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‘Syria army confiscates Israeli-made missiles’

September 28, 2013 By administrator

The Syrian army says it has confiscated a number of Israeli-made missiles, which were in the possession of foreign-backed militants.

Baqeri_d20130928090316323A military source told the Syrian news agency SANA that the seizure was made in the countryside of the southwestern city of Dara’a on Thursday.

It says Syrian troops seized a militant vehicle loaded with large weapons and ammunition, including at least four Israeli-made missiles.

This is not the first time that government troops have made such a seizure.

Media sources have in the past showed arms with Hebrew inscriptions, which they said originated from Israel.

Syria has been gripped by deadly unrest since 2011. According to reports, the Western powers and their regional allies — especially Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey — are supporting the militants operating inside Syria.

In a recent statement, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said the number of Syrian refugees, who have fled the country’s 29-month-long conflict, reached two million.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: ‘Syria army confiscates Israeli-made missiles’

Opposition Presidential Candidate Holds Baku Rally

September 28, 2013 By administrator

By RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service

September 28, 2013

2464B731-5A15-4AB0-A395-86E997A82654_w640_r1_s_cx0_cy17_cw0BAKU — Supporters of Azerbaijan’s united opposition presidential candidate, Camil Hasanli, have held a rally in the capital Baku.

Organizers said that up to 10,000 people attended the authorized event on September 28, which was Hasanli’s second election rally.

Police said 1,500 people attended.

Hasanli, who is the main challenger to incumbent President Ilham Aliyev, called on his supporters to vote for him in the October 9 poll to “end the dictatorship of one family in Azerbaijan.”

He accused Aliyev of corruption and the embezzlement of billions of dollars of public money.

Participants chanted, “Ilham, resign,” and “Ilham, enough.”

The peaceful rally ended without incident.

Hasanli’s candidacy is backed by the National Council of Democratic Forces — an umbrella organization comprising most of Azerbaijan’s opposition parties and groupings.

Ilham Aliyev has held power since succeeding his father, Heydar, in 2003.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Opposition Presidential Candidate Holds Baku Rally

Ministers Committee of Council of Europe to watch Turkish police closely

September 28, 2013 By administrator

izmir_policeA police officer is seen pulling a girl’s hair during a demonstration held in the western province of İzmir to support the recent Gezi protests that erupted over a government plan to demolish Taksim’s Gezi Park. (Photo: DHA)
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe said in Thursday’s assembly held in Strasbourg that it will be closely following the use of force by the Turkish police while dispersing demonstrations and the application of related court rulings.
The committee, as the body responsible for supervising the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings, discussed 37 ECtHR judgments against Turkey regarding the disproportionate use of police force.

It was emphasized in the assembly that the court continues to receive numerous case files from Turkey related to this issue, despite the ECtHR’s first ruling about an incident in 2006 that stated that the excessive use of police force in protests was against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The committee statement demands that the Turkish government review its legislation concerning police interventions in peaceful but illegal protests.

It also requires that the Turkish government draft a new bill that would compel the police to make an assessment of the conditions prior to engaging with demonstrators to determine if an intervention is necessary.

The committee also demanded detailed information from the Turkish government about the supervision of the police during protests in terms of oversight of the necessity, proportionality and reasonability of their planned actions, as well as the disciplinary and prosecution processes applied when police officers use excessive force and current investigations into such cases.

According to the committee, it has become a systemic problem that the police resort to excessive force against protesters.

In addition, the committee demanded that Turkey also review its legislation about the use of tear gas by the police.

In conclusion, the committee announced that it will closely follow Turkey’s adherence to ECtHR rulings regarding the use of police force as part of the committee’s regular schedule, which means that the subject will be discussed at each of their assemblies, held every three months.

The ECtHR has ruled against the Turkish government in more than 40 cases related to the excessive use of police force, and over 130 cases are still in progress.

On July 16, the ECtHR also called on Turkey to review its legislation on the use of tear gas in a ruling in the case of a Turkish applicant who was wounded in 2006 by a tear gas canister fired by police.

The ECtHR ruled against Turkey in that case, filed by Abdullah Yaşa, who at the age of 13 was injured in the face by a tear gas canister fired by police to disperse crowds during a demonstration in the southeastern province of Diyarbakır in 2006. According to the ruling, Turkey had to pay 15,000 euros in compensation to the applicant. It said that Turkey had violated Article 3 of the ECHR, which concerns the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.

Following the deaths of 14 members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in an confrontation that took place on March 24, 2006, many illegal demonstrations were organized in Diyarbakır between March 28 and 31, 2006, during which 11 protesters were killed.

Source TODAY’S ZAMAN, İSTANBUL

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Ministers Committee of Council of Europe to watch Turkish police closely

Protesters hurl shoes, eggs at Rouhani at Tehran airport

September 28, 2013 By administrator

September 28, 2013 – 14:39 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has been met by hardline protesters chanting “Death to America” on his return from the UN 170586forum in New York, BBC News reported.

During his trip, President Rouhani had suggested a shift in tone on Iran’s controversial nuclear program. This culminated in a phone call with U.S. President Barack Obama – the first such top-level conversation in 30 years.

Hundreds of people gathered at Tehran airport, with supporters hailing the trip and opponents throwing shoes.

An AFP journalist said some 200-300 supporters gathered outside the airport to thank Rouhani for his efforts. But opposite them were about 60 people shouting “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”.

Rouhani reportedly stood and raised his hand to the crowds.

A New York Times reporter described the scene as chaotic, with dozens of hardliners hurling eggs and shoes at the president’s convoy.

The Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA), said: “A crowd of young people and students gathered at Mehrabad airport to show support for the president’s remarks and his stance during the trip to New York.”

It said Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and a number of cabinet members also welcomed the president.

Rouhani, quoted by the Fars news agency, said it was the U.S. that had initiated the presidential phone call.

“Yesterday, as we were getting ready to head to the airport, the White House called and expressed willingness to set up a phone call between the American president and me. On our way a call was made to our ambassador’s cell phone. The conversation mostly focused on the nuclear issue,” he was quoted as saying.

Obama earlier spoke of a “unique opportunity” to make progress with Iran’s new leadership.

Rouhani had indicated Iran was keen to reach a deal soon on the nuclear issue. He also asserted that Iran did not seek a nuclear bomb, as Western powers have long suspected. Rouhani said initial discussions had taken place in an environment that was “quite different” from the past.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: eggs at Rouhani at Tehran airport, Protesters hurl shoes

The confiscation of Armenian properties: An interview with Ümit Kurt

September 28, 2013 By administrator

The following interview with Ümit Kurt published in The Armenian Weekly tackles how the physical annihilation of the Armenians paralleled the Umit Kurtconfiscation and appropriation of their properties in 1915. By citing the various laws and decrees that orchestrated the confiscation process, Kurt places our understanding of the genocide within a legal context.

Ümit Kurt is a native of Aintab, Turkey, and holds a bachelor of science degree in political science and public administration from Middle East Technical University, and a master’s degree from Sabancı University’s department of European studies. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the department of history at Clark University and an instructor at Sabancı University. He is the author of several books, including Kanunların Ruhu: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzlerini Aramak (The Spirit of Laws: Seeking the Traces of Armenian Genocide in the Laws of Abandoned Property, 2012) with Taner Akçam. His main area of interest is the confiscation of Armenian properties and the role of local elites/notables in Aintab during the genocide. Below is the full text of the interview Kurt granted The Armenian Weekly earlier this month.

Varak Ketsemanian: What were the laws and regulations that governed the confiscation of Armenian properties during the genocide?

Ümit Kurt: A series of laws and decrees, known as the Abandoned Properties Laws (Emval-i Metruke Kanunları), were issued in the Ottoman and Turkish Republican periods concerning the administration of the belongings left behind by the Ottoman Armenians who were deported in 1915. The best-known regulation on the topic is the comprehensive Council of Ministers Decree, dated May 30, 1915. The Directorate of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement of the Interior Ministry (İskan-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirin Müdiriyeti) sent it the following day to relevant provinces organized in 15 articles. It provided the basic principles in accordance with which all deportations and resettlements would be conducted, and began with listing the reasons for the Armenian deportations. The most important provision concerning Armenian properties was the principle that their equivalent value was going to be provided to the deportees.

The importance of the decree of May 30 and the regulation of May 31 lie in the following: The publication of a series of laws and decrees were necessary in order to implement the general principles that were announced in connection with the settlement of the Armenians and the provision of the equivalent values of their goods. This never happened. Instead, laws and decrees began to deal with only one topic: the confiscation of the properties left behind by the Armenians.

Another regulation was carried out on June 10, 1915. This 34-article ordinance regulated in a detailed manner how the property and goods the Armenians left behind would be impounded by the state. The June 10, 1915 regulation was the basis for the creation of a legal system suitable for the elimination of the material living conditions of the Armenians, as it took away from the Armenians any right of disposal of their own properties. Article 1 of the June 10, 1915 regulation announced that “committees formed in a special manner” were going to be created for the administration of the “immovable property, possessions, and lands being left belonging to Armenians who are being transported to other places, and other matters.”

The most important of these committees were the Abandoned Properties Commissions (Emval-i Metruke Komisyonları). These commissions and their powers were regulated by Articles 23 and 24. The commissions were each going to be comprised of three people, a specially appointed chairman, an administrator, and a treasury official, and would work directly under to the Ministry of the Interior.

The most important steps toward the appropriation of Armenian cultural and economic wealth were the Sept. 26, 1915 law of 11 articles, and the 25-article regulation of Nov. 8, 1915 on how the aforementioned law would be implemented.

Many matters were covered in a detailed fashion in the law and the regulation, including the creation of two different types of commissions with different tasks called the Committees and Liquidation Commissions (Heyetler ve Tasfiye Komisyonları); the manner in which these commissions were to be formed; the conditions of work, including wages; the distribution of positions and powers among these commissions and various departments of ministries and the state; the documents necessary for applications by creditors to whom Armenians owed money; aspects of the relevant courts; the rules to be followed during the process of liquidation of properties; the different ledgers to be kept, and how they were to be kept; and examples of relevant ledgers. This characteristic of the aforementioned law and regulation is the most important indication of the desire not to return to the Armenians their properties or their equivalent value.

The Temporary Law of Sept. 26, 1915 is also known as the Liquidation Law (Tasfiye Kanunu). Its chief goal was the liquidation of Armenian properties. According to its first article, commissions were to be established to conduct the liquidation. These commissions were to prepare separate reports for each person about the properties, receivable accounts, and debts “abandoned by actual and juridical persons who are being transported to other places.” The liquidation would be conducted by courts on the basis of these reports.

The temporary law also declared that a regulation would be promulgated about the formation of the commissions and how the provisions of the law would be applied. This regulation, which was agreed upon on Nov. 8, 1915, regulated in a detailed fashion the protection of the movable and immovable property of Armenians who were being deported, the creation of new committees for liquidation issues, and the working principles of the commissions. The two-part regulation with 25 articles moreover included explanatory information on what had to be included in the record books to be kept during the liquidation process, and how these record books were to be used.

In brief, these were the major legal rules and regulations in 1915.

VK: How did the Ottoman government deal with the property of Armenians living in Istanbul, since no actual massacres took place in the capital? Were there laws for them, too?

UK: It is very important to note that these laws and statutes were known as the Abandoned Properties Laws, which was the official euphemism and an established term in the CUP propaganda to characterize the expropriation of the Armenians, and were merely applied to deported Armenians. Movable and immovable properties of Armenians who were not deported were not subjected to the Abandoned Properties Laws. As known, there were some Armenians deported from Istanbul—of course, very limited compared to Western Armenia—and properties of those deported Armenians in Istanbul also went through this process of confiscation, expropriation, and liquidation of their properties.

VK: How does the concept of confiscation and destruction of property help us understand the broader picture of the genocide?

UK: Actually, a new group of critical genocide scholars has started to come up with a new definition of genocide by taking into consideration the confiscation and destruction of property and wealth of the victim groups. In doing so, these critical genocide scholars have brought Raphael Lemkin’s original definition of genocide to the attention of existing genocide scholarship.

I see Raphael Lemkin as the founding father of genocide literature. Lemkin introduced the concept of genocide for the first time in 1944 in his book entitled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The book consists of a compilation of 334 laws, decrees, and regulations connected with the administration of 17 different regions and states under Nazi occupation between March 13, 1938 and Nov. 13, 1942. That is to say, Lemkin did not introduce the concept of genocide together with the barbaric practices like torture, oppression, burning, destruction, and mass killing observed in all genocides, but through a book quoting and analyzing legal texts. Could this be a coincidence?

Given its importance, it is necessary to stress this one more time: In the year that Lemkin completed the writing of his book (1943), he already knew of all the crimes perpetrated by Nazi Germany. However, he did not present the concept of genocide in a framework elucidated by these crimes. On the contrary, he introduced it through some laws and decrees that were published on how to administer occupied territories and that perhaps in the logic of war might be considered “normal.” We cannot say that this situation accords well with our present way of understanding genocide. In the general perception, genocide is the collapse of a normally functioning legal system; it is the product of the deviation of the system from the “normal” path. According to this point of view, genocide means that the institutions of “civilization” are not working and are replaced by barbarism. Lemkin, however, seems to be saying the complete opposite of this, that genocide is hidden in ordinary legal texts. By doing this, it is as if he is telling us not to look for the traces of genocide as barbaric manifestations that can be defined as inhuman, but to follow their trail in legal texts.

Genocide as a phenomenon fits inside the legal system—this is an interesting definition. And this definition is one of the central theses of our book. The Armenian Genocide does not just exist in the displays of barbarity carried out against the Armenians. It is at the same time hidden in a series of ordinary legal texts.

What we wish to say in our book is that genocide does not only mean physical annihilation. Going even further, we can assert that we are faced with a phenomenon in which whether the Armenians were physically annihilated or not, is but a detail. How many Armenians died during the course of the deportations/destruction or how many remained alive is just a secondary issue from a definitional point of view; what is important is the complete erasure of the traces of the Armenians from their ancient homeland.

The total destruction of the Armenians marked the fact that a government tried to eliminate a particular group of its own citizens in an effort to settle a perceived political problem. Between 1895 and 1922, Ottoman Armenians suffered massive loss of life and property as a result of pogroms, massacres, and other forms of mass violence. The 1915 Armenian Genocide can be seen as the pinnacle of this process of decline and destruction. It consisted of a series of genocidal strategies: the mass executions of elites, categorical deportations, forced assimilation, destruction of material culture, and collective dispossession. The state-orchestrated plunder of Armenian property immediately impoverished its victims; this was simultaneously a condition for and a consequence of the genocide. The seizure of the Armenian property was not just a byproduct of the CUP’s genocidal policies, but an integral part of the murder process, reinforcing and accelerating the intended destruction. The expropriation and plunder of deported Armenians’ movable and immovable properties was an essential component of the destruction process of Armenians.

As Martin Dean argues in Robbing the Jews: The Confiscation of Jewish Property in the Holocaust, 1933-1945, ethnic cleansing and genocide usually have a “powerful materialist component: seizure of property, looting of the victims, and their economic displacement are intertwined with other motives for racial and interethnic violence and intensify their devastating effects.” In the same vein, the radicalization of CUP policies against the Armenian population from 1914 onward was closely linked to a full-scale assault on their property.

Thus, the institutionalization of the elimination of the Christian-Armenian presence was basically realized, along with many other things, through the Abandoned Properties Laws. These laws are structural components of the Armenian Genocide and one of the elements connected to the basis of the legal system of the Republican period. It is for this reason that we say that the Republic adopted this genocide as its structural foundation. This reminds us that we must take a fresh look at the relationship between the Republic as a legal system and the Armenian Genocide.

The Abandoned Properties Laws are perceived as “normal and ordinary” laws in Turkey. Their existence has never been questioned in this connection. Their consideration as natural is also an answer as to why the Armenian Genocide was ignored throughout the history of the Republic. This “normality” is equivalent to the consideration of a question as non-existent. Turkey is founded on the transformation of a presence—Christian in general, Armenian in particular—into an absence.

This picture also shows us a significant aspect of genocide as Lemkin pointed out. Genocide is not only a process of destruction but also that of construction. By the time genocide perpetrators are destroying one group, they are also constructing another group or identity. Confiscation is an indispensable and one of the most effective mechanisms for perpetrators to realize the aforementioned process of destruction and construction.

VK: What happened to the property after it was seized from the Armenians?

UK: Most of the Armenians properties were distributed to Muslim refugees from the Balkans and Caucasia at that time. Central and local politicians and bureaucrats of the Union and Progress Party also made use of Armenian properties.

The exhaustive process of administering and selling the property usually involved considerable administrative efforts, employing hundreds of local staff. Economic discrimination and plunder contributed directly to the CUP’s process of destruction in a variety of ways. At the direct level of implementation, the prospect of booty helped to motivate the local collaborators in various massacres and the deportation orchestrated by the CUP security forces in Anatolia in general.

The CUP cadres were quite aware that the retention of the Armenian property would give the local people a material stake in the deportation of the Armenians. In many cities of Anatolia, especially local notables and provincial elites who had close connections with the CUP obtained and owned most of the properties and wealth of Armenians. This process was realized in Aintab, Diyarbekir, Adana, Maras, Kilis, and other cities in the whole Anatolia. For my Ph.D. dissertation project, I am exploring how Armenians properties and wealth changed hands and were taken over by local elites of the city during the genocide.

Similar to the policy of Nazi leaders regarding the “Aryan”ization of Jewish property in the Holocaust, the CUP aimed to have complete control over the confiscation and expropriation of Armenian properties for the economic interests of the state, but could not prevent incidents of corruption from taking place.

It should be emphasized that corruption was fairly rift among bureaucrats and officers of the Abandoned Properties Commissions and Liquidation Commissions who were the responsible actors for administering and confiscating Armenian properties under the supervision and for the advantage of the state, as did happen in the “Aryan”ization of Jewish property.

Despite the widespread incidence of private plunder and corruption, there is no doubt that the seizure of Armenian property in the Ottoman Empire was primarily a state-directed process linked closely to the development of the Armenian Genocide. However, the widespread participation of the local population as beneficiaries of the Armenian property served to spread complicity, and also legitimize the CUP’s measures against the Armenians.

A number of leading members of the Central Committee of the Union and Progress Party, as well as CUP-oriented governors and mutasarrıfs, seized a great deal of property, especially those belonging to affluent Armenians in many vilayets. In addition, according to one argument, CUP leaders also utilized Armenian property and wealth to meet the deportation expenses.

Also, it is worth mentioning an important detail on the National Tax Obligations (Tekâlif-i Milliye) orders. This topic is important to show the Nationalist movement’s viewpoint concerning the Armenians, and also Greeks and the properties they left behind. The National Tax Obligations Orders were issued by command of Mustafa Kemal, the head of the Grand National Assembly and commander-in-chief of the Turkish Nationalist army, to finance the War of Independence against Greece. The abandoned properties of Armenians were also seen as an important source of financing for the war between 1919 and 1922.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, in 1926, Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a law. This law was promulgated and enforced on June 27, 1926. According to this law, Turkish governmental officers, politicians, and bureaucrats who were executed as a result of their roles in the Armenian deportations or who were murdered by Dashnaks were declared “national heroes,” and so-called Abandoned Properties of Armenians were given to their families.

And finally in 1928, the Turkish Republic introduced a new regulation that granted muhacirs or Muslim refugees who were using Armenian properties the right to have the title deeds of those properties, which included houses, lands, field crops, and shops.

As you can see, a variety of actors and institutions seized properties and wealth that the deported Armenians were forced to leave behind.

VK: What did this entire process of confiscation and appropriation represent, on the one hand to the Ottoman Elite, and on the other to the average Turk? Was it an ideological principle or a mere motivating element for further destruction?

UK: We should be very cautious when giving a proper answer to this question. Also, in my view, this aspect of the Armenian Genocide should be compared with the “Aryan”ization of Jewish properties in the Holocaust. We can see palpable resemblances between these two dispossession processes.

It is obvious that the material stake for the average Turkey played a significant role in his/her participation in the destruction process of Armenians. Economic motivation was always present and enabled CUP central actors to carry out their ultra-nationalist ideological policies against Armenians in terms of gaining the support and consent of average Turkish-Muslim people.

To have a better appreciation of the motivation of the average Turk, one should look at what happened at the local level—which means we need more local and micro studies in order to understand how the deportation and genocide alongside the plunder and pillage of Armenian properties took place in various localities in Anatolia.

The process of genocide and deportation directed at the Armenians was, in fact, put into practice by local notables and provincial elites. These local actors prospered through the acquisition of Armenians’ property and wealth, transforming them into the new wealthy social stratum. In this respect, the Union and Progress Party’s genocide and deportation decree on May 27, 1915 had a certain social basis through the practice of effective power, control, and support mechanism(s) at local levels. Therefore, a more accentuated focus on the local picture or the periphery deserves closer examination.

The function of the stolen Armenian assets in the Turkification process makes the confiscation of Armenian properties a social matter. In this respect, the wide variety of participants and the dynamic self-radicalization of the CUP and state institutions at the local level need to be examined. Although the CUP was involved throughout the confiscation process and was fully in charge of it, the collaboration of local institutions and officers also played a considerable role. The local institutions and offices could not operate in complete isolation from their respective societies and the prevailing attitudes in them.

The expropriation of the Armenians, therefore, was not limited simply to the implementation of the CUP orders, but was also linked to the attitude of local societies towards the Armenians, that is, to the different forms of Armenian hatred. As in the empire, the corruptive influence that spread with the enrichment from Armenian properties in Anatolia could also have led to various forms of accommodation of CUP policies. The robbery of the property is also a useful barometer to assess the relations of various local populations toward the CUP, to the CUP central and local authorities, and also toward the Armenian population in each city.

With regard to the widespread collaboration of parts of the local populace in measures taken against the Armenians, the distribution of a great amount of the Armenian property provided a useful incentive that reinforced hatred for the local Armenians as well as other political and personal motives.

One should keep in mind the fact that the participation of local people is a necessary condition to ensure the effectiveness of genocidal policies. Planned extermination of all members of a given category of people is impossible without the involvement of their neighbors—the only ones who know who is who in a local community.

Therefore, the entire process of confiscation can be evaluated and construed as both an ideological principle and economic motivation. These two aspects cannot be separated from each other in our analysis. In my view, the ideological principle was hugely supported and complemented by economic motivation and material stakes. In some instances, ideology played a more significant role than economic motivation, and in other instances economic interests came into prominence vis-à-vis ideology. Yet, in any case, these two parameters were on the ground and constituted effective mechanisms and dynamic in the confiscation, plunder, and seizure of Armenian material wealth.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: The confiscation of Armenian properties: An interview with Ümit Kurt

Armenia and Azerbaijan FMs inform Minsk Group co-chairs their commitment to peaceful settlement of Karabakh conflict

September 28, 2013 By administrator

September 28, 2013 | 11:02

YEREVAN. – Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Edward Nalbandian is participating in the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, in New York 173403City.

Along the lines of the session, Nalbandian on Friday met with Azerbaijani FM Elmar Mammadyarov, OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs Igor Popov (Russia), Jacques Faure (France) and James Warlick (USA), and Andrzej Kasprzyk, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office.

The interlocutors continued the discussions on the substance of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, informs the Armenian MFA press service.

The co-chairs stressed their countries’ commitment to assist in the pacific settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They also called upon the parties to the conflict to refrain from actions and rhetoric that could cause an increase of tension in the region and an escalation of the conflict.

On their part, the Armenian and the Azerbaijani FMs reaffirmed their determination to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict.

The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs informed that they plan to visit the region in November, to discuss with the presidents the matters concerning the summit that is planned before the end of the year.

News from Armenia – NEWS.am

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Armenia and Azerbaijan FMs inform Minsk Group co-chairs their commitment to peaceful settlement of Karabakh conflict

US: Senate Passes Budget Bill With Restored Health Funds, Setting Up Showdown With House

September 27, 2013 By administrator

The Senate on Friday approved stopgap spending legislation to keep the federal government open without gutting President Obama’s health care law, setting up a weekend showdown with the House that will decide whether much of the government shuts down at midnight Monday.
The 54-to-44 vote for final passage followed a more critical moment when the Senate, in a bipartisan rebuke to Republican hard-liners, cut off debate on the legislation. The 79-to-19 vote included the top Republican leadership and easily exceeded the 60-vote threshold to break a filibuster.
The Senate then voted along party lines, 54 to 44, to strip out House Republican language that tied further funding of the government to defunding the health care law. That vote required only a simple 51-vote majority.
READ MORE »
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/politics/senate-is-expected-to-approve-budget-bill.html?emc=edit_na_20130927

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Setting Up Showdown With House, US: Senate Passes Budget Bill With Restored Health Funds

CrossTalk: Blowback’s Revenge (Video)

September 27, 2013 By administrator

Kenyan terorDoes the War on Terror actually generate more terrorists and victims? What are the lessons to be learned from the attack in Kenya? And, where is the logic in Washington indirectly backing Al-Qaeda in Syria and fighting terrorists elsewhere? CrossTalking with Kelley Vlahos, Richard Barrett and Stephen Zunes.
 
 
 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: CrossTalk: Blowback's Revenge (Video), Kenya

Video Games and Cigarettes: Syria’s Disneyland for Jihadists

September 27, 2013 By administrator

By: By Christoph Reuter

Foreign Islamists coming into Syria have been gathering in the relatively quiet north. But many of them are finding transit towns — with good food, video games and smoking — preferable to the front. When they do end up fighting, it’s often with each other.

Atmeh looks like the set for a movie about al-Qaida. New arrivals pulling suitcases on wheels search for their emirs, Africans and Asians can be seen on the village image-518492-breitwandaufmacher-ybpustreets, and long-haired men dressed in traditional Afghan clothing walk around wielding AK-47s. There are patrons at the local kebab stand whose northern English dialect is peppered with Arabic words and phrases. “Subhan’Allah, bro, I asked for ketchup,” says one man. The many languages heard on the street include Russian, Azerbaijani and Arabic spoken with a guttural Saudi Arabian accent.

ANZEIGE

The once-sleepy smugglers’ nest on the Turkish border has become a mecca for jihad tourists from around the world. A year ago, SPIEGEL reporters in Atmeh met with one of the first foreign fighters in Syria, a young Iraqi who said that he had come to overthrow the dictatorship. Meanwhile, more than 1,000 jihadists are staying in and around Atmeh, making it the densest accumulation of jihadists in all of Syria. Ironically, while war rages in the rest of the country, the foreign jihadists have made one of Syria’s quietest spots into their base. Or perhaps they have chosen Atmeh precisely because it is so quiet. Once they arrive, many are reluctant to leave.

The Turkish mobile phone network provides strong reception, and the shops carry Afghan pakol wool hats, al-Qaida caps and knee-length black shirts made of the same coarse material used in the Pakistani tribal regions. New restaurants have popped up, and a company called International Contacts books flights and exchanges Saudi riyals, British pounds, euros and US dollars into the local currency. The pharmacy sells miswak, a teeth-cleaning stick from Pakistan with which the Prophet Muhammed supposedly brushed his teeth. The package label promises that the use of miswak increases the effectiveness of subsequent prayers by a factor of 70.

The Jihadist is Always Right

A third Internet café opened in mid-June to accommodate the many jihadists wanting to communicate with their relatives and friends at home via phone, email or chat programs. This prompted the owner of the first café to hang al-Qaida flags above his computers as a sign of loyalty to his customers. The move has improved business despite the growing competition. The heavily armed customers use Skype to tell their friends at home about what a paradise Atmeh is. The rents are cheap, they say, the weather and food are good, they can walk around with their weapons and, with a little luck, they can even find wives. In the evenings, the sound of several jihadists playing Counter-Strike spills into the streets in a cacophony of video game warfare. In Atmeh, the holy war is a costume spectacle, and everyone can feel as if he were part of it — without suffering any harm. In August, a restaurant specializing in various national dishes for the international crowd of jihadists opened in Atmeh. Falafito has koshari for Egyptians, falafel for Saudis and chicken tikka for Pakistanis, to list just a few offerings.

Even local business owners are pleased about their fanatical clientele. The Syrian salesman in a mobile phone shop says: “A man from Dagestan comes here every few days. First he bought a Samsung Galaxy, a week later he bought an iPad, and then he bought a newer model of the Samsung Galaxy. He must have spent more than $1,000 (€740) here.”

Why are the foreigners in Atmeh in the first place, asks an exasperated local commander with the Free Syrian Army (FSA)? “If they have come here to fight, then the front is that way,” he adds, pointing east.

In fact, Atmeh is a transit station for jihadists who usually arrive at the nearby Turkish airport in Hatay. Some remain in the region, while others continue on to Aleppo, to the mountains of Latakia, to Rakka in the east, or to wherever the unclear front happens to be.

Some Syrian rebels team up with the jihadists, but many find the foreigners sinister. And even when the latter do fight against regime troops, FSA commanders are puzzled as to why commanders like Abu Omar al-Shishani, from Chechnya, aren’t using the ammunition and anti-aircraft missiles they have obtained. Indeed, the FSA commanders fear the jihadists could use their weapons against Syrian rebels or even in terrorist attacks elsewhere in the world.

‘We Can’t Afford a Second Front’

“We hope that the jihadists leave again after (Syrian President Bashar) Assad has been overthrown,” says Hassan Hamada, a former colonel in Syria’s air force who made headlines a year ago when he defected to Jordan with his MiG-21. Hamada is now a member of the FSA leadership in northern Syria. “For now, we can’t afford a second front,” he says.

So, for the time being, they are fighting side by side, and jihadist and secular fighters still coexist. Shops in Atmeh sell music CDs, and women still wear trousers in the streets. This is because there is no power vacuum in Atmeh like the one there was in Iraq in 2003. Instead, there is a complicated structure of local councils, FSA brigades and moderate Islamists with whom the radicals must come to terms.

When the foreign fighters are asked about their plans, they only mention Syria as a stage. “First there is jihad here, until we achieve victory! Then we will liberate Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine,” says a young Arab from the UK. Israel is no longer of paramount importance now that Shiites are seen as the real enemies. Although Shiites are also Muslims, the Sunni radicals believe they are worse than any infidel.

These are the kinds of things they say in Atmeh, but their influence is already fading in Daret Azzeh, a city 25 kilometers (16 miles) away, where the FSA thwarted the jihadists’ efforts to assume power. Now the two groups work rotating shifts at checkpoints. But when the town council asked for help in repairing a water line, the jihadists merely shrugged their shoulders. “They want to take over half the world,” says Ahmed Rashid, a lawyer and town council member, “but they would already fail in a small city.”

Disparate Groups Lacking Solid Leadership

Meanwhile, in Atmeh, the jihadists are practicing a way of life that existed in the days of the Prophet, albeit with such amenities as Facebook and Counter-Strike. Though unintended, the scene is reminiscent of the early days of Islam, after the death of the Prophet, when three of the first four caliphs grappled with rivals from within their own ranks. All the radicals in Atmeh want a theocracy, but this doesn’t stop individual groups from constantly maligning each other, becoming rivals and occasionally starting feuds. In mid-June, there were at least five jihadist groups in and around Atmeh:

  • Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wa bilad al-Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), a growing group with more than 200 adherents
  • Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Army of Emigrants and Helpers), with about 170 fighters
  • Abu al-Banat, a group of about 70 men, named after its emir and consisting almost exclusively of Chechens, Dagestanis and Azerbaijanis. Its numbers are declining.
  • Abu Musab al-Jazairi, named after its Algerian founder and financier, with about 60 members Jabat al-Nusra (Front of Defense), with about 100 fighters

Al-Nusra is the murkiest of the groups, and it is in the process of disintegrating, at least in Idlib province, now that its leader, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who has never appeared in person, swore allegiance to al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in April 2013. The rank and file in Syria have a low opinion of Zawahiri for several reasons. The Egyptian is not seen as particularly charismatic, and although he managed to have himself named the successor of former al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden from his hiding place in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, he has failed to unite the terrorist conglomerate, allowing new groups to grow along its fringes.

In addition, jihadist pilgrims want a leader to call the shots. They want an emir in the flesh, someone who issues commands and delivers verdicts in person. But al-Nusra lacks such an emir. Even in their own propaganda videos, all that one sees of Abu Mohammed al-Golani is a figure with a tinny, distorted voice and pixelated face. Members often say that they know someone who knows someone who has met the emir, but that, upon closer examination, their stories often come to nothing. Several former al-Nusra members from Aleppo, Idlib and Damascus have said in recent months that no one has ever seen or even spoken with the man.

Besides, says a Syrian who left al-Nusra to join Dawla, the latter is “cooler.” Members can smoke, he says, as long as no one is watching. This is an important competitive advantage in the chain-smoking Syrian rebel community. Cigarettes are normally taboo among the jihadists because “smoking drives away the angels and delays our victory,” says the former al-Nusra member, quoting his local ex-emir.

Taking Extremism Too Far

While many of the Syrian al-Nusra members have gravitated to more moderate groups, the foreigners have joined Dawla, which has become the strongest group in the north.

But the most radical emir in the north has been Abu al-Banat, a former Russian officer from the Caucasus republic of Dagestan who converted to Islam and has gathered disciple-like supporters since then. Although he speaks only broken Arabic, he summarily declared al-Nusra and the other jihadists groups to be “kafirs,” or infidels, because they refused to submit to his command.

In the spring, the self-proclaimed emir from Atmeh went with his supporters to the village of Mashad Ruhin, nine kilometers away, which he then sealed off with armed guards and transformed into his personal emirate.

Al-Banat had three men beheaded in the village square in April. In a video of the brutal execution, which appeared online in the summer, an unkempt man surrounded by a gawking crowd, including children, speaks into the camera in broken Arabic. The man is Abu al-Banat. Three bound men cower on the ground next to him. An assistant slowly cuts off the head of one of the men and then proceeds to the second man. Then he holds the severed head up to the camera like a trophy.

Oddly enough, the recently published video appeared first on Syria Tube. The PR site for the Syrian regime claimed that the beheading victims were three Christian priests who had been killed in late June in the town of Rassania. The story was promptly disseminated by the Catholic news agency Agenzia Fides, which has a history of broadcasting made-up horror stories.

What the video actually depicts is the murder of alleged Assad loyalists in al-Banat’s camp in April, although who the three men were and what offences they committed remains unclear. As a former member of his group recalls, al-Banat “was both judge and accuser in one.” The villagers were horrified, says a man from a nearby town. “No matter what the three men did, people aren’t lambs to be slaughtered.” The executions triggered an exodus, with only about 70 supporters remaining behind.

Apparently the other jihadists unanimously agreed that the beheadings had gone too far, and on the night of June 28, there was a rare instance of collaboration. A Chechen Dawla commander and a group of heavily armed men invaded Mashad Ruhin and declared al-Banat’s reign of terror over. His remaining supporters surrendered without resistance, and al-Banat and two aides were taken away. All access routes had been sealed off during the attack by checkpoints of the FSA to prevent other jihadists from coming to the emir’s aid — but no one came.

The leaderless remnants of al-Banat’s jihadist group reportedly packed their bags in the coming days and left the village.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Azerbaijan, Video Games and Cigarettes: Syria's Disneyland for Jihadists

Turkey: Soccer Fans Give New Meaning to Political Football

September 27, 2013 By administrator

BY: Dorian Jones is a freelance reporter based in Istanbul.

Turkish soccer fans are taking the lead in İstanbul’s anti-government protests, effectively turning the country’s most popular sport into a potential political battleground.

The politicization of soccer fans poses a quandary for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A former semi-professional soccer player himself, who is known to don the scarf of a local club when addressing public rallies across the country, Erdoğan long considered soccer to be his own political domain. But no longer.

The sight of soccer fans standing on barricades, taunting police, has shattered that image. For many Turks, soccer is now associated with political protest.

Soccer fans notably took on a leading role in İstanbul demonstrations last week over claims that a police tear-gas canister had killed 22-year-old Ahmet Atakan during September 9 rallies in the southeastern city of Hatay. The demonstrations were centered in the city’s Kadıköy district, home to the 106-year-old Fenerbahçe soccer club, a national icon.

Interspersing political slogans with soccer chants, many demonstrators wore the club’s distinctive yellow-and-blue shirts. “This is Kadıköy, and this belongs to Fenerbahçe! We won’t let the police take this neighborhood!” shouted one defiant protestor, covering his face with a club scarf to protect his identity and mitigate the effects of pepper gas.

While the Fenerbahçe protesters received lots of notoriety, it is another İstanbul club, Beşiktaş, that is perhaps most closely associated with the protest movement. Known for their sense of humor and rebellion, a left-wing group of Beşiktaş fans, called Çarşı, are “the heroes of the [protest] movement, and they have been joined by other soccer fan supporters,” observed Yasmin Çongar, a writer on Turkish affairs.

Back in June, during the height of the Gezi Park protests, Çarşı supporters at one point gathered outside Prime Minister Recep Tayipp Erdoğan’s İstanbul office, just a stone’s throw away from the heartland of Beşiktaş supporters. One member “hijacked a bulldozer and drove it against police,” recalled Çongar. The club’s İnönü stadium is also not far from Gezi Park, where a small rally against government development of the area sparked the nationwide protests.

Soccer fans are accustomed to facing pepper gas, which authorities routinely have used to disperse unruly elements following matches. They proved eager to share their experience in dealing with gas attacks with other Gezi Park protesters. “They were always in the front when police used gas,” remembered one demonstrator who wanted to remain anonymous. “They really helped those not used to facing such things. They protected them.”

The anti-government mood that has simmered since the summer has achieved something that most sports commentators had thought impossible — breaking down, albeit temporally, the fierce rivalry that borders on hate between İstanbul’s soccer fans, claimed Çongar.

“There is no love lost between these İstanbul teams and supporters. They don’t even eat together,” Çongar said. “These Gezi park protests brought them together. There is new energy solidarity along the lines of soccer clubs. Watching that, the government has become very wary of what the fans could do.”

Of late, Çarşı supporters have become the target of a crackdown; under Turkey’s draconian organized-crime laws, prosecutors arrested and charged 20 of its members as ringleaders of the June unrest. “I hope football supporters are not being made [into] scapegoats,” warned Emma Sinclair Webb, Turkey researcher for the New York-based Human Rights Watch. “The laws used against them are normally used against groups like the mafia.”

The fans were subsequently released, pending trial. They face sentences of up to 15 years in jail if convicted. Further arrests could be in the offing. The newspaper Taraf reported on September 19 that as many as 1,000 people could be arrested as part of an alleged major sweep-up of anti-government protestors.

The crackdown extends to crowd behavior in soccer stadiums. Ahead of the new soccer season, which started in late August, the government took steps to purge politics from stadiums by extending a ban on racist slogans to political chants.

The owner of the Beşiktaş soccer club, Yıldırım Demirören, known for his close ties to the government, demanded that all season ticketholders pledge “not to insult in a way that could provoke social, political and ideological clashes” on pain of being banned from the stadium

The sports ministry has blitzed television channels with advertisements warning parents about political protests as the slippery slope to terrorism. The ads end with the image of a suicide bomber.

“They have come up with fantastic measures,” Soli Özel, a columnist for Haber Türk newspaper, said of the government. The techniques indicate that “if there is a wave of protests again, the response is going to be pretty harsh.”

For now, the crackdown appears to be only hardening attitudes. At the 34th minute of games [İstanbul license-plate numbers start with 34], many İstanbul club supporters switch from soccer chants to protest slogans.

Beşiktaş’ opening game on September 1st at its home stadium, in particular, saw a torrent of anti-government slogans. Adding insult to injury, the club is currently playing at Erdoğan Stadium while its own stadium is being rebuilt. Erdoğan Stadium is in İstanbul’s Kasımpaşa distinct, where the prime minster grew up. Sensitive to that awkwardness, TV channels quickly muted the sound of the protests in compliance with state regulations.

One defiant Çarşı supporter, though, dismissed the crackdown. “We will always protect our beliefs, which are always on the side of fairness and justice, and we will continue protecting

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Turkey: Soccer Fans Give New Meaning to Political Football

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