Iraq’s Kurdistan region,— 21 years ago the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) under the leadership of Massoud Barzani invaded Erbil (Hewlêr) city, the current capital of Iraqi Kurdistan region, with the tanks of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

Saddam Hussein, who killed 182 thousand Kurds in the “Anfal Campaign” entered Erbil with tanks, cannons and heavy weapons on 31 August 1996 in response to KDP’s invitation.

During that course, which the people of Iraqi Kurdistan refer to as the “August 31, betrayal”, KDP gave the Kurdish parliament building to Saddam’s army and it was used as headquarters.

During the Gulf War the 36th parallel north of Iraq was declared a no-fly zone. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK or YNK) initiated an operation to reclaim Erbil in 1992. PUK liberated the city and drove Baath regime forces out.

Following Erbil’s liberation from the regime under the command of the PUK Politburo member Kosrat Rasul Ali, the city became the capital of Southern [Iraqi] Kurdistan.

The Chelebi Plan To Topple Saddam

In 1996, amidst the turbulent developments in the region, Iraqi opposition led by Ahmet Chelebi worked together with the CIA on a plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, US had some reservations about the plan. Former US president Bill Clinton, halted the plan due to the elections that were to take place in that same year. Another concern of US administration was; since most of the Iraqi oppositions were under Iranian influence the USA consequently feared that “Iraq could fall under the control of Iran.”

Talabani’s Plan To Capture Kirkuk

PUK Leader Jalal Talabani stated that they would support the plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Talabani worked on a plan to dispatch his forces from the north to Erbil, to take over the city Kirkuk and isolate it from Mosul.

But as the USA was not truly interested in the plans of the opposition, Ahmet Chelebi stopped all preparations. However, after Jalal Talabani openly set an eye on Kirkuk city. Iraq’s oppositions concluded that after Kirkuk’s conquest they would go for Mosul as well. And with the fall of those two cities, they will regain the support of the USA.

In August Jalal Talabani, launched the operation to capture Kirkuk. The swift advance of the Peshmerga forces even baffled the CIA. But a crisis was in the making. The General President of the KDP Massoud Barzani sent on 22 August a letter to Saddam Hussein, inviting him to invade Erbil.

Letter From Barzani To Saddam

In his letter Barzani called the murderer of the 182 000 Kurds Saddam Hussein “My President” and said: “My dear Mr. President, you have to find with your success and your mind a solution for Iran’s intervention into Iraq (…) We request and plead with Your Grace to command the Iraqi army to enter Erbil against the foreign powers who are causing threats and against the collaborating betrayal of Jalal Talabani.”

According to the agreement with Saddam Hussein “the Iraqi army would to help Barzani in his conquest of Erbil city, and Barzani would in return support Saddam Hussein in clamping down all Iraqi oppositions in South Kurdistan.”

After the Barzani-Saddam agreement was reached, the Iraqi army entered the city Erbil with 150 tanks and 30 thousand soldiers. Heavy clashes broke out as they approached the city. After the KDP forces captured 13 PUK peshmergas on the way to Erbil-Giwêr alive and shot them all dead, conflicts erupted in several regions, especially in the Ainkawa neighborhood. In total 450 people have been killed and 200 others injured.

‘We Collaborated With The Baath’

On the 31st August, Barzani held a meeting with the KDP politburo member Fazil Mirani and President of Parliament Cewher Namik Salim. Barzani said that they allied with the Baath regime to capture Erbil and have cleansed the city of members of the PUK. Jawhar Namiq, said that Barzani’s acts are ‘betrayal’. The crisis between Namiq and Barzani started there.

Barzani Called For The Unity Of Iraq’s Soil!

Barzani, who is saying today: “There is now nothing that we have in common with Iraq, I will establish an independent Kurdish state”, stated after the 31st of August in a press conference: “We are Kurds, we are Iraqis. There might be some minor issues between us and Iraq. But our common point is the protection of Iraq. There are external threats hovering on us. Since the USA and the West did not give us any support whatsoever, we were forced to ask the central government for help.”

He Made The Betrayal His Practice

Before the 31st August 1996, the cities Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, part of Halabja, Ranya, Qeladiz, the Qandil region, Penjwin and many other areas were in the hands of the PUK. The KDP had only some influence in Duhok, Zakho, Soran and a part of Halabja. According to the figures, only 30 percent of Iraqi Kurdistan’s territory was under the control of the KDP. But after the betrayal of August 31, the area the KDP gained control over rose to 60 percent.

Source: Ekurd.net

By Hemin Lihony
A shocking betrayal, waves of suicide attacks, days hiding in the desert. This is a first-hand account by a top Kurdish commander in the Iraqi armed forces about what really happened – and what happens next – in Ramadi, Anbar and Iraq.

Transcript begins: Report rudaw.net

In the past year and half we engaged in major battles. At times, ISIS targeted the Iraqi Army and police with 25 car bombs, yet our forces managed to fight back and repel the attacks.

But this time there was a major betrayal by the Special Operations command. This command was formed by the Americans during [former] prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and they carried the latest advanced weapons.

Two days prior to the ISIS attack we had accurate information that the Special Operations had packed up and abandoned their base in Ramadi.

I personally relayed the information through the chain of command and contacted Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

This command was formed by the Americans during [former] prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and they carried the latest advanced weapons.

I informed him of the photo and video evidence and location of hundreds of army vehicles and Humvees of the Special Operations forces assembled and about to abandon Ramadi.

I explained to PM Abadi the exact location of the forces on the map. It was 4am. They flew a plane to the place I told them and took photos of the assembled vehicles. They learned that the intelligence was correct and that indeed the forces were getting ready to withdraw.

Later that day more than 200 army vehicles abandoned their posts and their withdrawal led to the defeat of all other forces that were in Anbar to fight.

Why did the Special Operations act this way? I personally think there was a political reason behind it.

As a military commander, I don’t think PM Abadi or the Ministry of Defense have any authority over the Special Operations. Or it could be that the Shiite forces close to Maliki committed this act in order to embarrass and bring down Abadi’s government.

The Anbar police force numbers 29,000, but over the course of the year and half that I was there I never saw more than 500 policemen showing up for duty. Most of them had settled in the Kurdistan region and still continued to receive their pay.

I had met with the Interior Minister, Iraq’s police chief and my chain of command that there didn’t exist in Anbar a police force and that the small number who remained were involved in spying, betrayals and causing us trouble.

They weren’t there to fight.

The confrontations broke out at 4am on May 17. As the Special Operations abandoned their posts, ISIS militants managed to enter Ramadi and cut off the remaining forces still fighting inside the city.

It was an extraordinary withdrawal and there was no reason for it. They pulled out so fast that in most cases they left their vehicles intact with their weapons and ammunition inside.

A day earlier, ISIS attacked us with car bombs as well as bulldozers, armored vehicles and loaders all laden with explosives but our force stayed put and didn’t pull back.

The operations commander and I stayed until 5pm in the base. Most of the Special Operations command base had by then fallen to ISIS. By the evening of that day, most of the soldiers of the Special Operations had fled. Even the personal guards of the commander took with them their six Humvees and left the commander alone.

I had with me 40 personnel who stayed on and didn’t abandon me. I was a Kurd and my guards were all Arabs. We were the last to leave Ramadi. We torched what we couldn’t carry to prevent it from falling to ISIS.

The Anbar police force numbers 29,000, but over the course of the year and half that I was there I never saw more than 500 policemen showing up for duty.

At 6pm, I was still inside the city stadium. When I realized it was all lost we pulled out, too. Along the way out of Ramadi I caught up with the force that had withdrawn earlier. There were 600-700 vehicles filled with soldiers, police officers and their families.

They were held up in a small area and had no way out.

At 7pm, I contacted the Defense Ministry and said that the forces were defeated, besieged by ISIS and under heavy attack with mortar fire. I said, If you do not come to our rescue a second Camp Spiecher would happen.

The place where we were held up was smaller than a football field. There were many dead and injured and we knew that if we stayed there until morning no one would make it out alive.

At that point, I realized that we had no other choice but to fight our way to safety. So I led my forces about 25km through the enemy forces. We were under fire from all sides. From there we made a turn into the Anbar desert.

We torched vehicles that broke down so that ISIS didn’t take them. That’s the way we managed to get out of Anbar. In that process of fighting our way out we lost 25 men and 45 were injured.

Once we reached a safe area of the desert we stayed behind in 15 vehicles. We were there for two days and two nights without food or water. The dead and injured had already started to smell. In that desert there was no mobile network coverage or proper roads.

Some still managed to get out with their vehicles. Others walked away on foot. For 350km in different directions people and soldiers were dispersed and everyone tried to get as far away as possible.

As commanders we could not leave them.

We checked at all times to make sure no one was left behind. The commanders couldn’t just save themselves and abandon the rest. The forces were in such defeated morale that we could neither control them nor organize them.

My guards stayed with me to the end because of our personal relationship and not the commander-soldier relationship.

We continued that way until we reached Nukhaib and from there to Karbala where we reached safety.

Iraqi and coalition jets offered limited assistance. The Americans weren’t really that serious in hitting ISIS to help us.

The last vehicles to get out of there that night were ours. Thankfully we all got out and we brought with us the dead and injured without leaving anyone behind.

I realized that we had no other choice but to fight our way to safety. So I led my forces about 25km through the enemy forces. We were under fire from all sides.

By all accounts and evidence I can say that the Special Operations command were responsible for the fall of Ramadi.

We had seen bigger wars and tougher confrontations without faltering. But the army in Ramadi collapsed in a short battle.

Two days before those events the Special Operations was split into two commands. One led by Muhammad Khalaf Saeed of the 12th division and the other, at Habanyya, was under the command of Fadhil Barwari. The Special Operations was responsible for the fall of both fronts.

Anbar is gone and will not be taken back.

Last year, the Iraqi army had 15 divisions and some of the best weapons and was in charge of Mosul and Tikrit, yet it couldn’t take back 10 percent of Anbar that was out of control. How can it retake this province with Mosul and Tikrit gone?

The ISIS of now is different from that of a year ago in terms of fighting tactics, arms and devotion.

About five days before the attack on Ramadi I had intelligence that 400 armed vehicles had entered Iraq from Raqqah through the Qaim border crossing. Their plan was to deploy 200 vehicles to Tikrit and the other 200 to Ramadi.

I informed my superiors of the ISIS plan and suggested they be taken out by airstrikes on the road but that didn’t happen and the convoys reached Anbar and Tikrit.

Within hours of their arrival 24 car combs attacked us. This means foreign suicide bombers had come to Anbar from Syria. That day, however, ISIS couldn’t advance. The next day they sent 30 suicide bombers into our defense lines.

An enemy that can prepare 50 suicide bombers overnight, isn’t a joke.

I don’t think all the airstrikes and attacks on ISIS in the past year and half have degraded any of the ISIS capacity. In fact, ISIS is getting stronger and has weapons that we don’t have.

ISIS now poses a 70 percent threat to the capital Baghdad and all the Shiite militia could do is to prevent the army from pulling out. I don’t think they can take back any territory from ISIS.

Source: Rudaw

The August 31 Barzani’s betrayal: Occupation of Erbil with Saddam’s tanks

Report: fall of Ramadi “Top Kurdish commander story & betrayal by the Iraqi Special Operations command”