At a news conference on Sept. 3, Atilla Kart, a lawmaker for the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), revealed the code names and birthplaces of 90 Turks killed over the past two years in the ranks of jihadist groups in Syria. Kart, who referenced “academic research,” said IS recruited militants mostly from Adapazari and its environs in the northwest and the Konya region in central Turkey. In Istanbul, recruitment concentrated in conservative, impoverished suburbs such as Sultanbeyli, Bagcilar and Esenler. Kart said IS recruited militants also through a number of Turkish Islamic foundations, associations and religious learning centers, saying it would be inconceivable for the security forces to be unaware of them.

Indeed, IS-linked activities have expanded and become more visible in Turkey in recent months. On June 17, for instance, the Haberturk daily reported about an association using the IS emblem in Istanbul’s low-income Gungoren neighborhood. On July 29, the media carried images of hundreds of people from an IS-linked group performing an open-air Eid al-Fitr prayer near Istanbul.

With those realities on the ground, one might well argue that the contributions coalition member Turkey could make to regional security in light of its caveat-related position could not be limited to securing its Syrian border and stopping the jihadist traffic. Of course, we are not speaking here of a permission to use the southern Incirlik air base for strikes on IS. This option remains in the scope of caveats and seems highly unlikely.

However, as a country with a peculiar geographical position and Muslim identity, Turkey gets not only the right to caveats but also greater responsibilities. Beyond securing its borders, Turkey has the obligation to enact measures to prevent young Turks from joining IS, including primarily the surveillance and elimination of IS activity and recruitment networks inside Turkey.

No doubt, the AKP government’s policy and hawkish rhetoric vis-a-vis Syria since 2011 has had an indirect effect in encouraging young Turks from the most conservative social segments to join the “jihad.” It is high time for AKP leaders to realize that their sectarian policies and hard-line rhetoric vis-a-vis Syria and Iraq have produced a blowback with direct threats to Turkey’s security.

Finally, we come to the AKP government’s ideological constraint, which is best illustrated in its leaders’ continuous reluctance to label IS as “terrorist.” This attitude has nothing to do with tactical considerations to avoid angering an IS that holds 49 Turks hostage. Had it been so, it could have been considered a “political” weakness. But the AKP government and its media have never referred to IS as a terrorist group, calling it a “radical element.”

In an Aug. 8 television program, then-foreign minister and current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called the organization a “terrorized” rather than terrorist group. “[IS] can be seen as a radical, terrorized formation. However, there are Turks, Arabs and Kurds in its ranks. The structure there [in Iraq], the earlier displeasure and resentments have led to a widespread reaction on a large front,” he said. Davutoglu’s approach could be seen as an attempt to understand and rationalize IS. Nevertheless, it also shows that IS enjoys a remarkable “caveat” in the mindset of Turkey’s leadership.