The Turkish Man Barzani in Ankara to Collect oil Money

July 14, 2014 By administrator

Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani arrived in Ankara on Monday for talks with Turkish leaders, including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Barzani, accompanied by three ministers of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had talks with Gül and is due to meet with Erdoğan later this afternoon. The kidnapping of 49 Turks, including the Turkish consul in Mosul last month, by militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is reportedly one of the main issues on the leaders’ agenda.

Reports allege that Barzani and the accompanying ministers are in Turkey to collect the Kurdish share of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil, deposited in Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank, but Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız denied such news, saying instead that the Kurdish delegation wants to turn temporary bank accounts opened for that purpose into permanent accounts. “They are coming, together with [Turkish] officials, for the opening of [permanent] accounts. We are making efforts to ensure that this becomes a sustainable business,” Yıldız told reporters.

Iraqi Kurdish website Rudaw reported late on Sunday that the Kurdish delegation in Turkey is there to make sure that the KRG can ultimately be paid for its oil sales through Turkey. “The purpose behind the visit regards a bank account for Kurdish oil revenue, which has been sold through Turkey, and transferring the account to the Kurdistan region,” Rebar Muhammad, the KRG minister of finance, was quoted as saying by Rudaw. Muhammad himself is part of the delegation, which also includes Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani and Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami.

The Rudaw report said the KRG has at least $93 million in its account at Halkbank, but it has been unable to withdraw its earnings from the sale of oil exported via a new pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This is because the Turkish government is still waiting for the resolution of a dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi central government on how to share revenue from the sale of northern Iraqi oil.

Yıldız said Turkey was not yet studying formulas that would open the way for the Kurds to take their share from the entire Iraqi oil sale. “We are talking about not only the northern Iraqi oil but also about Baghdad’s oil. The issue of splitting the northern Iraqi oil is not yet on our agenda; this is an issue to be taken up in the future. But, I have to say, we are working on [arrangements] concerning the rights of both Arbil [the KRG capital] and Baghdad,” Yıldız said.

Istanbul Corruption-linked manager to get bonus payment

March 27, 2014 By administrator

ISTANBUL, TODAY’S ZAMAN

FORMER HALKBANK GENERAL MANAGER SÜLEYMAN ASLAN (PHOTO: TODAY’S ZAMAN)

Former Halkbank General Manager Süleyman Aslan, who was detained after a large-scale corruption investigation became public on Dec. 17, 2013, and was later released, is expected to receive a bonus from Halkbank worth as much as TL 60,000, media reported on Thursday.

Aslan, from whose house $4.5 million stashed in shoeboxes was seized, was arrested along with the sons of two ministers and Iranian-Azerbaijani businessman Reza Zarrab early on Dec. 21, 2013. Aslan stated he was holding onto the money for charity.

The Taraf daily reported on Thursday that Aslan would receive a bonus payment on March 31 from Halkbank. The bank is readying for a reshuffle of its board in April. Sources have speculated that Aslan would lose his position as a board member. The news report raised criticism among market representatives that the bank was “awarding” the corruption suspect extra money. Following a request to be released by their lawyers, Aslan and eight other suspects who are accused of being involved in corruption and bribery were released by an İstanbul court on Feb. 14. Aslan was later rehired by Halkbank as a board member. The state-run bank had already appointed a new general manager to replace Aslan.

27 March 2014,

Turkey energy deal with KRG – Halkbank & TPIC an arm of the state-run Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) lacks transparency

January 9, 2014 By administrator

By: OLGU OKUMUŞ

Since international media reported crude oil flowing to Turkey from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), this oil flow’s legality has become a global issue. There is little transparency surrounding the issue in Turkey, as no public information has been released regarding through which pipeline Turkey is receiving Kurdish oil. Does a new pipeline exist in Turkey? If it does, who built, funds and manages it?

Indeed, if Kurdish oil is being exported out of Ceyhan, questions must be asked about this oil’s legitimacy and origins, before we can even begin to explore its effects on Ankara-Baghdad relations. The KRG-Turkey deal is shrouded in complete technical, juridical and financial opacity in Turkey, which is in contrast to the abundance of press releases that accompanied negotiations for the Nabucco, TANAP and South Stream pipelines.

The KRG oil flow has been expected since Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced in May 2013 that Turkey would pursue separate oil arrangements with the KRG, in partnership with ExxonMobil. The sector has questioned the legality of these agreements under both international law — as Iraq still lacks an oil-revenue sharing resolution — and under political acceptability, since the United States opposes the KRG’s independent energy trade with Turkey. This is probably why, following reports of KRG-Turkey oil flow, Turkish authorities stated that the oil would be stored at Turkey’s Ceyhan export hub and not exported without the Iraqi central government’s approval. Besides this proactive measure to defuse international tensions, the Turkish government has not made any effort to inform the public on this new oil import route for Turkey.

There has been no official statement as to where this oil flows throughout Turkish territories. During the KRG’s oil pipeline construction to the Turkish border, the Turkish government made no announcement about the Turkish part of the pipeline. With such scarce information, one can only speculate on different scenarios for this KRG-Turkey oil flow.

The first scenario would be for the Kurdish pipeline to link up with the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline on Turkish territory. This 970-kilometer crude oil pipeline was built during the reign of Iraq’s Baathist government. According to the governmental agreement regarding the pipeline, neither Iraq nor Turkey could transfer oil via the pipeline without the other party’s approval. This condition became an issue when authorities previously proposed to join the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to Kirkuk-Yumurtalik’s section in Turkish territory.

Indeed, if the flow is occurring via the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, then Turkey must already have the approval of Baghdad, and should already be earning transit revenues. Or, if Baghdad has not given its support, the legal framework of this oil flow remains murky. If Ankara is using the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline for the oil sent by Erbil without Baghdad’s approval and/or without paying Baghdad a transit fee, then Turkey has violated the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik governmental agreement. This violation could endanger Turkey’s prestige, jeopardizing its reliability as an energy transit country for its contracts with Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia.

The second scenario is that Turkey has built a new, independent oil pipeline running from Iraq’s KRG border to its Ceyhan port. But if there is a new pipeline operating in Turkish territories, then where does this pipeline run, who built it and when was it built? How much did this new pipeline cost, and how did the Turkish government fund it? Moreover, how did the Turkish government build a new pipeline without notifying the public?

In both scenarios, questions remain unanswered on import mechanisms. These questions concern which company was awarded oil-import contracts from Iraq to Turkey, how these import revenues would be paid and whether the Turkish parliament issued a ratification bill for this import deal. One can answer these questions only by surmising.

For example, in May 2013 Erdogan did not give the name of the state-owned firm set to spearhead efforts in the KRG, but various sources suggested the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC), an arm of the state-run Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO). Likewise, in November 2013, Turkey’s minister of energy and natural resources, Taner Yildiz, suggested Ankara could serve as an independent intermediary for revenues from the project by having Iraq’s oil revenues deposited into an escrow account at a Turkish state bank. As Halkbank already serves as mediator for Iran’s energy bill, one can surmise this state bank would be Halkbank as well.

Indeed, if the KRG and Turkey have launched an oil trade, this could be commercially enticing for both sides, but it risks becoming politically destructive. A lack of transparency may not only hamper both sides’ domestic support but also Turkey’s objective of becoming a reliable energy hub.