By Միքայել Յալանուզյան,

Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Artsakh War and the loss of land in Artsakh took place exactly 100 years after the Turkish-Armenian War of 1920. Armenian society started drawing parallels between the fortress cities of Kars and Shushi, and between the deployment of Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh and the collusion between Russia and Turkey that led to the sovietization of Armenia at the end of 1920, with their associated territorial concessions. In addition to these parallels, conspiracy theories started circulating around the fall of Shushi, which were surprisingly similar to the legends surrounding the fall of Kars on October 30, 1920. The pain of loss has led people to take a look at the past to find answers to today’s problems.

հայերեն 

Կարսի անկումը. Հայացք անցյալին

The fall of both Kars and Shushi must be looked at in the context of military operations, political events and ongoing Armenian internal divisions, a perspective that is too often missed. Furthermore, public perceptions of the impenetrability of the two fortress-cities had been woven into Armenians’ public consciousness for decades. It is for this reason that allegations of betrayal take root, whether they are confirmed or not.

The reasons for the fall of Shushi have yet to be examined and many issues are not yet resolved. However, the 1920 fall of Kars has been better studied, providing insights (though not a complete picture) about the 100-year-old event. Meanwhile, it is important to note that the public’s perception that events of the past are being repeated today is not correct, and can lead to wrong conclusions. It is likewise dangerous to ignore the events of the past and adopt certain political and geopolitical stereotypes. The best solution is to cover history comprehensively and honestly which, in turn, allows developing an understanding of geopolitical processes, the interests of the region’s countries and possible actions they might take, and personal shortcomings.

Taking into account the similarities being drawn between 1920 and 2020, let us first take a look at the 1920 Turkish-Armenian War in general terms.

The Bolshevik Victory and Geopolitical Changes

When talking about the 1920 Turkish-Armenian War, it is first and foremost necessary to reflect upon several important geopolitical events that were changing the political landscape of our region. The Bolshevik revolution, Russian Civil War and consolidation of power by the communists in Russia sets the context. It is well known that the reigning chaos and anarchy – a result of the 1917 February and October Revolutions – had dismantled the Russian army. At the height of the First World War, Russian soldiers and officers were leaving the Western and Caucasian war fronts and returning to Russia’s heartland, leaving behind their weapons. The Caucasian front, which had reached Trabzon and Yerznka (Erzincan) by 1917, was emptying fast. This was followed by the Ottoman Empire striking back. Within six months, the Turkish army captured Erzurum, Trabzon, Kars, Aleksandrapol (Gyumri) and reached the outskirts of Yerevan, without meeting meaningful resistance. Only with the battles of Sardarapat, Bash Aparan and Karakilise is the Turkish advance halted and the Armenian First Republic established.

In the spring of 1920, the Bolsheviks were able to win the civil war and started to restore the borders of the former Russian Empire. In April of that year, the Red Army entered Azerbaijan. After two years preoccupied with its own affairs, Russia had returned to the Caucasus.

Around the same time, the Kemalist movement formed in Turkey, the main aim of which was to maintain Turkey’s borders; the Ottoman Empire, left defeated after the First World War, was being divided among the Allied nations. This nationalist movement originated in the eastern provinces of Turkey, the region from where the Armenian people were uprooted through genocide.

In April 1920, the Allied Powers signed an agreement in San Remo that included their demands to Turkey. These demands laid the foundation for the Treaty of Sevres, signed several months later. With this treaty, the eastern provinces were to be given to the Armenians. Turkey was not able to reconcile with such a loss of territory and the creation of a Great Armenia. It is not a coincidence that, by April 1920, the 15th Army led by Kazim Karabekir was preparing for war against Armenia.

In the summer of 1920, the geopolitical situation was such that the regional and geopolitical interests of Bolshevik Russia and Turkey were quite aligned. These two countries, which were at war against each other a mere three years earlier, now had a common enemy: the Western Allies, the politics of which were a threat to both of them. Besides this fact, the foundation of Bolshevik ideology was the struggle against imperialism and the liberation of those who had been oppressed and colonized. Kemal was presenting his movement as such, which at that stage fell in line with Bolshevik ideology. Both Russia and Turkey were trying everything to expel Western influence from the region. Hence, they believed that the Treaty of Sevres and the creation of a Great Armenia was a threat to their vital interests.

Reasons for the War and the Defeat

That was the geopolitical situation by the autumn of 1920, when the Turkish-Armenian War broke out. The main accusations as to why Armenia was defeated in this war can be conditionally divided into two main groupings: a) the Armenian army was not ready and not able to protect the country; b) the army fought heroically, however, due to the shortcomings of its political leaders, it was not able to carry out its tasks. The truth, as always, lies somewhere in between: Armenia suffered a heavy defeat in the Turkish-Armenia War due to many military shortcomings, disorganization, as well as the short-sightedness of its political leaders, bad management of the rearguard, maximalism and other reasons.

The First Wave of the Attack

Three months prior to the war, in June 1920, Armenian forces had captured Voghtik (Oltu), which was considered territory belonging to the Armenian state. Its coal mines were of vital importance for Armenia’s economy and infrastructure, which were on the verge of collapse due to being surrounded and lacking energy sources. Afterwards, the Turkish side justified their decision to start a war because of the capture of Voghtik․ Even if Voghtik was not captured, however, the Turks would have attacked Armenia under another pretext. Different sources (including Turkish ones), as well as letters exchanged between Kemal and Karabekir, have shown that the Turkish army had been waiting for an order to attack since April 1920.[1]

The first wave of the Turkish attack started on September 10, 1920, which the Armenian forces were able to hold off. Three days later, however, they were not able to stand the pressure and left Voghtik. It is at this time that the shortcomings of the Armenian army and the rearguard started to become apparent. According to Simon Vratsyan, the Armenians had 2,400 soldiers at Voghtik and Sarikamish, whereas the 15th Turkish Military Brigade had nearly 28,000. “The [Turkish] forces were well fed, had vast amounts of weapons and clothing, which they were receiving from the Italians, the French and the Soviet Russians,” wrote Vratsyan.

This event is important because, for months on end, the Armenian side had been assuring the West that Kemal’s army had barely 10,000 soldiers, was weak and poorly organized. At the end of April 1920, at San Remo, Avetis Aharonyan, who was the head of the Armenian delegation, was telling Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Marshal Foch and others, “Mustafa Kemal does not have 14,000 soldiers, but far less and most of them are irregular soldiers, farmers, many of them held there by force, all of them poorly dressed and untrained. The data collected by the general staff of our army, which is correct, leaves no room to doubt this.”[2]

Aharonyan also told them that Armenia had almost 25,000 troops. Several months later, the number of the Armenian army was being presented as being much higher. On July 11, during a meeting with Greek President Venizelos, member of the Armenian delegation Colonel Ghorghanyan said that Armenia’s army could reach 40,000.[3]

Meanwhile, Ruben Ter-Minasian, the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia, wrote in his memoirs that in 1919 the Armenian army had around 10,000 soldiers and officers. Another 4,000 soldiers were in reserve military units in different parts of the country.[4] Throughout independence, the undeclared but nonetheless never-ending war with Azerbaijan had caused the Armenian army to be stationed throughout hundreds of kilometers across the state border.

It’s worth noting that Vratsyan observed that, after the war started, Armenia was left completely alone and was not ready to fight. Armenia appealed to the powerful forces of the world, who had until then considered Armenia their junior ally. However, Armenia did not receive any real military or political support from any of them.

The Failed Counterattack and Major Shortcomings

On September 20, the Armenian forces were already retreating from Sarikamish and Kaghzvan (Kağızman in Turkish). Mobilization of men up to the age of 27 began, and a death sentence was imposed for desertion.

On October 14, the Armenian forces launched a counterattack. Governor of Shirak Garo Sassouni writes that the Armenian army was around 12,000 men. Other sources say 8,000. The Armenians did not have a complete picture of the Turkish forces. Sassouni writes that, according to General Movses Silikyan, the Turkish forces were not more than 4,000. Only after the attack did it become clear that the Turks had eminently more forces.

During the attack, the fatal shortcomings of how the Armenian army was managed became apparent. Garo Sassouni writes that several military units started the attack three hours later than planned. As a result, the rest weren’t able to strengthen the positions they had taken and the Turks, regrouping their forces, took back the initiative. Artashes Babalyan, Minister of Social Security, also claims this to be true.

Recruitment for the Armenian army was also not done properly. Those recruited were inexperienced and not used to holding weapons. There were major disagreements among the heads of the military high staff – Generals Silikyan, Hovsepyan and military unit heads, specifically with Sebouh, who was the commander of one of the military fronts of Kars. These shortcomings and disagreements were the reason the counterattack failed. The Armenian side suffered heavy losses without any significant success.

The October 14 counterattack showed the spread of another fatal phenomenon within the Armenian army, which was not listening to orders. Two battalions of the Fifth Brigade left their positions and retreated without being given any orders to do so. Later on, similar incidents took place under the walls of Kars as well. The reason soldiers were not complying with orders was Bolshevik propaganda and general Bolshevik sympathies within the forces. During the May 1920 rebellion, the military units of Kars were actively involved in anti-government activity, and soldiers explained that this was the reason for their retreat during the war. At the beginning of 1921, military unit leader Sebouh noted two reasons for the fall of Kars: Bolshevik propaganda and the inexperience of reservist soldiers. “The last time the Turks attacked, untrained volunteers joined the army from every corner. It was very clear that, when someone does not know how to use a weapon, does not have military training, he will leave and run as soon as he hears the first gunshot. And if he stays, his fate is to be martyred with no impact on the battle…” Sebouh wrote. “The second reason for the failure was the Bolshevik propaganda, which greatly affected the spirit of discipline in the army and disbanded our ranks. The army commanders are at fault for this.”[5]

The Fall of the Fortress-City

It is noteworthy that the other stage of the Turkish-Armenian War, that is the military operations on the Igdir-Surmalu front, was eminently more successful. Dro and the military units of Kuro Tarkhanyan, who had come to aid him, held off the Turkish attacks until the end, retreating only after Kars was captured so as to avoid being surrounded.

On October 25, 1920, after a new attack from the Turkish army, Armenian forces retreated to Kars. The Armenian military command reported to the Prime Minister that the fortress-city could hold off the attack for two to three months. The Armenian military command believed that the Turks would attack Kars directly; however, they unexpectedly took a different approach. Unnoticed by the Armenians, they moved their forces to Nakhichevan, from where they captured Vezi-Kyol through a flank attack. Garo Sassouni states that the Armenian military command “searched” for the enemy for three to four days. Artashes Babalyan writes that the Armenian military command had considered an attack from the eastern flank by the enemy and it had sent unit leader Knazyan with several cavalries on an intelligence mission. Knazyan soon reported that “there is no enemy on the left front and everything is calm.” “Later, it was discovered that Knyaz and his cavalry did not want to take the trouble to reach where they were supposed to go and had returned after only going halfway, saying there was nothing to fear,” wrote Babalyan.[6]

On October 30, by attacking from three different fronts, the Turks took the Radinsky and Lazarevyan forts of Kars, and then the fortress and city. Information about these events is also contradictory. Sassouni writes that the soldiers did not want to fight. Babalyan states the opposite: that the people wanted to fight and sacrifice their lives, however, “their leaders were incompetent and dishonest.”

Within the city, the Turks did not meet any resistance, and a large number of soldiers (according to different sources: 1,500-2,000) were taken prisoner. Those taken prisoner included Armenian Army Generals Pirumyan, Araratyan, Ghazaryan, Colonel Vekilov, as well as Social Security Minister Babalyan.

Heavy Treaties and the Fall of the First Republic

After the fall of Kars, even though the Armenian army was not completely destroyed, and a great part of it had been maintained, it continued to retreat, plagued by low morale. Desertion was taking place on a mass scale. On November 7, Karabekir proposed a ceasefire, which was really more of an ultimatum. The Armenian side was forced to accept the Turkish conditions and left Aleksandrapol. However, soon after, the Turks pushed new conditions, which were that the Armenians had to retreat back to the Surmalu-Araks station-Mt. Aragats-Novo Mikhaylovka-Lorikend border. This was turned down. The attacks continued and, on November 16, the Turks captured Jajur. The Armenian side agreed to a ceasefire and negotiated with the Turks, while at the same time appealing to Moscow for an intervention.

On November 22, 1920, an Armenian delegation headed by Aleksandr Khatisyan went to Alexandrapol to negotiate with the Turks. Ten days later, a heavy peace treaty was signed, according to which Armenia lost nearly 30,000 square kilometres of land (the equivalent of Armenia’s entire current area). Surmalu and Kars would pass to Turkey, and Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan. Armenia could not have more than 1,200 soldiers and had to reject the Treaty of Sevres.

***

As can be seen, the wars and political processes of 1920 and 2020 have several similarities, which is natural since the main players in our region have not changed in the past 100 years. The political, economic and military problems, and the competition between the world’s powerful axes have not changed either. This is the most important conclusion which should be constantly examined, understood and taken into consideration.

As to the defeat, the best means to overcome its consequences is to comprehensively examine its causes. The expression “history repeats itself” is not a verdict and is subject to review.

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[1] Ruben Safrastyan, “Mustafa Kemal: The Battle Against the Republic of Armenia 1919-1920,” Yerevan, 2019.

[2] Avetis Aharonyan, “From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lozanne (A Political Diary),” Boston, 1943, Page 73.

[3] Avetis Aharonyan, “From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lozanne (A Political Diary),” Boston, 1943, Page 87.

[4] Ruben, “Memoirs of an Armenian Revolutionary,” Volume 7, Yerevan, 1990, Pages 335-336.

[5] Sebouh`s reaction on the fall of Kars, “The Last News,” February 8, 1921, No. 2096.

[6] Aratshes Babalyan, “The Fall of Kars,” Hayrenik, 1923, No. 12, Boston.

Source: https://www.evnreport.com/magazine-issues/the-fall-of-kars-a-look-to-the-past

Alin Ozinian

First staged in 2015 “Zabel,” a play about Ottoman-Armenian author and feminist Zabel Yesayan, returned to audiences last week. Written by Aysel Yıldırım and Duygu Dalyanoğlu and staged by the Boğaziçi Performing Arts Ensemble (BGST), one of the leading theater groups in Istanbul that work on feminist drama, “Zabel” tells the life journey of Yesayan.

Yesayan’s story was this time performed online on Feb. 19 and won the acclaim of theatergoers in this difficult time, when Turkey’s theaters have been hard hit by the coronavirus. COVID-19 has also taken a heavy toll on the art world in Turkey in terms of closed venues and canceled events as in other parts of the world. Like many, BGST is trying to adapt to the new circumstances and staged the play online, adding English subtitles in an attempt to attract English-speakers.

“Zabel,” the latest play in the company’s feminist theater series, concentrates on Istanbul-born Yesayan’s life story based on her books – “Silihdari Bardeznerı” (Gardens of Silihdar), “Hokis Aksoryal” (My Soul in Exile) and “Averagnerun Mech” (In the Ruins) — and her letters. The play was written, directed, designed and performed by women artists.

Co-writers Dalyanoğlu and Yıldırım started working on “Zabel” in 2015, on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide. While collaborating on the play the two women started to read and discuss details of Yesayan’s life with academics who have studied her at length.

“At that time, we [graduates] along with students who were members of the Boğaziçi University Women’s Studies Club began to conduct some research. The whole team worked carefully; we concentrated on Yesayan’s autobiography – ‘Gardens of Silihdar,’ where she describes her childhood and youth in Üsküdar, Istanbul. On March 8, 2015 we did a trial staging that focused on these memories, which afterward became the first act of the current play,” said co-writer Dalyanoğlu in an e-mail interview.

The most famous female representative of Armenian feminism and literature, Zabel Yesayan (1878-1943) played an exceptional role in establishing a new paradigm for Armenian society. She was well educated largely due to her father’s belief in the importance of education, an uncommon position at the time concerning girls.

In 1895 she moved to Paris where she studied literature and philosophy at the Sorbonne. She worked on articles and short stories for French and Armenian magazines and started her writing career. Yesayan returned to Istanbul at the age of 30, after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which gave great hope to Armenians for freedom and equality. She enjoyed an active literary life and was well recognized for her talent.

Yesayan was the only woman on the Young Turk list of Armenians to be deported and killed on April 24, a prime indicator of her influence as a writer and an intellectual. As the Ottoman government arrested and murdered hundreds of Armenian intellectuals and community leaders on April 24, 1915, the day is considered the beginning of the Armenian genocide.

In 1915 she succeeded in fleeing to Bulgaria and from there managed to reach the Caucasus, where she documented much of the atrocities taking place. In 1918 she went to Egypt and then to Paris. During this time she cared for Armenian women and orphans and also promoted Armenian literature in Europe.

Co-writer of “Zabel” Dalyanoğlu began her theater career in 2004 at the Boğaziçi University Theater Club. She has been working as a professional performer, director and playwright at BGST since 2009.

“Why is ‘Zabel’ important to me personally? The most important thing that makes Zabel’s story striking is that Zabel was an intellectual who was never at peace with power and authority. I wanted to tell the life story of such a person – a woman who does not give up, even if she is tired of fighting to defend her truth. The life stories of women like Zabel should become more widespread,” said Dalyanoğlu.

The first play attracted huge attention in 2015, and BGST decided to stage a new play in which they aimed to tell Yesayan’s entire life story. Two years later “Zabel” premiered on March 8, 2017. Since then BGST has performed in many cities including Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Istanbul and Izmir in Turkey, and also Stuttgart and Vienna in Europe. Its live screening on Feb. 19, 2021 was watched from many cities around the world.

Dalyanoğlu underlines that they received mainly positive reactions after the play. “A strong female figure like Zabel, who struggled for justice throughout her life, impressed our audience. In some cases, people found parallels between her struggle and their own today. Additionally many in the audience after seeing the play started to research Zabel’s life and read her books, translated into Turkish, by Aras Publishing. This makes us more than happy,” she said.

Yıldırım and Dalyanoğlu were named Best Playwright of the Year 2018 by the Turkish Theater Critics and the Üstün Akmen Theater. Yıldırım (who plays Zabel) was also recognized as the Best Actress in a Leading Role 2018 by Direklerarası and the Sadri Alışık Theater and Cinema Acting Awards.

“Our greatest wish is to continue to perform the play in different cities around the world. One of our biggest dreams is to follow in Yesayan’s footsteps and play in the cities where she lived, such as Yerevan, Paris and Adana. In addition we are working on translating ‘Zabel’ into different languages and publishing it. It will come out in France soon. It’s gratifying to see that her story is also being staged in other countries,” said Dalyanoğlu.

The life of Yesayan, who breathed new life into Armenian literature at the beginning of the 20th century, was also unique because she was involved in the most important stages of the “Armenian new history.” The writer survived the Cilician massacres and the 1915 Armenian genocide and witnessed the birth of the first Armenian Republic and the formation of the Armenian Diaspora.

In 1933 Yesayan settled in Yerevan and began teaching French and Armenian literature at Yerevan State University. She was able to escape death during the Armenian genocide, but another evil would subdue her in 1937, when she became a victim of Stalin’s Great Purge. Like many of her contemporaries, she was accused of simply having a connection to those who had already been proclaimed the “people’s enemy” or were suspected of spying, arrested and died in unknown circumstances.

Nowadays Istanbul’s prestigious Boğaziçi University is under tremendous state pressure. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s appointment of an outside rector to Boğaziçi has led to weeks of demonstrations, hundreds of arrests and one of the most sustained protests in recent years against the autocratic rule of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Melih Bulu, the new rector, said he has no plans to resign and that he expects the protests to end in six months.

Dalyanoğlu, who also performs the role of Srpuhi Düsap, another Armenian woman writer, in “Zabel,” thinks the situation is unacceptable and that the rector should be determined by the university stakeholders — such as professors, staff, students and alumni. “Everyone in the cast started their career at Boğaziçi University’s theater club, which was a ‘second school’ for us. Boğaziçi University was the place where I learned critical and feminist thinking in a free environment. It is not difficult but also more meaningful for us to play Zabel in these circumstances because we are telling the story of female characters who resisted pressure throughout their lives. While playing the role of Srpuhi Düsap, who teaches the young Zabel the life-long struggle of an intellectual, I was experiencing the same feelings and the similarities between our lives and those of these women,” said Dalyanoğlu.

Source: https://www.turkishminute.com/2021/02/24/return-of-ottoman-armenian-feminist-zabel-by-bgst/