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Why Turkey Wants to Invade the Greek Islands

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Invade the Greek Islands

by Uzay Bulut,

  • Turkish propagandists also have been twisting facts to try to portray Greece as the aggressor.
  • Although Turkey knows that the islands are legally and historically Greek, Turkish authorities want to occupy and Turkify them, presumably to further the campaign of annihilating the Greeks, as they did in Anatolia from 1914 to 1923 and after.
  • Any attack against Greece should be treated as an attack against the West.

There is one issue on which Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), are in complete agreement: The conviction that the Greek islands are occupied Turkish territory and must be reconquered. So strong is this determination that the leaders of both parties have openly threatened to invade the Aegean.

The only conflict on this issue between the two parties is in competing to prove which is more powerful and patriotic, and which possesses the courage to carry out the threat against Greece. While the CHP is accusing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP party of enabling Greece to occupy Turkish lands, the AKP is attacking the CHP, Turkey’s founding party, for allowing Greece to take the islands through the 1924 Treaty of Lausanne, the 1932 Turkish-Italian Agreements, and the 1947 Paris Treaty, which recognized the islands of the Aegean as Greek territory.

In 2016, Erdoğan said that Turkey “gave away” the islands that “used to be ours” and are “within shouting distance.” “There are still our mosques, our shrines there,” he said, referring to the Ottoman occupation of the islands.

Two months earlier, at the “Conference on Turkey’s New Security Concept,” Erdoğan declared: “Lausanne… has never been a sacred text. Of course, we will discuss it and struggle to have a better one.” Subsequently, pro-government media outlets published maps and photos of the islands in the Aegean, calling them the territory that “Erdoğan says we gave away at Lausanne.”

To realize his ultimate goal of leaving behind a legacy that surpasses that of all other Turkish leaders, Erdoğan has set certain objectives for the year 2023, the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, and 2071, the 1,000th anniversary of the 1071 Battle of Manzikert, during which Muslim Turkic jihadists from Central Asia defeated Christian Greek Byzantine forces in the Armenian highland of the Byzantine Empire.

The idea behind these goals is to create nationalistic cohesion towards annexing more land to Turkey. To alter the borders of Turkey, however, Erdoğan must change or annul the Lausanne Treaty. Ironically, ahead of his two-day official visit to Greece in December — touted as a sign of a new era in Turkish-Greek relations — Erdogan told Greek journalists that the Lausanne Treaty is in need of an update. During his trip, the first official visit to Greece by a Turkish head of state in 65 years, Erdoğan repeated his mantra that the Lausanne Treaty must be revised.

The following month, Erdoğan targeted CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, again accusing the party that signed the Lausanne Treaty of giving away the islands during negotiations. “We will tell our nation about [this],” Erdoğan said. What this statement means is that Erdogan accepts that the islands legally belong to Greece. Yet, at the same time, he calls the Greek possession of the territory “an invasion” — apparently because the islands were once within the borders of the Ottoman Empire — and he now wants them back.

Meanwhile, the CHP has been equally aggressive in its rhetoric, with Kılıçdaroğlu telling the Turkish parliament that Greece has “occupied” 18 islands. When Greek Defense Minister Panos Kammenos was described as “uncomfortable” with this statement, CHP’s deputy leader for foreign affairs, Öztürk Yılmaz, responded, “Greece should not test our patience.” Yılmaz also reportedly stated that “Turkey is much more than its government,” and that any Greek minister who provokes Turkey, will be “hit with a sledgehammer on the head…If [Kammenos] looks at history, he will see many examples of that.”

History is, in fact, filled with examples of Turks carrying out murderous assaults against Anatolian Greeks. In one instance, the genocidal assault against Greek and Armenian Christians in Izmir in 1922 was highlighted in a speech before the parliament by Devlet Bahceli, the head of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP):

“If they [the Greeks] want to fall into the sea again — if they feel like being chased after again — they are welcome. The Turkish nation is ready and has the faith to do it again. Someone must explain to the Greek government what happened in 1921 and 1922. If there is no one to explain it to them, we know how to stick like a bullet on the Aegean, rain from the sky like a blessed victory, and teach history to the couriers of ahl al-salib [the people of the cross] all over again.”

Turkish propagandists also have been twisting facts to try to portray Greece as the aggressor. Ümit Yalım, former secretary-general of the Ministry of National Defense, for example, said that “Greece has turned the Greek-occupied islands into arsenals and military outposts that Greece will use in its future military intervention against Turkey.”

Turkish politicians all seem to have their own motivations for their obsession with the islands: Traditional Turkish expansionism, Turkification of Hellenic lands, neo-Ottomanism and Islam’s flagship of conquest — jihad. There are also strategic reasons for their wanting to invade the islands, which can be understood in a statement made by Deputy Prime Minister Tuğrul Türkeş about Turkey’s control of Cyprus since 1974:

“There is this misinformation that Turkey is interested in Cyprus because there is a Turkish society there… Even if no Turks lived in Cyprus, Turkey would still have a Cyprus issue and it is impossible for Turkey to give up on that.”

The same attitude and mentality apply to the Aegean islands. Although Turkey knows that the islands are legally and historically Greek, Turkish authorities want to occupy and Turkify them, presumably to further the campaign of annihilating the Greeks, as they did in Anatolia from 1914 to 1923 and after. The destruction of any remnant of Greek culture that existed in Asia Minor, a Greek land prior to the 11th century Turkish invasion, is almost complete. There are fewer than 2,000 Greeks left in Turkey today.

Given that Turkey brutally invaded Cyprus in 1974, its current threats against Greece — from both ends of Turkey’s political spectrum — should not be taken lightly by the West. Greece is the birthplace of Western civilization. It borders the European Union. Any attack against Greece should be treated as an attack against the West. It is time for the West, which has remained silent in the face of Turkish atrocities, to stand up to Ankara.

Uzay Bulut is a Turkish journalist born and raised in Turkey. She is presently based in Washington D.C.

Turkey Threatens to Invade Greece

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently said: “We warn those who have crossed the line in the Aegean and Cyprus… Their courage persists only until they see our army, our ships and our planes.” (Photo by Elif Sogut/Getty Images)

by Uzay Bulut,

  • Turkey’s ruling party, and even much of the opposition, seem intent on, if not obsessed with, invading and conquering these Greek islands, on the grounds that they are actually Turkish territory.
  • “The things we have done so far [pale in comparison to the] even greater attempts and attacks [we are planning for] the coming days, inshallah [Allah willing].” – Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, February 12, 2018.
  • The head of the state-funded Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, has openly described Turkey’s recent military invasion of Afrin as “jihad.” This designation makes sense when one considers that Muslim Turks owe their demographic majority in Asia Minor to centuries of Turkish persecution and discrimination against the Christian, Yazidi and Jewish inhabitants of the area.

In an incident that took place less than two weeks after the Greek Defense Ministry announced that Turkey had violated Greek airspace 138 times in a single day, a Turkish coast guard patrol boat on February 13 rammed a Greek coast guard vessel off the shore of Imia, one of many Greek islands over which Turkey claims sovereignty.

Most of the areas within modern Greece’s current borders were under the occupation of the Ottoman Empire from the mid-15th century until the Greek War of Independence in 1821 and the establishment of the modern Greek state in 1832. The islands, however, like the rest of Greece, are legally and historically Greek, as their names indicate.

Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), however, and even much of the opposition seem intent on, if not obsessed with, invading and conquering these Greek islands, on the grounds that they are actually Turkish territory.

In December, for instance, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main Turkish opposition CHP party, stated that when he wins the election in 2019, he will “invade and take over 18 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, just as former Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit invaded Cyprus in 1974.” He said that there is “no document” proving that those islands belong to Greece.

Meral Akşener, the head of the newly established opposition “Good Party,” has also called for an invasion and conquest of the islands. “What is required must be done,” she tweeted on January 13.

The most garish muscle-flexing has come from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of course, who seems emboldened by his military invasion of the Afrin region in northern Syria having gone virtually unchallenged.

“We warn those who have crossed the line in the Aegean and Cyprus,” Erdoğan declared, continuing:

“Their courage persists only until they see our army, our ships and our planes… Whatever Afrin is to us, our rights in the Aegean and Cyprus are the same. Do not ever think that the natural gas exploration in the waters of Cyprus and the opportunistic attempts in the Aegean Sea drop off our radar.

“Just as we disrupt the plots [in the region] through Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch [on Syria], and soon in Manbij and other regions, we can and we will disrupt the plots of those who engage in miscalculations on our southern border… Our warships and air forces are keeping an eye on the area closely to intervene in every way when required.”

Referring to the days of the Ottoman Empire, Erdoğan went on:

“Those who think that we have erased from our hearts the lands from which we withdrew in tears a hundred years ago are wrong.

“We say at every opportunity we have that Syria, Iraq and other places in the geography [map] in our hearts are no different from our own homeland. We are struggling so that a foreign flag will not be waved anywhere where adhan [Islamic call to prayer in mosques] is recited.

“The things we have done so far [pale in comparison to the] even greater attempts and attacks [we are planning for] the coming days, inshallah [Allah willing].”

The Ottoman dynasty and empire was established by a nomadic Turkmen chief sometime around the year 1300. During the more than 600 years of the Ottoman period, the Ottoman Turks, who also represented the Islamic Caliphate, regularly launched wars of jihad, invading and occupying lands across five continents.

Neo-Ottomanists in Turkey still proudly embrace the concept of jihad (Islamic holy war) against the kafirs (infidels). The head of the state-funded Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, has openly described Turkey’s recent military invasion of Afrin as “jihad.”

This designation makes sense when one considers that Muslim Turks owe their demographic majority in Asia Minor to centuries of Turkish Muslim persecution and discrimination against the Christian, Yazidi and Jewish inhabitants of the area. In the 11th century, Turkic jihadists from Central Asia invaded and conquered the Greek-speaking, Christian Byzantine Empire, paving the way for the gradual Turkification and Islamization of the region through methods such as murder, kidnapping, rape and forced conversions.

The greatest 20th century Turkish assault against Christians took place in the 1914-1923 genocide of Greeks, Armenians and Assyrians (Syriacs/Chaldeans) in Ottoman Turkey. This did not prevent Turkey, which continues to deny the genocide, from becoming a member of NATO in 1952. The assault also did not stop Turkey, three years after joining NATO, from committing a savage anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul or from forcibly expelling the remaining Greeks from Turkey in 1964.

It is precisely because the Turks have never been held accountable for their criminal actions and aggression that they continue to threaten the security and sovereignty of their neighbors. It is high time for the West wake up and take Ankara to task.

Uzay Bulut is a Turkish journalist born and raised in Turkey. She is presently based in Washington D.C.

A Short History of Turkish Threats to Invade Syria

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And why they’ve failed to produce a stable Middle East (and probably won’t this time, either)

BY NICK DANFORTH

(Photo by Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

(Photo by Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

It seems that no one, including perhaps the government in Ankara, is entirely clear on what Turkey’s endgame in Syria is. Recent reports that the United States and Turkey had agreed to establish a “safe zone” along the Turkish border were quickly contradicted, while terms like “buffer zone” and “security zone” are now floating around. With Ankara nonetheless eager to establish some kind of zone in Syria, it might be a good moment to review Turkey’s history of threatening to invade its southern neighbor — and look at to what extent those threats have worked out in Turkey’s favor. Source: foreignpolicy.com

On several occasions, most notably in 1937 and 1998, the Turkish government discovered just how effective it can be to flex some military muscle along its southern border without actually launching a full-fledged invasion. Indeed, the success of Turkey’s previous non-invasions might make a similar approach seem very appealing to policymakers in Ankara trying to decide what to do today. Yet revisiting this history also suggests that, absent a coherent political or diplomatic strategy for the region, saber rattling in Syria’s direction fails to bring Turkey lasting security or stability.

Turkey’s disastrous relationship with Syria has its origins in the province of Hatay, a beautiful region that was best known for its Christian history and remarkable cuisine before the Syrian civil war. Following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in World War I, the province, then known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, was placed under French control as part of the Syrian mandate. After Ataturk founded the modern-day Turkish Republic in 1923, “liberating” Hatay became a matter of national and personal pride. When bilateral negotiations in Paris over the province’s fate stalled in 1936, Ataturk set out by train toward the Syrian border, threatening to “resign and lead the army into the Sanjak himself if its fate could not be resolved in a manner consistent with Turkey’s honor.” His government also provided covert support to Turkish nationalist guerrillas planning an insurgency against the French. Then in 1937, as detailed in Sarah Shield’s excellent Fezzes into the River, Ataturk “took to the road once again to demonstrate the urgency of Turkey’s claim.” In cities and military bases along the border, the president reviewed his soldiers, hoping to leave the French with no doubt over his willingness to settle the issue by force.

The fight against France’s mandate of Syria ended on the eve of World War II, when France, its strategic position in Europe increasingly desperate, acceded to Turkey’s demands and returned Hatay to Turkish control. Patient diplomacy and a well-timed show of force had secured for Turkey a valuable new province, whose people’s loyalty the government then belatedly won over the course of the next several decades. Indeed, the only price Ankara paid for its acquisition was a half-century of Syrian hostility.

The Syrians continued to lay claim to Hatay, leading to problems throughout the Cold War. Turkish nationalists didn’t help matters in the 1950s when they responded to Syrian irredentism by suggesting they might not mind acquiring the neighboring Syrian province of Aleppo, too.Turkish nationalists didn’t help matters in the 1950s when they responded to Syrian irredentism by suggesting they might not mind acquiring the neighboring Syrian province of Aleppo, too. (A cartoon from the period shows Aleppo preparing a flag as a dowry for Turkey, while a crude caricature of Syria looks on with anger.) Turkish-Syrian tensions during this period helped push Damascus toward the Soviet Union, thereby setting the stage for another threat of Turkish invasion. When Damascus seemed to be drifting too far into the Soviet orbit in 1957, Turkey’s government suggested that a military operation might secure a friendlier Syrian regime. U.S. diplomats nixed the plan, explaining that while they admired Turkey’s anti-communist zeal, there was no need to alienate the Arab world with an outright invasion when they could just continue discreetly plotting coups instead.

Turkish policy succeeded in alienating Arab states anyway. By the 1980s, persistent friction with Syria — expanded to include a dispute over the allocation of Euphrates River water — led then-Syrian President Hafez al-Assad to begin supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the Kurdish nationalists waging a war against the Turkish state. Assad provided the PKK with training and arms as leverage against Turkey’s more powerful military, and he allowed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to make a home in Damascus. In the end, Assad proved largely unable to extract concessions from Turkey, but he did ultimately come closer than any of his predecessors to provoking an actual Turkish invasion. In 1998, the Turkish army once again massed on the Syrian border, demanding that Damascus cease its support for the PKK. Conceding to the seriousness of the threat, Assad complied and booted the Kurdish rebels out. (Shortly after being expelled from Damascus, Ocalan was captured by Turkish special forces in Kenya with the help of U.S. intelligence.)

Had Turkey capitalized on its success by pursuing a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish question, Ocalan’s capture could have been transformative. Instead, the opportunity for a negotiated settlement was squandered. In jail, Ocalan proved newly willing to cooperate, and even many in the Turkish military came to realize that the PKK could never be destroyed by force alone. Over the last decade, the ruling Justice and Development Party, AKP for its Turkish name, undertook unprecedented efforts to make peace with the PKK but was never quite committed or courageous enough to succeed. Bold gestures, like delivering increased Kurdish cultural rights, alternated with (U.S.-approved) air and ground assaults against PKK bases in Iraq like those of the past week.

It remains uncertain just what measures Turkey is prepared to take to keep its proposed “safe zone” in Syria safe. To date, the Turkish military has proved itself to be the voice of moderation, while the government appears ready to contemplate more invasive measures, if not a full-scale invasion. History gives Turkey grounds to be concerned about the establishment of a PKK safe haven in Syria, while more recent developments provide ample reason to fear the Islamic State. (The reconsolidation of a hostile Assad regime, meanwhile, seems little more likely at this point than the resurrection of the French mandate.)

In the 1930s, Turkey won Hatay and lost Syria. In 1998, it managed to mitigate a civil war that now risks erupting with renewed fury. If Ankara hopes that today a combination of threats and limited intervention can solve its most pressing problems in Syria, it may well be right. But if military force proves effective in forestalling Kurdish or jihadi gains, it has historically proved incapable of achieving what has long eluded Turkey: a stable and secure southern border.