Kurdish Archives

Turkey 15 pro-Kurdish TV channels banned in Turkey

September 15, 2015 By administrator

More are approaching the new legislative elections in Turkey, the pressure intensifies on the media opposed to power. So that not only Twitter was suspended again, but more serious, 15 pro-Kurdish TV channels broadcast would be prohibited.

These attacks on freedom of expression are part of the line of deposits complaint by the authorities against journalists, such as against the Chief Editor of Today’s Zaman, Bulent Kenes.

If the AKP were to regain the majority in the elections of November, one wonders about the emergency powers that could bring Recep Tayyip Erdogan when we see what is happening in Turkey, especially against the Kurdish population. A president who, in his wildest dreams think the rally the people to his standard by shining against the Kurds.

According to a survey Metropoll, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) would get 41.4% of the vote, against 40.9% in June, while the Republican People’s Party (CHP Kemalist left) would gain 2.3% compared to the elections of June 6, with 25%. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) would increase his score with 15.3% (against 16.3% in June) and the Peoples Democratic Party (HDP pro-Kurdish) remains at 13% (13.1% in June).

Tuesday, September 15, 2015,
Jean Eckian © armenews.com

Kurdish forces liberate seven Iraqi villages from Daesh

September 11, 2015 By administrator

Kurdish Peshmerga fighters have managed to retake seven villages in the northern part of Iraq from Takfiri Daesh militants as they continue to push the terrorists back from the area.

Idris Sheikh Adel, the chairman of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) political party in Kirkuk Province, told Arabic-language al-Sumaria satellite television network on Friday that Peshmerga fighters liberated the villages of Albu Mohammad, located some 30 kilometers (18 miles) south of the provincial capital city of Kirkuk, Minor Tal Rabiah, Major Tal Rabiah, Sheikh Saleh, situated 45 kilometers (27 miles) south of Kirkuk, Zaklawa, Samoud and 7 Nisan (April 7) following fierce skirmishes with Daesh extremists.
Separately, seven members of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces lost their lives when bombs struck them as they were securing the road linking Baghdad to Kirkuk as well as the center of Daquq town, located approximately 180 kilometers (111 miles) north of Baghdad.

Brigadier General Mohammed Mustafa Hama, a Peshmerga commander, said 16 Kurdish fighters were also wounded in the act of violence.

Meanwhile, at least 20 Daesh Takfiri have been injured when Iraqi security forces fired a barrage of rockets at terrorist hideouts in the districts of Tal Masoud and al-Maziq, located nine kilometers (5.5 miles) east of Anbar’s provincial capital city of Ramadi.

The northern and western parts of Iraq have been plagued by gruesome violence ever since Daesh Takfiri terrorists mounted an offensive in June 2014. The militants have been committing vicious crimes against all ethnic and religious communities in Iraq, including Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, Christians and others.

The Iraqi army together with fighters from the Popular Mobilization Units has been engaged in operations to liberate militant-held regions.

Source: RT.com

Masoud Barzani and Kurdish presidential succession

August 12, 2015 By administrator

By Michael Rubin,

REUTERS/Ako Rasheed

Since Iraq regained its sovereignty in 2004, it has had four prime ministers : Ayad Allawi, Ibrahim Jaafari, Nouri al-Maliki, and current premier Haider al-Abadi. Over the same period, Iraqi Kurdistan has had one ruler: Masoud Barzani. In 2005, the Iraqi Kurdish parliament, dominated by Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), agreed that the presidency should be limited to two terms but they skirted the law in 2013 by unilaterally extending Barzani’s second term by two years. That ends on August 19 and, while the KDP remains the largest party in parliament, it lacks an absolute majority. By law, the speaker of parliament, currently from the opposition Gorran Movement, should become acting president. The minority parties, which Barzani could once co-opt, bribe, or coerce into supporting him, are so far refusing to support outright an extraconstitutional extension of his term.

As the political crisis unfolds, the independent (and London-based) Kurdistan Tribune as usual has perhaps the best political analysis. Barzani has become accustomed to power and, in the spirit of Middle Eastern dictators of decades past, is simply refusing to step down – law or not. For the Barzani family, the presidency has reportedly been worth billions of dollars, and that is not something they’re willing to give up. Yesterday, Barzani apparently ordered a convoy of military vehicles to drive through the capital Erbil in a show of force, a not too subtle threat of what might happen should Parliament push the issue.

Barzani would rather see Kurdistan descend into chaos than lose power. With the clock ticking down on what should be his final week in power, it’s still worth considering long murky questions that surround transition and Kurdistan’s future when a transition of power eventually does occur:

1) Where does Barzani live? Ever since Barzani returned to Iraqi Kurdistan – against the backdrop of the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein – he has resided in Sar-e Rash, a resort complex which had been appropriated by the Iraqi dictator. Barzani has expanded the palace complex, and made the former resort an insulated seat of power for the exclusive use of his family and closest advisors. In effect, it has become the seat of the presidency, home to reception halls and the formal functioning of office. If Barzani is forced to step down, however, what becomes of Sar-e Rash? Barzani has long treated it like personal property, but what title should or does he have to the property? Should the new president occupy the complex on August 20 and send Barzani, his sons, and his wives back to their home village? The analogy would be if President Obama decided that, on January 20, 2017, he should simply continue living in the White House, his successor be damned.

2) What’s the difference between government, party, and personal property? Barzani makes in official salary more per month than the US president does in a year. In addition, his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) owns often multiple offices in every district and every town (so too does the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). Barzani, over the nearly quarter-century since he returned to Iraqi Kurdistan, has conflated personal, party, and government property. If Barzani leaves office, how will the Kurdish government separate the finances? How will they retrieve monies that may have been illegally appropriated by Barzani and his aides? Will the KDP vacate offices and properties that do not belong to them? Will Gorran take them over, even on a temporary basis?

3) Will civil society speak up? Kurdish civil society is complicated. Many Kurds genuinely want democracy, but they would be wrong to blame outside powers exclusively for their failure to achieve it. After all, too many Kurds allow themselves to be co-opted by political leaders, parties, and neighboring powers. Too many civil society groups have subordinated themselves to party. Hero Khan, the wife of former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, maintains a staple of media and civil society groups and uses them as an arrow in her quiver – as much to target political opponents as to promote health and well-being. And the Barzani Foundation is best known for its private jet, lavish expenses, and its refusal to cooperate with other groups which might share the limelight. In effect, it has become the Kurdish equivalent of the Clinton Foundation. Still, there are elements of civil society that might speak up or at least allow independent voices. Kurdistan still maintains a small, but fiercely vocal independent press. Young journalists have literally put their lives on the line to challenge nepotism, corruption, and abuse-of-power. Too many other journalists, however, are afraid to take risks; it is time they do so. If Barzani believes everyone can be bought or silenced, there will be no change. The universities, too, could step up for change. The American University of Iraq-Sulaimani, for example, could be less shy about upsetting the powers that be, but its leadership and/or advisers include enough ambitious politicians (more than other corollary American universities) that it seeks to avoid controversy and remains deferential to Barzani.

4) Where are the bodies buried? Both Barzani and rival Jalal Talabani grew up under the political mentorship of – at various times – Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, Muhammad Reza Shah and Ayatollah Khomeini, and Leonid Brezhnev. Such models were often lethal. Neither Barzani nor Talabani have been as murderous as their mentors but nor have they been saints. During the 1994-1997 Kurdish civil war, perhaps 3,000 Kurds disappeared, including several hundred prisoners. Kurdish Interior Minister Karim Sinjari has acknowledged none of these are still alive, but neither Barzani nor Talabani (nor, for that matter, former Talabani deputy Noshirwan Mustafa) has openly acknowledged what happened and where the bodies are buried so that families can have resolution. Will a new president—even a temporary one—release files that Barzani has hidden because of image or shame?

5) How to handle transition? Make no mistake, the Kurds have achieved miracles, but at the same time, many of the top party officials have been involved in illegalities, whether abuse-of-power, illegal expropriation, or shady financial dealings. It will be impossible to unravel the entanglements quickly and transitions risk instability. Given that this could theoretically be the first real transition in modern Kurdish history, how will a new president professionalize what essentially is now a party bureaucracy? Will there be consequences or amnesty for past wrong-doings, or will a new government establish some sort of South Africa- or Morocco-style ‘Truth and Reconciliation’ Committee? For example, will the murderers of Sardasht Osman, Soran Mama Hama, and other journalists go free? Will the new government repossess private companies like Korek, acquired by Barzani’s nephew with the assistance of a questionable public loan? Given how Barzani has placed his placed his sons in various security and military agencies, how will a new president unravel his predecessor’s grip? Or will Barzani simply rule from afar?

Realistically, it is doubtful Barzani will abide by the law and step down. He sees himself as indispensable, and he has distributed enough patronage that supporters will fight to achieve in the streets what they might not be able to achieve through the law. Still, Kurdistan has never been so close to a democratic watershed, and if Kurds truly wanted it, they could go out into the streets to take what should be theirs. So, even if Barzani sits petulantly in his palace, it’s worth considering the future given that no dictator can escape his own mortality… and even if he won’t resign, Barzani is rapidly becoming an old man.

Source: aei.org

Video show Turkish forces brutalizing Kurdish workers & compere that with ISIS

August 8, 2015 By administrator

according to the pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) news agency, DİHA, the video was shot on Wednesday in Hakkari’s predominantly Kurdish district Yüksekova, where the Special Forces raided a private construction site and detained 52 people on unclear charges.

Kurdish militants threaten to attack Turkey dams

July 12, 2015 By administrator

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AFP/File | Hasankeyf, a small poverty-stricken town on the banks of the Tigris and once a mighty city in ancient Mesopotamia,

ISTANBUL (AFP) – A Kurdish militant group on Sunday threatened to target dams harnessing hydroelectric power in southeastern Turkey, accusing the government of violating a fragile ceasefire.

The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) said in a statement quoted by the pro-Kurdish Firat news agency that the building of the dams was aimed at displacing people and to help the Turkish military rather than creating energy.

Turkish forces and the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have largely observed a ceasefire since 2013 but tensions have flared again in the last months as the parties remain short of a final deal.

The KCK — considered the urban wing of the PKK — said it would use all means, including guerrilla attacks, to prevent the construction of dams.

“From now on, all the dams and vehicles used in the construction will be targeted by our guerrilla forces,” the KCK said, urging contractors involved in new projects to leave the areas.

The public “should know that our guerrilla forces will use their right of resistance against construction of dams and outposts for military purposes,” the statement added.

The KCK said that while it had demonstrated great responsibility in observing the ceasefire, the Turkish state had failed to observe the conditions of the truce.

It said there was no need to build additional hydroelectric dams in the region. Turkey argues the projects are needed to improve its energy self-sufficiency.

Kurds, widely seen as the world’s largest stateless people, are Turkey’s largest minority and the main group in the southeast of the country.

The PKK waged a decades-long insurgency for self-rule that claimed tens of thousands of lives but declared a truce in 2013 after the government opened secret peace negotiations with its jailed chief Abdullah Ocalan.

However Kurds have become increasingly frustrated with the government’s policy on Syria, as Ankara refuses to support the Kurdish groups fighting Islamic State (IS) jihadists inside Syria.

The tensions come as the main pro-Kurdish party in Turkey — the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) — scored a breakthrough in June elections to take 80 seats in parliament.

Sales of Kurdish oil point to beneficiaries close to Erdoğan

April 4, 2015 By administrator

By DOĞAN ERTUĞRUL / ISTANBUL

Kurdistan, Turkish Cash Cow (photo gagrule)

People close to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are the beneficiaries of a lucrative oil deal signed between Ankara and Arbil that has laid the framework for the transfer of Kurdish oil, as the company granted the exclusive right to the transfer through Turkey is run by a former deputy candidate from the ruling party and an ex-official from Çalık Group, a company known to have ties with the ruling party.

Furthermore, according to a book written by the Hürriyet daily’s Washington correspondent, Tolga Tanış, Powertrans, the company that was given the exclusive license to carry and trade Kurdish oil by the cabinet shortly after its foundation in 2011, is run by Berat Albayrak, who is married to Erdoğan’s daughter, Esra Albayrak.

Who are the people behind Powertrans? Well, Turkey has sought an answer to this question since the establishment of the company. According to trade registry data, the general manager of the company is a former deputy candidate from the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) Ahmet Sadi Güngör, who also previously worked in the Petroleum Trade Coordination department of Çalık Group. For this reason it is claimed that the company’s secret partner is Çalık group.

Players making profit from oil deal between Arbil and Baghdad not known.

On Dec. 29, 2013, a new relationship between Turkey and Kurdistan began. On that day, Ankara and Arbil signed a series of agreements that had been in development for some time. The agreements, valid for 50 years, regulate the delivery of Kurdish oil and gas to the Ceyhan district of Adana, products which will then be sold on the international market.

As expected, Baghdad fiercely opposed the deal, accusing Arbil of “being in pursuit of independence.” The Maliki government also accused Turkey of “interfering in the sovereignty rights of Iraq,” but by then the genie was out of the bottle, and Ankara added new agreements to the deal in March 2014.

Access to Kurdish oil was indeed a great opportunity for Turkey and the region. But things did not go well. A transparent oversight mechanism open to international monitoring announced by Energy Minister Taner Yıldız was never established. Today it is unknown who buys Kurdish oil and who then sells it to whom at what prices, or how Turkey gains from the trade. It was only after Baghdad’s appeal to an international court of arbitration that people learned the names of the local and foreign companies selling Kurdish oil on international markets.

Due to the failure to establish a transparent mechanism to oversee the sales of oil extracted in northern Iraq, little is known about the buyers and sellers of the oil, extracted by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the price at which it is sold, or what Turkey gains as a gateway country for the Kurdish oil to be sold on international markets. The oil extraction capacity of the Kurdish region rose to 400,000 barrels per day as of January, while 150,000 of those barrels are sold on the domestic market.

The rest is flown to the Ceyhan pipeline in line with the agreement signed with Baghdad, while a portion of this oil is given to some oil extraction companies in order to pay off Kurdistan’s prior debts. According to information given by the Vice President of Arbil Chamber of Commerce and Industry Mele Mecid, the foreign companies and the Turkish companies extracting oil take 30 percent of all extracted oil in order to cover debts Arbil is unable to pay in cash. Oil companies then sell 30 percent of the oil they extracted on international markets at prices they determine.

On the other hand, no transparency has been achieved on the identity of the bank where these petro-dollars will be deposited, an issue which Ankara, Arbil and Baghdad have been negotiating. It had been announced that the parties had agreed on state-run Turkish bank Halkbank. Yıldız even announced in October 2014 that $700 million had been deposited in Halkbank. However, it is still a mystery how much revenue has been made by the sale of Kurdish oil today.

Due to regional circumstances, there is no mechanism in the KRG to monitor and oversee oil sales. The only functioning supervising authority is the Committee on Natural Resources in the Kurdistan Parliament. The committee obtains information from Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami periodically.

In an interview with Sunday’s Zaman, committee head Sherko Cevdet provided information about the official data and the process regarding oil sales.

“Kurdish oil is sold at low prices due the economic crisis in the Kurdish region. As of January, 34 million barrels of oil were sold, which is equal to $2.5 billion,” he said. “Oil companies and some intermediaries are making big money. No one wants them to be disclosed,” he continues.

Cevdet added there are some 30 companies from 19 countries operating in the Kurdish region and it is difficult to make oil sales transparent and place the sales under supervision.

According to him, in order to make the sales of Kurdish oil more transparent, the disagreement between Baghdad and Arbil should be overcome. But there is little hope for a resolution of the crisis in the near future.

When asked, Arbil Chamber of Commerce and Industry Vice President Mele Mecid said, “What is the role of Ankara in the sale of Kurdish oil?” He said Turkey has a vital role in the sale of Kurdish oil after the energy agreement between the KRG and Turkey, which fundamentally changed the oil trade.

“There used to be tankers which shipped oil through land and a railway until the deal was made with Turkey. After the agreement, a limitation was placed on the trade made through tankers because Kurdish oil now flows directly to Ceyhan,” he says.

“The sale of Kurdish oil is under the control of the Turkish Energy Ministry. The ministry knows how much oil was sold, who bought it and how much money was deposited because the agreement stipulates so. On the subject of private companies, well, every government can grant some privileges. Turkey could have given privileges to some companies as well,” he added.

Delay in money transfers with Halkbank

“It is true that there is a bank account of Kurdistan in Halkbank. All the petrodollars used to be deposited there. But now not all the money is accumulated in Halkbank. Two new accounts were opened in the US and Germany as money transfers was not convenient with Halkbank. Money is now being transferred more rapidly. Halkbank was transferring money slowly due to a shortage of cash. Because of that, new accounts have been opened,” says Cevdet.

Even Kurdish Parliament does not know the fate of the money deposited in Halkbank. “We don’t know how much was withdrawn from the money accumulated in Halkbank. We don’t know how much interest rate the money yielded as well,” Cevdet said.

Iraq possesses 8.7 percent of oil reserves in the world, which is equal to 143 billion barrels. Around 30 percent of Iraqi oil reserves are located in the Kurdish region.

A total of 550,000 barrels of oil a day flow into Ceyhan from the Kurdish region and Kirkuk.

Powertrans: Mysterious company granted privilege in Kurdish oil

Return to the biggest question regarding Kurdish oil: Which Turkish firms are participating in the sale of oil from northern Iraq? Is Powertrans, which was founded by businessmen close to President Erdoğan, selling Kurdish oil from Ceyhan to international markets as claimed?

The knowledge of Kurdish authorities and the businessmen involved in the oil business in the region regarding those who are selling the oil is limited. This is due to the fact that the procedure on the sale of oil was not institutionalized at Kurdish administrative level.

In addition to Natural Resources Minister Ashti Hawrami and Prime Minister Nachirvan Barzani, only a few have thorough knowledge on the subject. Furthermore, the Kurdish authorities are not interested in those who sell oil in Ceyhan because of the terms of the agreement.

Nonetheless, the officials Sunday’s Zaman spoke to say the answer to the question is in the deal signed on November of 2013.

Interestingly, before Kurdish oil flowed into Ceyhan, debates on who would sell the oil had come onto the agenda of Parliament.

Republican People’s Party (CHP) deputy Aytun Çıray in a parliamentary inquiry had asked the energy minister what the agreement with Arbil featured, who was granted the license and privilege to transport Kurdish oil and, if it was true as claimed, according to which criteria Powertrans was given the privilege. However, no answer provided, as expected.

In response to a parliamentary question posed by CHP deputy Mevlüt Dudu on May of 2013, the ministry acknowledged that Powertrans had been given license to ship Kurdish oil from the Mediterranean to world markets.

But the questions asking which companies besides Powertrans had applied to transport the oil and according to which criteria the selection had been made were left unanswered, though it constituted an outright breach of the Constitution and Parliament bylaw.

Today no one, including Parliament, knows the terms of the agreement made with Arbil. Why? Because the KRG is not a sovereign state and thus the agreement made with it is not considered similar to agreements signed between states. It is qualified as an agreement based on terms of private law.

It also means the agreement did not require Parliament’s approval. The monitoring of an agreement worth billions of dollars was thus circumvented on a technical legal pretext.

On the other hand, Powertrans’ inclusion in the agreement is shrouded in mystery. According to data obtained by Sunday’s Zaman from KRG officials, Turkey founded an off-shore company to extract and sell Kurdish oil. The agreement with the KRG on the production of oil was made via this company.

The partners of the company that will operate in the six fields in the KRG include the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC) — nothing wrong here. But according to claims, the company also has domestic and foreign partners that are subjected to private law terms. Could these partners include Powertrans? It’s highly likely. What is certain is that Powertrans has the privilege to buy and sell Kurdish oil flowing to Ceyhan.

Powertrans not responding to allegations

Though Powertrans has been at the center of debates for some time, no official explanation has been provided by company officials. Our request for a meeting was not accepted by officials staying at a plaza in Maslak.

The officials of the company, who left our questions unanswered, said “According to our business contract, even a general manager might be fired if he provides information about the company,” and upon our insistence, said if we sent questions via e-mail, they would notify the headquarters in Singapore and we would then be contacted by the headquarters.

But two weeks have passed and no response has been provided by Powertrans to the below questions:

-Does Powertrans export northern Iraq oil? In which other regions and countries does the firm have a presence?

-Is Powertrans the only firm entitled to export Kurdistan’s oil flowing to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline?

-How much of the sales of 34 million barrels of oil since June of 2014 was done by Powertrans?

-What is the duration of the privilege granted by the Customs and Trade Ministry to Powertrans to sell oil?

-Is the money obtained by Powertrans after oil sales deposited in the Halkbank account of the KRG?

-Does your company have a partnership with the Çalık Group?

My questions may solve the mystery in the sales of Kurdish oil in Ceyhan to a certain extent. But the claims of illegality and fraud about the oil trade have not been satisfactorily explained because the answers should be provided by the Energy Ministry and the government that should monitor and provide transparency on the agreement.

Source: TodayZaman

Kurdish Authorities Claim IS Used Chlorine Gas In Attack

March 14, 2015 By administrator

By RFE/RL

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The January 23 suicide bombing happened between Mosul and the Syrian border

Authorities in Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) claim that Islamic State (IS) militants used chlorine gas in an attack against Peshmerga forces.

The KRG’s Security Council released a statement on March 14 that said Peshmerga forces had taken soil and clothing samples after an IS suicide bomber attack in northern Iraq in January.

The statement said the “samples contained levels of chlorine that suggested the substance was used in weaponized form.”

It was not possible to independently verify the claim.

The statement said the analysis was conducted in a European Union certified laboratory after KRG officials handed over the samples collected at the attack site to a “partner nation” in the U.S.-led coalition fighting IS militants in Iraq and Syria.

Peter Sawczak, spokesman for the Dutch-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), said his organization had not received a request from Iraq to investigate the incident so “the OPCW cannot immediately verify the claims.”

The OPCW oversaw the removal of chemical weapons from Syria after reported chemical weapons attacks by Syrian government forces on rebel-held areas.

The January 23 suicide bombing happened between Mosul and the Syrian border where Peshmerga forces were preparing defensive positions after a two-day attack on IS forces, according to the statement.

The statement said Peshmerga forces fired a rocket at an approaching vehicle so there were no casualties except for the bomber but about a dozen Kurdish fighters at the scene experienced nausea, vomiting, dizziness, or weakness.

The U.S. Central Command said on January 30 that an Islamic State chemical weapons expert had been killed in a coalition air strike near Mosul six days earlier.

The expert was identified as Abu Malik, who had been a chemical engineer during Saddam Hussein’s rule and joined Al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq in 2005.

Meanwhile, in northeastern Syria, Kurdish and Christian fighters were reportedly pushing IS militants out of villages in Syria’s Kurdish region.

Nasser Haj Mansour, a defense official in Syria’s Kurdish region, said on March 14 that fighters had captured the Christian village of Tal Maghas in Hassakeh Province that had been under the control of IS militants.

Haj Mansour and the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights both said the village was taken overnight.

Both also said warplanes from the U.S.-led coalition had been pounding IS positions in the area for several days and had continued attacks on March 14 near Tal Tamr village, some 10 kilometers from Tal Maghas.

With reporting by Reuters

Solidarity for the family of a Kurdish soldier Hujam Surchi, a Kurdish peshmerga beheaded by ISIS

February 5, 2015 By administrator

On 1 February, the journalist Saeed Yerevan, based in Washington, has launched crowdfunding site IndieGoGo, a campaign to help the family of Hujam Surchi, a Kurdish peshmerga décapitté by ISIS on 25 January.

The request is unusual for a journalist. But he said, “When the forces of darkness as the Islamic State threatens all of us, it makes us accountable to each other and call us to be grateful for those who protect us by their heroic actions. ” (article HERE)

The reason that pushed Saeed Yerevan to engage in this fundraising campaign, due to the situation of the family of Hujam Surchi. A family living below the poverty line, consisting of his wife and 10 children.

The journalist in his message ensures that every penny will go to the soldier’s family, in coordination with the Representation of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Washington DC. It also understand that the question of trust vis-à-vis itself, but relies on the public understanding since it is known – (see his blog here) . Besides, if you had to persuade, Aram Hamparian Suren, Executive Director of the ANCA Washington knows him and relayed the call itself Yerevan Saeed.

IndieGoGo visit HERE . The latter presents the collection of funds in dollars, which poses no problem. The amount will be debited from the bank in Euros.

Kurdish ISIS Recruits Threaten Identity and Security of Kurdish State

January 23, 2015 By administrator

By Rebecca Collard/Erbil

Some Kurdish Sunni Muslims prefer ISIS religious fanaticism to Kurdish nationalism

When Imam Shawan Kurdi disappeared in November, residents of his Daretu neighborhood of Erbil thought it was strange. The Friday before, Imam Shawan led prayers at the tiny Jaffer mosque but the next day, he, his wife and two daughters had vanished. Three days later, Kurdish intelligence confirmed that Imam Shawan had taken his family and two other young men from Daretu to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). He is now in Mosul, the largest city under the control of ISIS. Report Time

Imam Shawan is among hundreds of mostly young Kurds to cross the frontlines and join ISIS, who have been in battle with Kurdish forces since June. The Kurds are losing young men to the extremists and in Erbil many talk about fathers and sons fighting on opposite sides. Like ISIS, Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but nationalism has long trumped religious identity here. Residents in Daretu aren’t keen to talk about how they lost one of their own to the militants, but when pressed, they say there were signs Imam Shawan was leaning to toward ISIS.

“He always talked about…how we had to do things the way they did in the time of the Prophet Mohammed,” says Mohammed Jamil, a 54-year-old resident of Daretu who prayed behind the Imam for a year.

Imam Shawan was paid by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the body that runs the semi-autonomous Kurdish territory of northern Iraq. Officials here began to worry their youth were being radicalized in Kurdish government-funded mosques and religious schools.

“One of my employees, his son joined ISIS, and he was a student in one of our schools,” says Salam Sidan, an advisor at the KRG’s Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs. Late last year Sidan’s ministry fired 80 government-paid religious teachers they felt weren’t “modern” enough for the job. “Some of the Imams and Mullahs were preaching that non-Muslims are infidels,” says Sidan. “It’s natural, in a place where you have 5 or 6 million people, you are going to have some voices calling the others infidels.”

Sidan stresses that the ministry is being diligent, ensuring new hires fit with the Kurds’ ideas of acceptance and tolerance. The ministry has no exact figures on how many Kurds have joined ISIS but Sidan’s estimates around one in 5,000, which would put the number as high as 1,000. Most of these men simply disappear, raising suspicions of family and neighbors. Some are never heard from again but others surface online. “You can’t hide anything with social media these days,” says Sidan. “Everything is on Facebook. And they post proudly that they joined ISIS.”

Some appear on social media encouraging their brethren to come join ISIS and threatening the Kurdish forces known as peshmerga. In one video, titled “A message to the Peshmerga,” a man who identifies himself as a Kurdish ISIS fighter promises attacks his own people. “By sword we will chop your heads and by Quran we will implement God’s rule, Sharia,” said the young man, standing with a motley crew of militants, a black ISIS flag flapping in the corner of the screen. He warns Kurds to stop supporting the “Crusader Coalition” referring to the US-led alliance that has been targeting ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.

The Kurdish ISIS fighters pose a serious threat to the security of the KRG. Kurdish speakers usually cruise through security checks with few questions and little searching. In November, a truck exploded in front of government buildings in Erbil. An ISIS-affiliated website posted a statement claiming the attack and saying it was carried out by a Kurdish recruit they called Abdel Rahman el-Kurdi and two others. “They were able to cross all these borders,” reads the statement. “And hit the heart of Erbil….We ask god to accept them as martyrs.”

But here they will not be accepted. Most families are ashamed that their kin have pointed weapons at fellow Kurds and intelligence officials have said those killed fighting with ISIS will not be allowed funerals in Kurdish territory.

Salar Salim contributed to this report

Turkey, Kurdish leader: We recognize Armenian Genocide without question

January 19, 2015 By administrator

Selahattin Demirtas, who is co-chair of Turkey’s pro-Kurdish “Peoples’ Democratic Party” (HDP) and an ex-presidential candidate, has reiterated that they recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Demirtas responded to numerous questions, including the query on the recognition the Armenian Genocide, on the air of CNN Turk.

“We recognize the Armenian Genocide without question. The Kurds and others certainly have played a role in the Armenian Genocide, but the political will [to commit this genocide] was that of the Young Turks’ party, led by Enver and Talaat Pashas.

“If Turkey claims to own the Ottoman heritage, let it own it [, the Armenian Genocide], too. If not, let it come to grips with this tragedy,” Selahattin Demirtas specifically noted.