By: ZAUR SHIRIYEV
z.shiriyev@todayszaman.com
An additional important point about the Azerbaijanis who have joined the Syrian war relates to their education: how they got interested in the conflict and how they got involved.
The video footage posted on YouTube and open information sources about mujahideen groups show that Azerbaijanis have joined the fight under the umbrella of several affiliated groups. Among these are the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the al-Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), though recent information shows that most have joined the Army of Emigrants and Helpers (AEH) created by the Chechen-origin northern Caucasus mujahideen. This latter jihadist group was created later than the others, and given the general influence of the northern Caucasus jihadists over Salafi groups in Azerbaijan along with their geographical proximity, Azerbaijanis prefer to fight with them.
Moreover, foreign fighters in Syria are spread among different military units operating in various geographical areas, but the AEH is an exception, with its concentration of foreign fighters in a single unit. In this organization, Azerbaijanis are under a single command, which they feel makes them more efficient. There are two reasons for this. First, the Azerbaijanis fighting in Syria are from north Azerbaijan, which borders the northern Caucasus. Second, the AEH commander for Azerbaijanis identifies himself as Abu Yahya al-Azeri and appears in videos reading statements in Azerbaijani, outlining the objective of imposing Islamic law and calling on listeners to fight in Syria.
In this sense, there is no evidence to date that Azerbaijanis have joined other non-jihadist groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). There are several reasons for this. First of all, extremist ideology is the main reason why Azerbaijanis join jihadist groups; unlike the FSA, jihadist groups don’t care about the political integrity of Syria nor the fate of Bashar al-Assad. These jihadist groups fight against both Assad and anti-Assad forces.
Local Azerbaijani media has shared video footage of Azerbaijani jihadists openly saying that they have joined the war in the name of God, to spread Islam and be martyred. These are essentially farewell messages. Their indifference to Syria’s future as a sovereign state is also interesting. While some foreign fighters such as Chechens are fighting against the Syrian government as a continuation of the war with Russia (which supports Assad), this is not the case for Azerbaijanis.
Second, in the eye of jihadist groups, the FSA is Western-backed, and jihadists believe that the FSA are helping “kafirs (infidels)”. This is the first lesson for any foreign jihadist. Religious mentors for “beginner jihadists” (including Azerbaijanis) show videos of the FSA bombing mosques, holy places for all Muslims. Based on this, fledgling jihadists are ready to treat FSA as infidels.
What is most interesting is that the Azerbaijanis in Syria are fighting on both sides, against as well as for Assad. Until now, the only proof has been local media reports of Azerbaijanis who went to study in the Iranian city of Qom unexpectedly returning home in coffins having been killed in battles against the mujahideen in Syria. However, this is the only case of its kind and it is not clear whether Iran is influencing Azerbaijani Shiites to go to Syria.
Looking at this picture, the remaining questions are how Azerbaijanis are getting information about going to Syria and how they are travelling there.
Quite clearly, Azerbaijani fighters in Syria have access to key information before they go there, presumably from various jihadi information sources. Anyone who understands Russian can use Internet forums (such as the website http://salaf-forum.info); in the north Caucasus, the mujahideen have numerous websites in Russian. This network is heavily reliant on Internet communications. But on the other hand, it seems unusual that this alone would prompt Azerbaijanis to go to all the way to Syria. Thus it seems likely that there are also missionaries who are providing in-person religious education. This teaching and networking cannot be happening in mosques, because it would be too easy for intelligence services to identify them. They probably operate in private houses and invite people via the Internet, expanding their network that way.
These people probably travel to Syria routed via Turkey or Iran, but then it is unclear how they reach the final destination. There is no specific proof that the routing is via Turkey or Iran, but last December a few people were arrested at Baku airport — their final aim had been to get to Syria, but they were on a Turkish flight. This would also explain why Azerbaijani intelligence services failed to identify these people before they joined the Syrian war. There is a visa-free system in place with Turkey, and travel to Turkey is common for numerous reasons such as tourism, education or business. Intelligence services hold the view that it is impossible to check tourists; based on my own observations, I disagree.
Overall, based on the known facts, the exact number of people from Azerbaijan who have gone to Syria is unclear, but the means by which they find themselves in this trap is clear. The various jihadist groups and missionaries have been successful in persuading them to join Syria’s war, which they believe is a religious war. The only good news is that after the news about Azerbaijanis in Syria, local intelligence has located some members of jihadist groups. But more work needs to be done in terms of strengthening religious education and identifying causes of social alienation leading to this situation, such as welfare standards.