KRG Archives

Human rights watch Report Kurdistan Regional Government: Mass Executions of Detainees

February 8, 2018 By administrator

New evidence suggests that between August 28 and September 3, 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Asayish security forces from the West of the Tigris branch carried out mass executions of alleged Islamic State (also known as ISIS) fighters in their custody, which constitutes a war crime.

Mass Grave Located Near Bardiya Village

(Erbil) – New evidence suggests that between August 28 and September 3, 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Asayish security forces from the West of the Tigris branch carried out mass executions of alleged Islamic State (also known as ISIS) fighters in their custody, which constitutes a war crime, Human Rights Watch said today.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Peshmerga military forces detained the men, both foreign and Iraqi, in a school in Sahil al-Maliha, a village 70 kilometers northwest of Mosul. Asayish forces bused them to a prison in Shilgia, a village 45 kilometers away, according to a now retired security force member, and from there they took them to two sites in the vicinity of the town of Zummar, where they executed them. Human Rights Watch located an apparent mass grave site where Asayish buried at least some of the bodies after the executions, according to the retired security force member and six residents of the neighboring village. KRG criminal justice authorities should investigate the apparent war crimes and prosecute those implicated up to the highest levels of responsibility.

“The evidence suggests that Asayish security forces conducted mass executions of captured ISIS suspects night after night for a week, perhaps killing scores or even hundreds of male detainees,” said Lama Fakih, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “Iraqi and KRG authorities should urgently and transparently investigate the allegations of mass executions and hold those responsible to account.”

Because the mass grave site is located within the flood zone of the Mosul Dam reservoir, it is critically important to urgently allow international forensic experts to conduct a detailed exhumation of the site before seasonal rains fill the reservoir again later this year and submerge the grave site, complicating the identification of bodies, Human Rights Watch said.

Human Rights Watch was not able to speak with witnesses to the executions. But other evidence suggest that Asayish forces executed the ISIS suspects. Human Rights Watch spoke to a now-retired security force member, “Nadim,” who was regularly in contact with the Asayish members who told him they participated in the executions. Researchers also analyzed video and photographic evidence, including geotagged photos of bodies and satellite imagery showing the apparent mass grave was created sometime between July 5 and September 3 by bulldozer, and interviewed residents of a neighboring village.

Nadim went to one of the execution sites on August 29, where he said he saw approximately 30 bodies hours after the first group of men are believed to have been executed. Human Rights Watch visited a mass grave site where Nadim and local villagers said bodies were buried on January 30, 2018, and a second time on February 6.Nadim said that on August 29, a friend of his in the Asayish said that he and other Asayish members, all part of the West of the Tigris Asayish branch, had taken about 80 detainees suspected of ISIS affiliation from Shilgia prison the night before and had executed about 50 of them outside the village of Tal Ahmed Agha al-Kabir, and the others outside Bardiya village, which researchers visited.

Nadim said that a few hours later he traveled to the site near Bardiya, which he located based on information from locals who told him they discovered bodies there. There, he counted about 30 unburied bodies, all shot in the head, and took three photographs of them and two short videos. Human Rights Watch reviewed the photos and videos and was able to confirm based on their metadata that they were taken on August 29, 460 meters from a mass grave which was later created. In total, the photos and videos show at least 20 bodies of men. The bodies did not have visible injuries consistent with battle wounds or suicide attacks, were dressed in civilian clothing, and did not appear to have their hands bound or eyes blindfolded.

Nadim said that an Asayish security member also told him that in the evening of August 30, and through the early hours of the following morning, he and a group of other Asayish members loaded between 100 and 150 men into a large refrigerator truck, keeping them there, in freezing temperatures, for seven hours. They transported the men to the site of the previous executions near Bardiya, dumped the bodies of the men who had died in the truck from the cold or asphyxiation in a ditch, and shot and buried alongside them any who were still alive, he said.

Nadim’s statements were partially corroborated by photographic evidence posted on social media and another witness statement. A photo of what appears to be the truck that transported the detainees surfaced on Twitter on September 2 on at least two Twitter accounts, one of which has been suspended. One of the tweets states that Kurdish Peshmerga forces executed 375 ISIS members captured since August 27, northwest of Tal Afar. The other states that between August 27 and September 1, 375 ISIS fugitives from Tal Afar to Zummar and northwest al-A’yadhia were executed.

The photo shows a white truck and a pile of bodies underneath, in a ditch. A Bardiya villager also told Human Rights Watch that on an evening at the end of August, he saw Kurdish forces drive through the area with two large white refrigerator trucks.

The two tweets also included two other photos. One shows a man in what appears to be an Asayish uniform, his face painted over to hide his identity, standing over a pile of bloody bodies. The second shows over 15 bloodied bodies in a pile in an open grave. In both photos, the hands of some of the men appear to be bound.

Read More: https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/08/kurdistan-regional-government-mass-executions-detainees

Iraqi Kurdistan KRG closes offices of Yezidi rights organization Yazda

January 2, 2017 By administrator

ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Kurdish authorities confirmed that they have closed the office of the rights organization Yazda, which advocates on behalf of the Yezidi community, because it did not abide by the terms and conditions of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the Region.

Monday evening, Yazda said in a statement that their offices were “formally closed by the Security Forces ‘Assayesh’ for unknown reasons, this includes all Yazda’s humanitarian projects serving the Yazidi community.”

Dr. Dindar Zebari, head of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s High Committee to Evaluate and Respond to International Reports, told Rudaw English that the closure came after the rights organization ignored an initial warning to abide by the rules of the Kurdistan Region regarding the work of NGOs.

Zebari said the department for NGOs had earlier warned them to fully abide by the rules, but that they failed to do so in “some aspects” and they “stepped outside their organizational mission.”

He refused to give specific details of the closure, saying that the decision came from the NGO department.

Rudaw English could not immediately reach the NGO department for comment.

Local and international organizations have to register with the NGO department in order to work in the Kurdistan Region.

Zebari said Yazda is a registered organization.

Iraqi Kurdistan: Kurdish Journalist Abducted, Killed, repeated interrogations by the KRG’s

August 26, 2016 By administrator

Wedad Hussein Ali, 28, a Kurdish journalist who was abducted in Dohuk on August 13, 2016 and later found dead.
© 2016 Private

Threatened by Security Forces Over His Reporting

(Dohuk) – An Iraqi Kurdish journalist who had been threatened by security services was abducted and found dead on August 13, 2016. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) should ensure a prompt, thorough, and impartial investigation into the killing of Wedad Hussein Ali, 28, who was allegedly affiliated with the armed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Witnesses described his apparent kidnapping by unknown assailants, who claimed to be Kurdish security forces, following repeated interrogations by the KRG’s Asayish political police forces over the past 12 months about his writings critical of Kurdish authorities.

“The KRG should provide serious answers about how it came to be that this journalist was kidnapped and killed in broad daylight, following repeated interrogations by Asayish forces,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at Human Rights Watch. “He is one of dozens of journalists in KRG territory who have been killed, beaten, detained, or harassed.”

In 2015, the METRO Center to Defend the Rights of Journalists, a Kurdistan journalism rights advocacy group, documented 145 cases of attacks on journalists that year including arbitrary detention, ill-treatment, and unlawful killing. In 2011, following large public protests in the region, journalists faced attacks and threats, including from the security forces. In March 2011, Human Rights Watch interviewed more than 20 journalists, who said that security forces and their proxies routinely threatened, arbitrarily arrested, beat, and harassed journalists, and confiscated and destroyed their equipment.

Tariq Hussein Ali, 40, told Human Rights Watch that his brother Wedad was an accredited journalist for the pro-PKK RojNews, and also worked in the cultural office of the Dohuk governorate, part of Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

Two of Wedad Hussein Ali’s friends told Human Rights Watch that he had spent time in PKK camps two years ago, though not as a fighter. Over the last months, Asayish officers had taken Wedad in for questioning three times about his role supporting the PKK and his work as a journalist.

One of his friends said he saw a text message with a death threat on Wedad’s phone. Wedad told him the threat came from a man who he believed worked for Parastin, intelligence forces for the Kurdistan Democratic Party, one of the governing parties in the region.

Tariq Hussein Ali said that his brother told him in July that the Asayish had detained him and ordered him either to leave the paper or provide intelligence from inside the publication. “Otherwise we will stop you,” his brother said they threatened. Tariq Hussein Ali said his brother said he had been beaten and that his ribs and shoulders were covered in dark bruises and he could not walk for 10 days after the interrogation.

Wedad ignored their threats and continued his work, his brother said, including publishing articles and Facebook posts alleging corruption within the KRG. He also wrote Facebook posts criticizing Kurdistan Democratic Party forces for abandoning the Yezidi community when the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, took over the area where they lived, killing and abducting thousands of Yezidis. Another friend said that the journalist had told him that he was in danger if he stayed in the Dohuk area.

On August 13, at 8:45 a.m., Wedad Hussein Ali dropped another brother, Sardar, 35, at the construction site where he worked near a marketplace in the Malta neighborhood of Dohuk. Sardar Hussein Ali said that 15 minutes later, he saw large crowds gathering and police cars arriving at the marketplace. He saw his brother’s empty car in the middle of the road.

A police officer told him that unidentified men had detained his brother. Another man told him he saw two unmarked cars cut off his brother’s car, and that three men inside had dragged his brother out, hooded him, forced him into one of the cars at gunpoint, and drove off in the direction of the highway. The witness said the men told Wedad they were security forces, arresting him because he had “an accident with children.” The witness said he noted the make and license numbers of both cars.

Sardar Hussein Ali said that police officers took him and the witness to the police station, questioned them and another brother, Darban, who joined them, and promised to view footage from security cameras in the shop the witness had left before the abduction. The witness later posted the details of what he had seen on Facebook, a screenshot of which Human Rights Watch reviewed. The post began with, “After I post this, maybe someone will find my body in the city street.” Four days later the witness took down the post. The Hussein Ali family said that since then his profile has been inactive and they have tried unsuccessfully to contact him.

At about 10:45 a.m., as the brothers were driving home, Darban Hussein Ali said, a policeman he knows called him to say that someone from his family was at the Azadi Hospital in Dohuk. The family went to the hospital and found Wedad’s body in the morgue. He said they asked the investigative judge in the hospital how the body got there and were told that police from Semmel, a city west of Dohuk, found it dumped on the side of the road.

Photographs of Wedad’s body, taken by his family at the morgue, that Human Rights Watch reviewed, show lacerations, abrasions, and contusions of the head, torso, and extremities. The pattern of bruising and lesions suggests they may have been caused by a blunt long cylindrical object, such as a bat or baton, a doctor who reviewed the photos said.

A senior Semmel police officer told Human Rights Watch on August 18 that they were looking into the case but had no update on the progress of the investigation.

At least two other journalists have been murdered in the KRI. Kawa Garmiani, from the town of Kalar, was shot dead on December 5, 2013, after threatening to expose corruption. Garmiani’s lawyer said that in 2014, a court sentenced Twana Khalifa, who was allegedly affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan political party, to death for Garmiani’s murder, but an appellate court reduced the sentence to life in prison. Soran Mama Hama, a journalist in Kirkuk, was killed on July 21, 2008, after receiving threats about a report he planned to publish on alleged police complicity in the city’s sex work. No one has been arrested for his death.

A number of journalists, including Sherwan Sherwan and Sabah al-Atrushi, are facing prosecution for their reporting. Isa Barzani, a retired fighter for the Kurdish Peshmerga security forces, whose Facebook posts were critical of President Masoud Barzani, was arrested on August 4, 2015, by the Parastin and held for six months, then released and barred from travelling outside the KRI.

The KRG should establish an independent investigation into Wedad Hussein Ali’s death, particularly in light of the implication of Kurdish security forces. Police should immediately release the video showing his kidnapping, as well as the report of the police who allegedly found his body.

“The authorities’ failure to prevent attacks on journalists not only denies them justice, but has a chilling effect on what they can report,” Whitson said. “The authorities should show they are actively and aggressively hunting for the culprits of this crime, and not just promising yet another bottomless investigation.”

Sarah Leah Whitson

Middle East director at Human Rights Watch

Source: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/25/iraqi-kurdistan-kurdish-journalist-abducted-killed

Iraqi Kurdistan: The KRG Economy: Booming or Dooming? oligarchy & Money laundering

March 8, 2015 By administrator

By Harem Karem and Kamal Chomani:

he Ibrahim Khalil and other border points have generated huge revenues – for whom?

‘Kurdistan is booming’ was the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oligarchy’s catchphrase – often echoed by short-sighted foreign businessmen – over the past decade. Undoubtedly, there has been development: hundreds of hotels and skyscrapers have mushroomed in the region, the standard of living has improved in comparison with the civil war era, and public services have improved to some extent.

However, this ‘booming economy’’ – or, as we call it ‘capitalism on steroids’ – hasn’t been due to the smart strategic planning of astute visionary members of the oligarchy. Instead, it has been primarily due to the billions of dollars poured into the region following the invasion of Iraq, mainly through international development programs, large-scale international money laundering and natural resources exporting – smuggling through the backdoor or by official routes.

Since 1992, for example, tens of millions of dollars per day have been generated at the border points with Turkey and Iran such as Ibrahim Khalil, Hajyomaran, Bashmakh and Khanaqeen. Until recently this income was not officially recorded and it was often appropriated by the dominant political parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). Even now there is a lack of transparency surrounding these funds.

As a result of the lack of long-term planning, mismanagement and the oligarchy’s attempt to thwart progress and divert projects for its own gain, most developments have benefited a tiny gang of greedy, money-munching monsters at the heart of government, while the majority of ordinary citizens have struggled to make ends meet.

By implementing half-baked populist policies to keep the populace submissive and prolong their exclusive grip of power, the oligarchy has deliberately promoted complacency and low productivity by creating a deformed welfare state – assigning nearly 80% of the national budget to a dole scheme and rewarding their hordes of lackeys by distributing public lands, luxurious cars and lucrative salaries at the national expense.

Such schemes have paved the way for thousands of villages to become deserted, the countryside abandoned and agriculture for internal consumption neglected throughout the region. Take the example of Sakran, one of 400-plus villages in the Choman area, situated in Eastern Choman (120 km North-East of Erbil). Until the nineties, it was self-sufficient and, what’s more, selling its products in the market. Sakran was a well-known agricultural brand in the Erbil province. All the people of this village were farmers. But, as a direct result of the KRG’s failed policies, the village is now deserted, with all its people living in the city and most receiving hand-outs from the KRG. Furthermore, local crafts have disappeared at an alarming rate: local products are fast becoming extinct, despite the fact that, historically, the region was self-sufficient through the centuries, resisting many calamities.

The ruling parties deliberately ignored the real needs of the countryside, putting farmers on the dole because they wanted to buy votes and strengthen their private militias. Sadly these local despots have managed to inflict a huge damage on society in two decades which the enemies couldn’t achieve in nearly a century. There is a saying among Kurds: “An axe cannot cut down a mighty oak-tree if the handle isn’t made of itself”.

The clientelist and kleptocratic practices of the oligarchy have paved the way for monumental failures politically, economically and in terms of government performance as well as the burgeoning grievances of the populace. The oligarchy has been wielding its axe to tear apart the society (‘divide and conquer’), running a patronage system to maintain a disproportionate hold on every aspect of power and business, together with multi-million-dollar, state-of-the-art propaganda machines to launch mass deception campaigns. How many millions, for example, are being allocated from the KRG budget to the Rudaw media empire owned by the prime minister?

In the words of the current finance minister, who took office less than a year ago as part of the coalition agreement, “out of almost 30,000 employees in the ministry, half of them do not exist”. Corrupt officials have registered their associates and party supporters to receive salaries without doing any work. It can be suspected that essentially the same is true for the rest of the ministries and local authorities.

Our quarrel here is not with those suffering from the KRG’s fraud and deception but with the oligarchy and those propagating its failed policies and corruption. Blinded by their own self-interest, and to feed the populist welfare state they have created, the oligarchy has pursued a myopic oil policy since 2007 without any due regard to existing oil and gas laws and ignoring national interests and experts’ warnings about the recklessness of putting all the eggs into one basket. Today, with the oil price at a record low, the total oil revenue at its best wouldn’t exceed $500 million each month, while the welfare state they have created requires $711 million. Additionally, the KRG needs $334 million to provide electricity every month and more than $200 million to protect its borders with IS and support the internally displaced people.

The oligarchy blames the budget dispute with Baghdad for all these problems, diverting attention from its own greed and lack of a viable economic strategy. Furthermore, the Kurdish oligarchy has been deeply involved with Baghdad since 2005, holding the positions of Iraqi presidency, deputy prime minister, deputy parliament speaker and several ministries including finance and foreign ministries.

The fact is that, over the past decade, more than $100 billion (and this is just the declared income) has poured into the KRG’s coffers and, not only has it failed to invest this wisely, but today the KRG owes nearly $18 billion – mainly to the oligarchy-owned giant companies and banks! We can safely say that the hundreds of luxurious hotels and skyscrapers are no substitute for what the region’s people urgently need: thousands of school buildings, hospitals, roads, dams and social wellbeing programs to look after the large numbers of people living below the poverty line.

There is a lack of official statistics but tens of thousands of the elderly have not received their pensions for the past three months. They turn up to their local bank each month only to be told it hasn’t got any money. Hundreds of thousands of teachers and other civil servants haven’t received wages for December, January and February. We know that most are struggling with their food and heating bills and those who live in rented accommodation or have a sick family member can often survive only through charity.

In conclusion, the booming economy has mainly benefited the corrupt political elite (oligarchy): many of them rapidly became millionaires and billionaires, while a majority of citizens are now seeing a dooming economy with increasing calamities

Source: kurdistantribune.com

The KRG should accept responsibility for the current calamity in Kurdistan

August 10, 2014 By administrator

Dr. Hussein Tahiri — Special to Ekurd.net

August 10, 2014

The defeat of Kurdish forces at the hand of a terrorist group sent a shockwave through Kurdistan. It caused the exodus of tens of thousands of Kurdistanis, many deaths, countless rapes and pillages. This cannot be considered as an ordinary defeat or a tactical withdrawal. It has far reaching implications for the Kurds and their image in Kurdistan and beyond.

First, the fact that the Peshmargas evacuated their positions in Shangal, Zumar and other Ezidi populated areas and exposed the defenceless Ezidi population to an onslaught by the Islamic State is unforgivable. The Islamic State is a terrorist group that knows no boundary in savagery and is willing to go as low as a human being can go to satisfy their savage God whose demand for worship is only terror and blood of innocent people. How a defence force of a country can leave their population at the mercy of such savages?

Yes, Kurdistan shares more than 1000 Kilometres with the Islamic State and given the long borders, the Kurdish forces are stretched but the same applies to the Islamic State forces. Don’t the Kurds claim to have a force of 200,000 Peshmargas to defend Kurdistan? What happened to those Peshmargas who could hold up and defeat a huge Iraqi army with their basic weapons?

Whatever the Ezedis might be feeling towards Kurdish nationalism and their Kurdish identity is not relevant at this point. They are Kurdistanis and they must be defended. Leaving the Ezidis at the mercy of a terrorist group is not only a reckless act but crime.

Second, Christians within the border of Kurdistan must be protected like any other Kurdish citizen. In fact, Christians and other minorities should be given priority when it comes to the protection of their lives and properties. They are more vulnerable to terrorists as a minority and as non-Musims. The Kurdistan Regional Government has a duty of care towards them and they must have been protected.

Third, the defeat of Kurdish forces at the hand of a terrorist group undermines the very notion of Kurdistan independence. The Kurds in South Kurdistan are preparing to declare statehood and there is an increasing rhetoric that the Kurds deserve to form their own nation state. If the Kurds declare an independent state how can they defend their boundaries and sovereignty against strong neighbouring states when they cannot defend themselves against a terrorist group?

Fourth, Kurdish freedom movement has always prided itself in having a force, the Peshmarga, who are willing to die for the defence and freedom of Kurdistan. Peshmargas have established a reputation for being brave and fearless fighters. This name has gained sanctity amongst thewww.Ekurd.net Kurds. Kurdish withdrawal in the face of the Islamic State has undermined this image. Or, are we talking about different kinds of Peshmargas, and should we be distinguishing between the traditional Peshmargas who were willing to give their life for freedom of Kurdistan for no material gains and those whose main motives for serving in the Kurdish armed forces are financial gains? If this is the case, the Kurdistan Regional Government should no longer call its armed forces the Peshmarga. The behaviour of Kurdish forces since last week does not befit a Peshmarga force.

Fifth, despite all Kurdish bravados, they are now considered a weak force that are unable to defend themselves and are in need of foreign protection. The Iraqi armed forces became the subject of ridicule across the world for abandoning their positions in the face of a terrorist group. Now the Kurdish forces acted like their Iraqi counterparts. This was neither a surprise attack on the Kurds nor one that could not be anticipated.

The Kurdistan Regional Government should accept responsibility for this calamity and urgently initiate an investigation into this matter and find out what went wrong. Those Kurdish armed forces and leaders who failed in their duties should be hold accountable. Failure to do so will expose Kurdistan to a greater risk.

The Turkish Man Barzani in Ankara to Collect oil Money

July 14, 2014 By administrator

Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani arrived in Ankara on Monday for talks with Turkish leaders, including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Barzani, accompanied by three ministers of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had talks with Gül and is due to meet with Erdoğan later this afternoon. The kidnapping of 49 Turks, including the Turkish consul in Mosul last month, by militants of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), is reportedly one of the main issues on the leaders’ agenda.

Reports allege that Barzani and the accompanying ministers are in Turkey to collect the Kurdish share of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil, deposited in Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank, but Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yıldız denied such news, saying instead that the Kurdish delegation wants to turn temporary bank accounts opened for that purpose into permanent accounts. “They are coming, together with [Turkish] officials, for the opening of [permanent] accounts. We are making efforts to ensure that this becomes a sustainable business,” Yıldız told reporters.

Iraqi Kurdish website Rudaw reported late on Sunday that the Kurdish delegation in Turkey is there to make sure that the KRG can ultimately be paid for its oil sales through Turkey. “The purpose behind the visit regards a bank account for Kurdish oil revenue, which has been sold through Turkey, and transferring the account to the Kurdistan region,” Rebar Muhammad, the KRG minister of finance, was quoted as saying by Rudaw. Muhammad himself is part of the delegation, which also includes Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani and Minister of Natural Resources Ashti Hawrami.

The Rudaw report said the KRG has at least $93 million in its account at Halkbank, but it has been unable to withdraw its earnings from the sale of oil exported via a new pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. This is because the Turkish government is still waiting for the resolution of a dispute between the KRG and the Iraqi central government on how to share revenue from the sale of northern Iraqi oil.

Yıldız said Turkey was not yet studying formulas that would open the way for the Kurds to take their share from the entire Iraqi oil sale. “We are talking about not only the northern Iraqi oil but also about Baghdad’s oil. The issue of splitting the northern Iraqi oil is not yet on our agenda; this is an issue to be taken up in the future. But, I have to say, we are working on [arrangements] concerning the rights of both Arbil [the KRG capital] and Baghdad,” Yıldız said.

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) oil shipment stranded in Morocco (no buyer)

June 6, 2014 By administrator

A shipment of oil from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that passed through Turkey’s Ceyhan pipeline nearly two weeks ago is sitting without a buyer in a Moroccan port, according to ship tracking data from Thursday.

The shipment, which was sent to Ceyhan via a pipeline constructed by the KRG, has enflamed already high tensions between the KRG and Baghdad — in addition to straining Ankara’s relations with the latter. The Iraqi federal government took legal action against Turkey last month for facilitating the shipment. The issue is a source of concern for Washington, which said it does not support oil exports conducted without Baghdad’s consent.

The KRG opened its new pipeline last December and began shipping oil to Turkey, angering the central government in Baghdad and prompting it to cut the KRG’s 17 percent share of the national budget in January. The KRG has since stated that the cuts left it with no choice but to sell its oil independently. According to KRG Spokesman Safeen Dizayee, US Vice President Joe Biden called Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki repeatedly and requested that the KRG’s budget be reinstated. Al-Maliki told Biden that Baghdad would do so, but has failed to deliver on its promise, according to Dizayee.

There has been much speculation about the shipment’s final destination. Some analysts believed it was headed across the Atlantic while Energy Minister Taner Yıldız had said it was destined for Italy and Germany; now it’s halted in Morocco, which Dizayee said on Tuesday was its final destination.

Turkey energy deal with KRG – Halkbank & TPIC an arm of the state-run Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) lacks transparency

January 9, 2014 By administrator

By: OLGU OKUMUŞ

Since international media reported crude oil flowing to Turkey from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), this oil flow’s legality has become a global issue. There is little transparency surrounding the issue in Turkey, as no public information has been released regarding through which pipeline Turkey is receiving Kurdish oil. Does a new pipeline exist in Turkey? If it does, who built, funds and manages it?

Indeed, if Kurdish oil is being exported out of Ceyhan, questions must be asked about this oil’s legitimacy and origins, before we can even begin to explore its effects on Ankara-Baghdad relations. The KRG-Turkey deal is shrouded in complete technical, juridical and financial opacity in Turkey, which is in contrast to the abundance of press releases that accompanied negotiations for the Nabucco, TANAP and South Stream pipelines.

The KRG oil flow has been expected since Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced in May 2013 that Turkey would pursue separate oil arrangements with the KRG, in partnership with ExxonMobil. The sector has questioned the legality of these agreements under both international law — as Iraq still lacks an oil-revenue sharing resolution — and under political acceptability, since the United States opposes the KRG’s independent energy trade with Turkey. This is probably why, following reports of KRG-Turkey oil flow, Turkish authorities stated that the oil would be stored at Turkey’s Ceyhan export hub and not exported without the Iraqi central government’s approval. Besides this proactive measure to defuse international tensions, the Turkish government has not made any effort to inform the public on this new oil import route for Turkey.

There has been no official statement as to where this oil flows throughout Turkish territories. During the KRG’s oil pipeline construction to the Turkish border, the Turkish government made no announcement about the Turkish part of the pipeline. With such scarce information, one can only speculate on different scenarios for this KRG-Turkey oil flow.

The first scenario would be for the Kurdish pipeline to link up with the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline on Turkish territory. This 970-kilometer crude oil pipeline was built during the reign of Iraq’s Baathist government. According to the governmental agreement regarding the pipeline, neither Iraq nor Turkey could transfer oil via the pipeline without the other party’s approval. This condition became an issue when authorities previously proposed to join the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to Kirkuk-Yumurtalik’s section in Turkish territory.

Indeed, if the flow is occurring via the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, then Turkey must already have the approval of Baghdad, and should already be earning transit revenues. Or, if Baghdad has not given its support, the legal framework of this oil flow remains murky. If Ankara is using the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline for the oil sent by Erbil without Baghdad’s approval and/or without paying Baghdad a transit fee, then Turkey has violated the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik governmental agreement. This violation could endanger Turkey’s prestige, jeopardizing its reliability as an energy transit country for its contracts with Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia.

The second scenario is that Turkey has built a new, independent oil pipeline running from Iraq’s KRG border to its Ceyhan port. But if there is a new pipeline operating in Turkish territories, then where does this pipeline run, who built it and when was it built? How much did this new pipeline cost, and how did the Turkish government fund it? Moreover, how did the Turkish government build a new pipeline without notifying the public?

In both scenarios, questions remain unanswered on import mechanisms. These questions concern which company was awarded oil-import contracts from Iraq to Turkey, how these import revenues would be paid and whether the Turkish parliament issued a ratification bill for this import deal. One can answer these questions only by surmising.

For example, in May 2013 Erdogan did not give the name of the state-owned firm set to spearhead efforts in the KRG, but various sources suggested the Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC), an arm of the state-run Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO). Likewise, in November 2013, Turkey’s minister of energy and natural resources, Taner Yildiz, suggested Ankara could serve as an independent intermediary for revenues from the project by having Iraq’s oil revenues deposited into an escrow account at a Turkish state bank. As Halkbank already serves as mediator for Iran’s energy bill, one can surmise this state bank would be Halkbank as well.

Indeed, if the KRG and Turkey have launched an oil trade, this could be commercially enticing for both sides, but it risks becoming politically destructive. A lack of transparency may not only hamper both sides’ domestic support but also Turkey’s objective of becoming a reliable energy hub.