Turkey is going to use advanced technologies to protect its oil and gas pipelines from acts of sabotage, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey, Taner Yildiz, stated after an explosion hit the main line of Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline in Kars Province yesterday. The pipeline transports Azerbaijani gas from Shah Deniz gas field.

Remarkably, the minister blamed the militants of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for the explosion. Earlier, the Kurds were accused of blasting the trunkline supplying gas from Iran and Iraq to Turkey. Yildiz said Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline’s explosion last week led to the reduction of the revenues from oil sales of Iraq Government.

Notably, the Azerbaijani information agency Trend was told in Kars province governor’s residence that BTE blast was the consequence of a gas leak, rather than a terror attack.

The spokesperson for SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan), Nizameddin Guliyev, said Azerbaijan did not suffer losses from Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline explosion as there was practically no gas in the pipeline. The reason was that the gas supply had been suspended there since August 2 because the platform on Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan had stopped for maintenance operations.

Against the backdrop of yet another tension in the confrontation between the Turkish authorities and the PKK armed detachments, the Kurdish militants’ responsibility for the series of pipeline explosions seems convincing at first sight. However, the BTE case arises a logical question: what is the reason for blowing up an empty gas line given that neither the foreign investors nor official Ankara suffers material damages?

In the worst case, this will cost Turkey deterioration of the image of a stable and reliable partner for energy resources transits. In addition, there is the possibility that Iran may enter the international market, and the decrease of Azerbaijan’s oil production and export (as for January-July, 2015, the oil export through Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was by 13% less than it was in the same period under review in 2014). For instance, Kamil Salimov, an Azerbaijani expert, does not consider it a coincidence that Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline blast came immediately after Iran and Azerbaijan’s economics ministers talks, because during these negotiations, the Iranian side offered to use the Azerbaijani communications to transport Iranian energy resources.
The easiest option is certainly to accuse the rebels, who are out of the authorities’ control, of a terror attack. Suffice it to recall a similar and quite suspicious explosion on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline on 5 August 2008. Kurdistan Workers’ Party immediately claimed to be responsible for the blast. However, then energy minister of Turkey, Hilmi Guler, said no traces of sabotage were found on the pipeline.

Meanwhile, in 2014, Bloomberg Agency published the results of an investigation totally refuting the widely believed version of PKK’s involvement in the blast. It turned out the security system of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had remotely been put out of action by hackers.

The explosion led to a spill of 30 thousand barrels of oil to the surrounding areas. BP and other stakeholders of the pipeline lost $5 million every day because of the halt of the oil flow. The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan lost $1 billion. Bloomberg said Russia was responsible for the explosion.

Now, the Azerbaijani website Haqqin.az has also “discovered” Russian factor because as a result of the delay of the project “Turkish Stream,” Azerbaijani gas will reach Europe earlier than the Russian one through the Southern Gas Corridor (TANAP and TAP), something Gazprom does not want to allow.

However, the Russian company’s fear of the Azerbaijani project, which the Western investors quit one by one, seems to be an exaggeration at least after the recent reports about the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) going to extend a $1 billion loan to the Russian company Lukoil. The loan will be invested into the realization of the second stage of the operation of the sea gas condensate field Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan. Lukoil has 10% interest in Shah Deniz project operation. The other stakeholders in the project are BP (the project operator) with 28.8%, Turkey’s TPAO – 19%, Azerbaijan’s SOCAR – 16.7%, Malaysia’s Petronas – 15.5% and Iran’s NICO – 10%.

Initially, the stakeholders’ staff was totally different with European companies intending to make investments in TAP. France’s Total, however, abandoned the project practically immediately after signing the investment decision, and sold its 10% share to Turkey’s TPAO, which owned only 9% before. Total explained its decision by little interest in the project. In addition, E.On, Germany, decided to center on the North-Western Europe, where it had problems with demand.

Statoil, a Norwegian company, first vended its 10% in the Consortium for $1.45 billion (it had 25.5% before). The buyers were BP (3.33%) and SOCAR (6.67%). Later it also sold the remaining 15.5% in the project Shah Deniz. The transaction value amounted to $2.25 billion. Statoil abandoned the project TAP, as well, passing its 15.5% stakes to the Malaysian company Petronas. Earlier, Lars Christian Bacher, the vice president of Statoil, explained the stake’s sale by the necessity to optimize their portfolio and strengthen their financial flexibility.

Actually, the Norwegian company abandoned its control of the rival project in Europe. And here arises the second logical question: whether the company has itself made the decision to leave the Azerbaijani market because of the increasingly complicated economic situation in the country, or Azerbaijan’s government has decided to create a “circle of confidants” in the energetic sector, including the British company BP, its oldest partner, and the “elder brother” Turkey, as well as the Islamic solidarity presented by Malaysia. The reason is that the Azerbaijani side probably uses any destabilization in the region to finally exclude the Western partners with conditions that are unfavorable for them. The question is – is this clear for the Europeans who tried for many years to balance their energetic interests in Baku with criticism of total human rights abuses in that country?

Norway’s example is also worth studying. The Embassy of Norway and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee quite actively supported the human rights defenders and civil activists in Azerbaijan in their time. The Norwegian Embassy spoke out for the release of the bloggers Emin Milli and Adnan Hajizade, and the journalist Eynulla Fatullayev. The crackdowns on the participants of peaceful protests in Baku were actively discussed, too, and Media Rights Institute Azerbaijan’s reports about the freedom of expression in the country were financed. However, Norway’s foreign office has recently ceased to take up special actions regarding the issue and the arrests of many fighters against the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan have remained beyond its attention.

The Azerbaijani authorities have even been forgiven for the attack on the Norwegian diplomats in Nakhijevan when the latters tried to enter the village Benanyar with their American colleagues. The authorities had organized repressions against the village residents the day before in order to bar the celebration of the religious event Ashura.

The Azerbaijani authorities also managed to get away with the beating and humiliation of the Norwegian journalist from the TV channel NRK, Amir Asgharnejad, in Heydar Aliyev airport. He had arrived in Baku to cover Eurovision Song Contest in 2012. He was taken to an interrogation room, threatened and forced to put off his clothes. The Norwegian journalist of Iranian origin was made to kick the Iranian flag. Meanwhile the police captured on film how he was insulted.

As a result, the official Baku – that used to beware criticism and act with caution to its Western partners – has now practically ceased to consider their interests and is forming a new model of partnership based on blackmail and threats. In such circumstances, either the Western companies will accept these rules of the game without any guarantees of security for their business, or they will finally concede the Azerbaijani market to players who are more loyal to Aliyev’s regime.

Asatur Sarkisyan