminism.
Your work is concerned mainly with the gendered aspect of genocides. Is this phenomenon peculiar to the Armenian genocide or is it the same with the other genocides too?
I teach a course called “Women and War”, and we do talk about different genocides. And I always have this question in my mind – what is different in the Armenian case? We study other genocides – Rwanda, the Holocaust, and Cambodia – and I don’t know any other genocide where the transfer of women and children is such an integral and conscious part of the plan to unmake a people. The target itself (or part of the target), in this case, is considered by the Young Turks to be changeable, recyclable, and reprogrammable into the perpetrator group. Yes, we see rape, abduction in the Rwandan case and others, but not this much.
The Holocaust is very different. It’s almost an exceptional one in the sense that rape is avoided, because it is illegal during the Nazi era from 1933 onwards. Not just marrying, but even having any sexual relationship with the Jews for the Aryan people is racial defilement. So for them it is unthinkable, it’s impossible to grab part of the Jewish population and turn them into Aryans.
Thinking about the Holocaust is actually very eye-opening. Even though they are both genocides, from a gendered perspective they work out very differently. Women, pregnant women and little children were the first targets during the Nazi regime. In the Armenian case, adult males are the main target. We should not of course generalize. In the eastern parts, what is historical Western Armenia, the deportation and the massacres are more whole scale and gender-blind. Women and children are also killed on the spot, but the more west we go, the more gender-aware it becomes.
Someone needs to do a systematic study of this.
In some areas women had to take weapons, fight, and survive on their own – all previously not considered female roles. How did the genocide change the notions of what it meant to be a woman?
I wish it had changed. I don’t think it had changed that part of Armenian female identity. What I studied is the Armenian public discourse; newspapers in the aftermath of the war, from 1918 on in Constantinople. People do talk about how women sacrificed themselves during the Medz Yeghern.
Yes, women fought against the enemy and maybe took up weapons, but there is not a big deal about it in that period that I’m talking about. But that they had to give into “the lust of the barbarian races”, that they were raped, dishonored, or that they succumbed to Turkish passion… This is how it is talked about. And this, in itself, is considered a sacrifice that they went through, and it is something that shouldn’t be held against them.
Across the board I see it. I looked at various different newspapers – those closer to the church or the political parties, and feminist press. There was the idea that the raped women should not be held accountable, should not be reprimanded, or regarded as committing shameful, disrespected acts. I did not see anything that excluded these women from the new, post-genocide Armenian community. And in this regard it is not unique. For instance, not genocide, but the India-Pakistan partition, or even the Bangladeshi separation from Pakistan in 1971, are similar. During the Indian partition too, a lot of mass abduction and rape happened, as people were moving from one side to the other. And then, in the aftermath, we see both Pakistan and India talking about these women who had been raped or remained on the other side as heroes, war heroes, that need to be brought back, that should be seen as goddesses, even virgin goddesses. We see the same thing in the Armenian case; of course years ago.
This is such a big crisis, and Armenians are so desperate, that they know their number shrunk, so they don’t have any other choice actually but to include these women as well. So it is inclusive.
And they were married off to Armenian men.
The patriarch himself, the patriarch’s employees, the newspapers, the elite, the Armenian Red Cross, the head of the hospitals, the doctors, professionals, those who are writing, who are deciding on the public agenda of Armenians at that moment, accepted the formerly kidnapped women and children back into the nation.
But it doesn’t mean that people on the ground accepted them as beautiful Armenian virgins and good brides for their kids. No. We see that there is definitely conflict there. The native Armenian population of Istanbul, which had not been deported, didn’t seem to want to take these daragirs (outcasts), who had gone through hell, as proper brides. There seems to be many people from abroad, coming from America, France and Iran, for example, who were not there during the genocide, lost their families, or were not married, who come and marry the orphans and the newly rescued women and girls. And those native Armenians (many of whom are women themselves and are feminists) organized around the journal that I worked on, and tried to do everything so that some people marry these girls. But members of their own community aren’t marrying them as often.
Moreover, the Armenian administration in Istanbul also accepted the rape babies as full-fledged Armenians. Despite the patrilineal tradition, at this point the fathers are Muslim or if they are rapists or legitimate husbands, what they care about is that the nation needs people, and anyone with an Armenian mother is considered full Armenian…
It is easy to read these inclusive policies as “progressive” but in fact it did not change any patriarchal rules. These refugee women, those who went through violence and then come to Istanbul, some of them didn’t want to have a baby with them especially because the baby had been conceived in such bad conditions. They want to get rid of the baby, but the Armenian administration won’t let them do that. They actually take the babies. They say – just give the baby to our orphanage and you go, you don’t have to look after the baby any more.
“Hay Gin” argues at that time that tradition and equality could co-exist. How were they trying to make this happen?
“Hay Gin” is the journal that Hayganush Mark edited from 1919 to 1933 and it was the initial basis of my study. The writing cadre of Hay Gin is mostly feminists. They try to come up with different arguments, saying that ok, as Armenian women we are going to pay our dues to the nation, perform our duties. We’ll do whatever is necessary for us to do at this point. Especially after the genocide there is need for everyone’s contribution to this huge mechanism of finding a way to shelter these people, to feed them. So they turned schools, churches into shelters for these people.
From the 1870-80s on in Istanbul there is an organized philanthropic movement of women who came together to help other women, thus to help the Armenian nation. After the 1909 Adana massacres, for instance, they were very organized, they sent help to Adana, they wrote about what happened in Cilicia. These are people who are experienced in what to do in response to mass violence, in terms of providing care and fundraising. So they do whatever is expected from them at this moment of crisis for the nation (Jknajamayin bah).
And then they also want to be part of the decision-making mechanisms, so they want more political power. In 1919 they establish an organization called the Armenian Women’s Association. “Hay Gin” (Armenian Woman) is the publication of that organization. In the very first issue of “Hay Gin”, at the end, you see the program of the Armenian Women’s Association, and one of their goals was to work for the equality of Armenian men and women. But they add that, given the fact that this is a critical moment, their first goal is to promote the Armenian cause (Hay Dat) along with the Patriarchate in front of the whole international community.
But these women will never get equality, for various reasons. “Hay Gin”, for instance, campaigned for the women to be in the Armenian Patriarchate commissions or to be a yerespokhan (deputy) (there was an Armenian National Assembly inside Armenian Patriarchate since late 1860’s). In 1919 there was a suggestion that women too should be part of this assembly which is the decision-making body of the nation. So they try to be in that big parliament, but it doesn’t happen, because they argued that it’s not the right time to make such big changes. Now the nation is concerned with something else, now we have to save ourselves, recover Mets Hayastan and then in that United Armenia we’ll have equality.
What women claim at this moment is that the Republic here, the Yerevanian Hanrapetoutyun, has already women members in their parliament (there were 3 women members in the first parliament here and women had the right to vote).
Then, in 1922-23, Constantinopolitan Armenian feminists organize for women’s participation in Judicial Commission of the Armenian government in Istanbul. This Commission decided who can get an inheritance, marriage, but mostly divorce. Through “Hay Gin” (editor – Hayganoush Mark) they argue that women are the ones who suffer in this marriages, they are beaten, abused, they want divorce, so their voices should be represented in the Datastanagan Khorhurd (Judicial Commission) so that they can support other women who are vulnerable. It doesn’t work also, because the argument is that they need juridical diploma. Women could not be lawyers at that moment, so if you are not a lawyer or in legal business, you can’t partake in that Commission.
During all these processes (there were other campaigns too) what Armenian feminists say is that if we have equality, the nation will not lose anything, it is going to gain a lot. If women are doing whatever the nation asks us to do, then we need to receive our due, respect, and we need to be political subjects who have a voice and who have the capability to make decisions on behalf of our group. We are not just mothers, we are doing whatever mothers do, but we are also thinking subjects. The fear is that if women get equality, the society will disintegrate, degenerate (ailaserum bid ella), and then we lose our Armenianness. So what can the feminist say, no, we are very Armenian. If we are feminist women (this is what they argue) we are better Armenian mothers, because one knows what to pass to one’s children.
Were there Turkish feminists during this period and what were the relations between them and Armenian feminists? The issue seems to concern the power relations between majority and minority, the victimizer and the victim.
I like that you’re putting it like this, because sometimes people think of them as parallels, compare Turkish and Armenian as if they are on the same ground. Even though they are both speaking about equality, how they can speak about it is already framed inside the larger political framework in which they had to act.
It’s different, it changes. From 1918 to 1922 Turkish-Armenians in Istanbul are able to express themselves freely, because they think that the British and the French will protect them, they will give them the new Armenia and will punish the Turks. At that time Armenian feminist women are writing explicitly about Turkish women and accusing them of complicity. For instance, in “Hay Gin” there is a piece I translated into Turkish, in which Gohar Mazlmyan writes about how the wives of the Young Turk Ittihadists could have stopped their husbands, or even if they were not able to stop them, they could have protested or rejected sharing the spoils of the disappeared Armenians. She says these Turkish women have blood on their hands because Armenian jewelry is now on their hands.
Zaruhi Kalemkiarian asks Turkish women why you don’t cry with us, why you don’t help our orphans now. Now that we have the orphan problem, why don’t you come contribute to our efforts? Maybe someone will one day bring it to light, I don’t know, but there doesn’t seem to be any Turkish feminist who cares about Armenian orphans in the aftermath of the war. What is women’s solidarity if you fall short of doing this, if you fall victim to this kind of political clash?
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, Hayganoush Mark seems to have a relationship with the Turkish Women’s Association of the time. She writes explicitly in her autobiography about these relationships, but in the Turkish Women’s Association’s records we don’t see that. According to Hayganoush Mark, she was invited to become a member of the Turkish Women’s Association but it didn’t materialize because she wasn’t invited personally, but through a Belgian feminist who was in Istanbul at that time. So there is no big cooperation. But the same Gohar Mazlmyan, for instance, who was accusing Turkish women of perpetration, now, in 1926, writes another piece and congratulates Turkish women, who went to a western dance competition.
This is an instant where Armenians are happy that Turks are finally getting civilized, because they like that part of Kemalist secularism. In the 1920s, Islam is taken out of the constitution, the calendar changes, the letters change from Arabic to Latin alphabet. Armenians, especially the elite, in Turkey interpret all these changes as a good thing. They think that finally the Turks are coming into terms with the western civilized nations.
It is western modernity that connects these Turkish and Armenian feminist women. For example, Hayganoush Mark is in the jury of these beauty pageants. In 1932, Keriman Halis (Ece), the Miss Universe of the year, comes to the “Hay Gin” office with her father and visits Hayganoush Mark, says thank you and says we have always been friend with Armenians, and then they take a picture. The picture is published in Hay Gin and is also archived in Hayganush Mark’s papers which are here in the Art and Literature Museum dedicated to Yeghishe Charents. In short, they connect not as feminists, but as modern, Western oriented women.
One of the paradoxes that you encountered was that it was difficult to be an Armenian feminist in post-genocide Turkey, when maintaining identity was through traditions, which themselves meant inequality and patriarchal relations. Is it the same reason that hinders the progress of feminism in Armenia?
After ten years, this is my first time in Armenia. I have been living in America busy with a lot of things and I did not follow what’s going on inside Armenia from this perspective. So I’m not very qualified to talk about it.
But now that I’ve been here for more than a month, I’ve been thinking about this question – why? When I’m thinking about Turkish context, Armenians in Turkey, this paradox is understandable, because in a country that doesn’t want you, you need to be conservative as a group. Conservatism is resistance. Turkish Armenians lack other ways of sustaining themselves than hanging onto tradition –marrying Armenians, naming their kids Armenian names, sending them to Armenian schools (even if they will not learn good Armenian there and will not learn Armenian history, they’ll meet other Armenians, for instance). So, for them, patriarchal tradition is almost a survival kit, because there is the danger of the Turkish state under which they lived and they have to abide by its rules. So in that sense it is to a certain extent understandable that feminism might be seen as threatening for this small community of 60,000 people in a 70 million Turkey and that they would have to hold on to patriarchy.
But for Armenia I don’t understand that, because in my mind it is a regular legitimate country. Ok, it is small and surrounded by countries that are not necessarily friendly, but it is an independent country. Why should patriarchy be so dominant here? There is no reason. Why is this fear?
For instance, I am here to do research for my second book. I go to libraries and archives during the day. The librarians and archivists on the ground are all women (worked there for 35-40 years). But then, when you go up, the dnoren (director) is a man, always. It cannot be a coincidence that all institutions are like this. It means that there is some kind of systematic hierarchical organization of the society along gender lines that disadvantage women. At the end, the society, the Armenian society is losing because of this inequality because many capable women are not going to be put to good public use while average men –because they are men—will hold good positions. This is exactly what Hayganush Mark argued in Hay Gin and I think it is applicable to Armenia today. This is the main feminist criticism everywhere.
Your upcoming book, Recovering Armenia: The Limits of Belonging to post-genocide Turkey will soon be published. Can you please outline some questions you raise there?
I was interested in trying to understand the worldview of Armenian intellectuals and political and religious leaders, who remained in Istanbul or returned to Istanbul after the Great War, who lived through the occupation years when hopes were high, and then they had to go through that disappointment when Kemalists won everything and Armenians lost all. How could they stay there and what did they do to be able to fit into this new country of unapologetic perpetrators? How did they change, because some of them are the same people who were “anti-Turkish” during Istanbul’s Allied occupation years and then, after 1923 these Armenian leaders have to assume a pro-Turkish discourse? How did they make that change in their discourses? This was one of the main drives of the book.
The other motive was to understand how and why Armenian feminism lived its most vigorous moment in the aftermath of a national existential crisis in the Ottoman capital. After a decade of research and thinking I answered these questions in the form of a book which will come out at the end of this year.
Source: Hetq
INTERVIEW: West misread AKP and Erdoğan, legitimized crude power grab
By William Armstrong,
Author Toni Alaranta argues in his new book that international opinion failed to understand Turkey’s domestic dynamics after 2002, legitimizing authoritarianism in the search for a ‘moderate Muslim democracy’
Around 10 years ago, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were at the height of their international reputation. Praised almost universally abroad, they were seen as bringing about a democratic transformation in Turkey. Such has been the decline since then, those days are sometimes hard to remember.
How this perception took root is the subject of a stimulating new title by Toni Alaranta of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, reviewed in HDN earlier this week. The book argues that international conditions combined with Turkey’s internal politics to legitimize a crude power grab dressed up in the language of liberalization and human rights.
Alaranta spoke to the Hürriyet Daily News about his book and where the situation could be headed now that the AKP may be losing its 13-year electoral dominance.
Your book looks at the dramatic changes in Turkey’s international identity over the past couple of decades. What prompted you to look into this issue?
I had previously concentrated more on domestic issues and the various expressions of Kemalism in recent decades. But it is quite obvious that the AKP became, through its electoral hegemony, a very dominant force.
It was already clear some years ago that one needed to look much more critically at the powerful interpretations of Turkey’s political history that had basically created a very widespread expectation that the AKP would democratize Turkey. In my view, those interpretations had become an obstacle to scrutinizing the AKP experience. So in a sense the starting point was a very common one for any scholar writing a book: I thought the existing literature was handicapped.
At one point you write: “Irrespective of what we think about Turkey’s potentiality to become a world power, the assertion that it would be such with the ‘Muslim’ label now sounds completely natural to many of us.” But you argue in the book that this is actually a very recent international conception of Turkey’s state identity. Could you explain a little?
I think it’s very important to keep in mind that we are talking about a recent phenomenon. The fact that, as the saying goes, “99 percent of the Turkish population is Muslim,” has produced over the last decade an idea that Turkey is a “naturally” Muslim nation, and that its actions as a sovereign state in the international field have something crucial to do with its population’s Islamic faith. This has become a very widespread idea.
My argument is that these bold claims about Turkey being a “Muslim” nation and state are very recent developments. It’s true that Turkey’s national identity has had explicitly “Islamic” content since the 1980s.
But it is only during the AKP era that Turkey has declared itself as being the protector of a specifically Muslim cause in the international field across the globe. This is a very radical departure from the previous era, when Turkey wanted itself to be seen as a modern nation state taking its place in what it thought was a universal civilization characterized by cultural modernity. For the previous political elite, the idea of being seen specifically as a “Muslim” power would have been astonishing and even insulting. Because the Kemalist foreign policy tradition saw religious identification as something anachronistic, defining a past world.
So in this sense, the idea of Turkey as a state actor being a “Muslim power” is an AKP invention. But there are some elements in the current international order – and especially in the way we now speak about international relations – where we can observe these kinds of essentializing, particularistic religious-cultural demands. They have been legitimized over the last two decades. The talk about the “Alliance of Civilizations,” for example, or the idea of Turkey being able to function as some kind of bridge between Western and Islamic “civilizations,” all signal this new way of talking. I think it’s important to emphasize that this is actually a recent phenomenon.
You refer to two specific events: The end of the Cold War, and the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terror attacks. In your opinion, these events opened up space for Turkey in the international arena?
The main point is the interlinking of domestic changes in Turkey with the international reality emerging after the Cold War. The end of the Soviet bloc and the ever-expanding horizons of global free-market capitalism created an expectation that opening up economies would drive onwards liberal democratic regimes everywhere. There was a lot of talk about the end of political ideologies. In intellectual terms this was the period – especially during the 1990s – when Western academia became convinced that the period of classical modernity was irreversibly over and we were living in some kind of “post” world – post-modern, post-ideological, post-enlightenment, post-rationalist.
This all coincided with domestic changes inside Turkey. During the Turgut Özal era in the 1980s there was a strong neoliberal restructuring of Turkey’s economy. There was a strange combination of market liberalism with a conservative social atmosphere, which was actually similar to what had taken place during the Thatcher and Reagan era in the Western world. In this situation, Turkey’s political elite was able to have a new orientation. As the fear of Soviet aggression decreased there was a widespread new discourse that enabled political leaders to look beyond the nation-state paradigm.
Particularly after 9/11 there was what you call a “structural demand” for the “moderate Muslim democracy” label. For 10 years Turkey was the poster boy of this demand. Why did this happen? Was it a conscious decision by the AKP to cultivate this label?
The 9/11 terror attacks suddenly seemed to discredit all the previous talk of post-ideological politics. People began to think of the world as essentially defined by a struggle between large-scale civilizational entities:
Samuel Huntington’s famous “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, or at least how it was understood. At this time, when there was this perceived antagonism between the so-called Western world and the so-called Islamic world, there emerged an idea that the West had this long-term NATO ally Turkey that could function as a kind of balancer or bridge between antagonistic entities.
At the same time, Turkey’s EU candidacy was given a boost with the declaration of its official candidate status in 1999 and negotiations starting in 2005. So there was a huge expectation both in U.S. and EU circles that Turkey was more or less destined to become a role model, a liberal democracy ruled by Muslim conservatives who had allegedly managed to move beyond the political Islamist position and were now embracing democratic pluralist values.
I believe that the leading cadres of the AKP realized this situation and saw it as an opportunity – they used the “bridge” metaphor themselves. But in my opinion all the reforms of the AKP’s first term were very much instrumental. Their purpose was to delegitimize their political opponents and to consolidate the AKP in power. So I would definitely say that the EU and the U.S. should look in the mirror and take at least some responsibility for the legitimization of the AKP within this liberal democratic discourse.
The idea that the AKP was “post-Islamist” became widespread throughout the 2000s. Many people thought of it as a technocratic party that was only interested in modernizing Turkey’s economy, rather than pursuing a religious-identity agenda. How did this perception take root and why was it, in your opinion, mistaken?
The aforementioned events in the international arena were preceded by a very long debate in Turkey regarding to the so-called “Second Republic” [İkinci Cumhuriyet]. This debate was reproduced by influential liberal intellectuals, who claimed that the Kemalist project and ideology had very early on hijacked Turkey’s modernization process, and that the Kemalist ideology had become, with its secular nationalist discourse, the main obstacle to Turkey’s democratization. In this situation, the AKP was seen as a reformist inheritor of the Milli Görüş [National View] movement, Turkey’s main strand of political Islam.
This is a well-known story but the problem is that the story is full of inconsistencies and half-baked arguments. The liberals obviously thought they had domesticated a party of political Islam to their own agenda, but the AKP had obviously embarked on a very different project – one that can be called an Islamic-conservative state project. Its most essential elements, in my view, are that the AKP has tried to create a kind of social-political order where it is impossible to criticize the AKP from a liberal and secular position. It’s very difficult for any opposition parties to rise against the AKP because they have been so delegitimized. This is done by claiming that all troubles in Turkey emanate from the Kemalist tutelary regime, which according to this narrative ruled Turkey from 1923 to 2002. The “real nation” of pious conservative Muslims are said to have been marginalized throughout the republican decades – only liberated by the alleged liberal-democratic-conservative AKP. This narrative is a pure myth that is very skillfully used and propagated by the AKP cadres.
So we had the liberals saying they found a partner for their reform agenda and AKP cadres even today saying they have liberated Turkey from the tutelage regime. The reason why the AKP was able to get backing from the liberals was based on this widespread idea that the Islamic-conservative constituency would enforce the retreat of the state, which was dominated by a monolithic, almost petrified Kemalist elite. This was a crude simplification, a distortion of the past century of Turkey’s political history.
Even if the idea of the “secular elite” is crude and incomplete, was it not still a problematic reality that developed its own vested interests and established itself in untouchable power structures in Turkey?
Of course it was problematic. I would say that the state has been problematic in Turkey – my problem is with this definition of it as a “Kemalist state.” Kemalism represents a kind of radical modernizing perspective, and I would talk about the Kemalist state in Turkey only during the one-party era [1923-1950] of the Republican People’s Party [CHP]. After then, I think we have seen in Turkey a nationalist-conservative state, though of course there were groups within the bureaucracy and the army who afterwards used these Kemalist slogans in their own agenda.
There is a hint of truth in the Islamic-conservative narrative that the previous state elite did look down upon other people, especially conservative Muslims. My point is that this is not something unique to Turkey. This is how modernizers and urban elites have behaved in all European states.
Where I do agree with the criticism is in terms of the ethnic definition of Turkishness, where I think the Kemalists committed a terrible sin. They should have seen by the 1960s that it is not possible to define nations through such a strong ethnic definition. During the 1960s, the Kemalist circles had become left-wing oriented, so they should have made a deal with progressive Kurds to come up with a different idea. In that sense, regarding the Kurdish issue, I think the Kemalist tradition has been a tremendous burden to Turkey.
Turkey at the moment is in the midst of a big shift, ahead of yet another election. The populist political Islam of the AKP has for 13 years been predicated on the idea that it is the majority, the “authentic” representative of the nation. Now that the AKP has lost its parliamentary majority, and may not get it back, what does that mean for the inherently majoritarian AKP project?
That’s a very difficult question. At the moment it is not the PKK or the ethno-nationalist Kurdish movement that threatens the AKP project; it is the HDP, the Kurdish party’s ability to emerge as a kind of liberal democratic movement. This demonstrates that even the Kurds are not the kind of monolithic, Islamic-conservative constituency that the AKP imagines the whole of Turkey to be.
There is obviously a very brutal power struggle going on in Turkey at the moment. To go back to the earlier point, there was a widespread expectation that political inclusion and economic development would moderate the political Islamists, but we are now witnessing a very significant – even historic – course of events. If the AKP is unable to get back its absolute majority, we will come to the question of whether the political Islamists will hand over power.
On the other hand, we are only now starting to see just how strong the ideological layer of the party is. If a parliamentary majority does not back this political Islamist movement it will be an interesting moment:
Either the political Islamists will have to step aside, or it will be proven that the very widespread idea of political inclusion of these groups to make them more democratic has been a failure.
August/29/2015
Published on: hurriyetdailynews
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