The Russian president is it a force of nuisance or proposal for Armenia? September 3, 2013, Vladimir Putin weighed its weight to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement between Armenia and the European Union which they had worked for four years. Meanwhile, he imposed his accession to the Eurasian Union under construction with Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, on May 29, Putin signed the agreement provided in Astana with these two countries, while in Armenia saw excluded. What has happened then between?

Kazakh president, who from the beginning had reservations about entering Armenia in the Eurasian Union in the name of solidarity with Azerbaijan, has developed a series of obstacles before it. He first denied any economic development that would make it more bearable this association with more powerful it, especially energetic states. But above all, he demanded – at the express request of Baku – a customs barrier is established between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in order to maintain the ostracism of the Armenian territory was liberated from Turkish Azerbaijani. This injunction, which however goes against the Putin asserted willingness to join Armenia in the Eurasian Union, has left the Kremlin no apparent reaction. And silence feeds all speculation.

What does this mean in fact? Putin, who poses as great sachem of the Eurasian Union and great rival of the West, is unable to impose its Kazakh partner in this case? Or, more cynically, it is simply being let go Armenia, leaving it in midstream, after weighing all his weight to get out of the sphere of European influence in the region? The information of 23 May 2014 on the sale of new Russian heavy weapons to Azerbaijan (over 100 tanks T_90) nourishes all suspicions. Especially, the last Azerbaijani diatribes against the West, and particularly against the U.S. position on Nagorno-Karabakh (denounced – wrongly – as pro-Armenian), suggest that Baku could s’ rely on Russia to resolve the issue, which is also an issue as to the nature of relations between Moscow and Ankara.

It is clear that Russia has always had the ambition to militarily regain a foothold in this highly strategic area on the border of Iran. Armenia is now broadly in his boot. This leaves him to renegotiate increase its share of influence on Azerbaijan, with the danger to Yerevan that dealings will be done at his expense. The risk of betrayal of Russia is indeed registered watermark in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, as evidenced by the granting by Stalin from that territory of Armenia to Azerbaijan. And nothing seems able to resist playing a more or less identical scenario, if it is not, perhaps, any western expansion area domination Kremlin reserves – although his protests generally remain very theoretical …

It is clear from these episodes that Putin does not derogate from despotic paradigm that has always prevailed in the tsarist policy in the Caucasus. In this scheme, the role assigned to Armenia is of a captive ally and not a strong partner. And he is certainly not in the interest of regional Kremlin to abandon the appetites of Turkism, or leave completely wither (hence its preferential tariffs for the supply of gas), it does nothing that can either make him head out of the water and bring to pass his “support”. If necessary, it seems that the Russian big brother is even willing to weaken even further Yerevan to increase its length.

Seen, Armenia is still stuck between the hammer and the anvil. But the Turkish-Azerbaijani side is clearly not the only power to take advantage of this situation. What plays Vladimir Putin? And expected by Europe to establish the status of particular partnership advocated by François Hollande May 12 in Yerevan, which allow Armenia to break his isolation, loosen the grip without preventing him to sign, where appropriate, with the Eurasian Union? The question is, more than ever.

Ara Toranian