Lebanon’s Archives

Russia is keen to widen its influence in the Middle East. In the second of a three-part exclusive for DW, Benas Gerdizunas examines why the Kremlin is allegedly supporting the Greek Orthodox community in Lebanon.

In the aftermath of Lebanon’s civil war, the Greek Orthodox community failed to secure a fixed political representation in post-Taif Lebanon [the Taif Accords that ended the country’s 1975-90 civil war — the ed.]. It found itself usurped by the Maronite political clergy, the dominant representatives of Christians in Lebanon.

This left many in the community feeling underrepresented and barred from career paths, and more open to overtures from other creeds.

The problem, it seemed, was that there was no one to represent a fledgling community that suffered from fragmentation and emigration.

That changed with the emergence of the Orthodox Gathering (Liqaa Orthodoxi) in 2011, on the fringes of Lebanon’s political crisis, when Hezbollah forced the collapse of the government.

Founded by Orthodox clerics, former and current politicians, and various fringe parties in 2011, the key members of the Gathering include Elie Ferzli, Lebanon’s former information minister and deputy speaker of parliament.

In one of the first recorded meetings of the Gathering in February 2011, Ferzli claimed that the Orthodox community in Lebanon felt “oppressed and alienated.”

Eager to exploit the vacuum, the Kremlin, in 2011, pivoted toward the Gathering and the Greek Orthodox community, following the so-called Orthodox Law proposal that was put forward in 2011.

The Gathering draft law would allow sects to elect their own representatives, enabling fixed presence of Greek Orthodox forces in the parliament, which until now had no political footing. It would also secure Christian representation in the long-run.

In February 2013, coinciding with parliamentary approval of the draft law, Russia’s ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, reiterated his country’s “historical support for Greek Orthodox communities in the Middle East,” following a visit to Gathering headquarters in March.

The middlemen

In January 2014, Russia’s parliamentary delegation, allegedly including representatives from all parties, as well as Sergey Gavrilov, the head of the Duma’s committee for the “defense of Christian values,” stopped off in Lebanon en route to Syria, where they would meet President Bashar Assad and Patriarch John X of Antioch.

Smiar Nuaimi, the Orthodox Gathering’s secretary, brokered a meeting in Lebanon between the Russian delegation, Ambassador Zasypkin and Orthodox figures, including Elie Ferzli.

At that meeting, Gavrilov called for the “forming of a cooperative council to work on activating cooperation on all levels.”

“Lebanon differs from Syria. We cannot solve the problems of Christians by force using Russian fleets,” he said.

More recently, in February 2017, Lebanon’s president, Michel Aoun, received a Russian delegation at his residence, including Arseny Sokolov, the Moscow Patriarchate’s representative in the region, and Duma representatives, including Gavrilov. The nature of the conversation, according to the public statement released following the meeting, focused on Russia’s efforts to protect Christian minorities in Syria.

Sources close to the Greek Orthodox clergy have told DW that the Orthodox community is aware of Russia’s attempts to use “Christian protection” as a pretext for a more active role in Lebanon. The archbishop of Beirut, Metropolitan Elias Audi, allegedly told Russian ambassador Zasypkin that the Greek Orthodox had “never asked to be protected.”

Crucially, the conflict in Syria has prompted Audi to seek independence for his church, according to Ghassan Saoud, an independent Lebanese journalist.

“Audi is not with Russia politically, and at the beginning of the Orthodox Gathering he was not happy with it,” Ghassan told DW.

According to Ghassan, Patriarch John X of Antioch — the head of the Greek Orthodox church in Lebanon and Syria, based in Damascus — is using church funds to rebuild church properties in Syria, which is causing friction in Lebanon. “From the time he arrived in Beirut [in 1980], Metropolitan Audi has wanted to be independent; and now he has a reason to convince some people,” said Ghassan.

Audi’s secretariat declined interview requests, citing his refusal to discuss politics.

Closer cooperation

In October and November 2017, a spate of meetings between the stakeholders from Moscow and Lebanon resulted in calls for closer cooperation with Orthodox entities in Lebanon, including the Gathering.

What appears to be a particularly crucial meeting took place in October 2017 between Sokolov, the Moscow Patriarchate’s representative and Russian ambassador Zasypkin.

The statement released following their meeting emphasized the need for a “coordination of cooperation with different social and political associations of Lebanon, including the Orthodox Gathering.”

Elias Halabi, a high-ranking member of the General Secretariate of the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) and the director of the Inter-Church Network for development and Relief (ICNDR), told DW about the dangers posed by fringe parties that emerge to represent communities trapped in a political vacuum.

“The church in Lebanon confirms political principles, but never involves itself in the game,” said Halabi. He conceded, however, that a feeling of underrepresentation is prevalent within the Greek Orthodox community of Lebanon.

“It’s a double-edged sword,” Halabi said. “A group with fiery statements can hijack the whole community, especially as the church [in Lebanon] does not represent [a position].”

Joe Macaron,

Three interconnected developments that occurred in December 2017 will have a lasting impact on Lebanon. The Lebanese government made two long overdue decisions: launching the energy exploration process and setting the parliamentary elections date for next May. The third development is a breakthrough that has regional implications: a United Nations-sponsored meeting was held between Lebanon and Israel to discuss for the first time the demarcation of their maritime border, an official Lebanese source told Al-Monitor.

After years of tensions and delay, the Lebanese government had agreed in January 2017 on a formula to divide the offshore oil and gas blocks along the Lebanese coast on a political, geographical and sectarian basis. The winning bidder of the first licensing round was a consortium of France’s Total, Italy’s ENI and Russia’s Novatek. Their bid was confined to two blocks only, including block 9 in south Lebanon near Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Official sources in Lebanon told Al-Monitor that the exploration and production agreement between the Lebanese government and the consortium will be signed at the end of January, whereas exploration is expected to begin in mid-2019 and production in 2021-22.

The smooth flow of oil production can only be ensured by two factors: maintaining the minimal agreement among Lebanese leaders and maintaining the current rules of engagement between Hezbollah and Israel.

On the domestic level, the energy process will largely depend in the foreseeable future on the dynamics between President Michel Aoun and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. Aoun aims to keep the oil and gas exploration process in the Energy Ministry, which has been under the influence of his political movement since 2009, while Berri seeks to establish alternative institutions that allow him to exert control over the process.

The next parliament, with a term that expires once the energy exploration concludes in 2022, will have to debate and vote on establishing a sovereign fund to preserve and invest the surplus revenues of oil and gas production. The exploration process’ financial dimension is currently led by a small unit in the Finance Ministry, while the energy minister, advised by a multi-confessional Petroleum Authority, handles the technical side. Moving forward, Lebanese politics is not expected to have an impact on the exploration process, at least until production starts.

The maritime blue line

It is increasingly obvious that oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean adds a new layer to the complex enmity between Israel and Hezbollah, most notably in Lebanon’s southernmost blocks where oil and gas reserves are potentially abundant. The blue line that was drawn in 2000 between Lebanon and Israel, from Shebaa Farms to Naqoura, was not extended into the sea, which caused a dispute over 860 square meters (9,257 square feet) of international waters and triggered an energy exploration race between Lebanon and Israel.

US and UN efforts to resolve that dispute have previously failed and have been suspended since 2014. However, an official source in Lebanon told Al-Monitor that a trilateral meeting was held in late December 2017 between military commanders from Lebanon, Israel and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to discuss the demarcation of what is known as the maritime blue line. Meanwhile, Lebanon and Israel are making sure not to come close to the disputed international waters.

Indeed, the geopolitical impact of energy discovery on Lebanon and its neighborhood should not be understated, as it helped the country withstand domestic and regional turmoil since 2011, from upheaval in Syria to the recent resignation saga of Prime Minister Saad Hariri. As a result, the United States became more cautious in approaching Lebanese politics to help Israel clear roadblocks to become an energy player in the Middle East. Satisfied with the status quo along the Lebanese-Israeli border since 2006, both Hezbollah and Israel became less interested in a confrontation as they eyed the economic benefits of oil production.

The international community is invested as well in maintaining stability. The European-Russian consortium reflects a decision to sponsor Lebanon’s entrance to the petroleum production, which some have called a “petroleum UNIFIL,” as both France and Italy are heavily invested in the UNIFIL forces operating near the Lebanese-Israeli border.

Impact of energy production on Lebanon

Lebanon is not expected to become a major energy exporter, as the country’s excessive demand for electricity is big enough to absorb the energy production in the next two decades at least.

The data speculations regarding the estimated oil and gas reserves have fluctuated over the years. An official Lebanese source was skeptical, saying, “For sure, we do not have proven reserves. What is publicly available is informal information.” Furthermore, the production costs tend to increase when we move away from the Nile to the Mediterranean basin due to the thick sedimentary cover of the rocks on the Lebanese coast. While the Energy Ministry and the consortium signed a production-sharing agreement, production costs can later increase and cut the profits of the Lebanese state.

Managing expectations is paramount regarding the potential benefits and rewards of energy production. The Lebanese government has yet to devise a long-term economic plan or offer a road map that addresses the country’s crippling electricity problem and a national debt spiraling out of control. Lebanon’s energy promise could indeed be a regional game changer, but the jury is out on whether the Lebanese people will get the chance to reap the economic benefits.

The Kremlin’s tie-up with Lebanon’s Greek Orthodox community

Lebanon’s energy promise could be regional game changer