SALİM AVCI / ANKARA

Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was shot to death in İstanbul in front of the offices of the Agos newspaper, where he was working, on Jan. 19, 2007.

In connection with the murder, 17-year-old Ogün Samast, who assassinated Dink, Yasin Hayal, who aided and abetted him, and Erhan Tuncel, who was a police informant, were arrested. But the shady forces behind the attack were never fully identified. The murder was labeled by former İstanbul Police Chief Celalettin Cerrah as being “committed with nationalist sentiments.” Who gave the instructions to Samast, Hayal and Tuncel? What were the ties these people had with intelligence agencies? No concrete evidence could be obtained to answer these questions. report Zaman

Can we say that Dink’s murder has been properly resolved?

No. Eight years have passed since Dink was assassinated but no progress has been made to solve it. This is because certain institutions of the state have deliberately resisted efforts to solve it. They have become partially successful in this resistance. The errors committed by the police and the gendarmerie after the murder was committed were scrutinized, but no investigation was conducted regarding the performance of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), or there was pressure that no such examination should be conducted.

How do you think the road to murder was paved?

In 2004, Dink published a news story about Sabiha Gökçen — the adopted daughter of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and Turkey’s first female pilot — in his newspaper [that suggested Gökçen could be one of the thousands of Armenians who were orphaned in 1915]. This made him the target of criticism and threats. He was threatened by MİT agents in the office of a deputy governor. A few days after this meeting, he wrote in his column that he had received threats. Then a lawsuit was brought against him on charges of denigrating the Turkish identity under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). The complainant was an ordinary construction worker in appearance, but he was allegedly linked to an intelligence department. Following the launch of this lawsuit, Dink was exposed to a smear campaign. He was harassed and insulted in front of the courthouse. The İstanbul Police Department and Governor’s Office did nothing to prevent these insults or threats. Thus, Dink and his family were denied any police protection.

Do you think there were ulterior motives behind the lack of protection provided to Dink?

It was certainly not well meaning. Due protection should have been provided to a person who was receiving death threats. He had been threatened with death and he had been made a target. It was quite natural for such a person to be murdered in the end. It is the duty of the authorities to ensure the security and safety of citizens, regardless of their ethnic origins. The state has to embrace everyone. Even if we suppose the police and the governor failed to notice these threats, we cannot say that the interior and justice ministers of the time had not noticed the process by which Dink was made a target for potential murderers.

Were “nationalist sentiments” the main motive for the murder as Cerrah claimed?

I disagree with this statement by former police chief Cerrah. By making such a statement, Cerrah wanted to protect himself and his colleagues. The portrayal of Dink’s murder as one being committed over “nationalist sentiments” serves to cover up what was happening behind the scenes of the murder. It helps you to close the case by holding Samast, Tuncel and Hayal responsible for the attack. But this murder implies the involvement of the deep state. Some state institutions knew of its coming in advance, but they opted to turn a blind eye to it. If you simplify the murder, you cannot see certain concrete moves by MİT and the gendarmerie. You cannot identify the four intelligence officers who helped Samast in Şişli. Actually, if you attempt to identify them, you will not be allowed to do so.

Why aren’t you allowed?

This is because the National Security Council (MGK) conducted a project about Armenians in Turkey in and after 2003. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and MİT provided the council with information and documents about this matter. However, the police failed to do so. Then, a senior military officer warned a police chief, urging the police department to focus on the so-called “missionary threat” [Christian missionaries as a national threat]. But the police department was reluctant to get involved in this process. In the wake of the MGK’s decision, security bureaucrats conducted the necessary investigation. Therefore, we can say that this MGK decision was the first stone laid in the road to the murder of priest Andrea Santoro in 2005 as well as of Dink and several Christian missionaries in Malatya. It is exactly for this reason that one cannot shed light on what was happening behind the scenes of these murders. Someone will rush to label them as “committed with nationalist sentiments” and you will never see behind the veil of these murders. In the final analysis, four intelligence officers scouted the area to help Samast. Nothing has been done regarding these officers despite the intervening eight years. As a matter of fact, if those who aided and abetted Samast are identified, the murder will be automatically resolved.

Who aided Samast?

We need to pay close attention to the young people who were picked for this murder. They were aged between 15 and 17. There are two reasons for this. The first one is to create the perception that the murder was committed with nationalist sentiments. Second, the intention is to ensure that perpetrators would not be sentenced to extended prison terms due to their age. These intentions are very obvious regarding the murders of Dink, Santoro and Malatya’s Christian missionaries. Someone is trying to conceal the big conspiracy by bringing nationalist sentiments to the agenda. A 17-year-old boy came to İstanbul and killed a famous person. Was it so easy? There must have been others who scouted the area and showed him the target. Indeed, four intelligence officers scouted the area during the murder. These officers were from two different intelligence organizations. Why weren’t they identified during the last eight years? Dink’s family worked hard to ensure that these intelligence officers were identified, but their efforts led to a dead end.

What was the reason for efforts to delete [all] images of Samast?

The İstanbul Police Department seized all video recordings in the vicinity of the crime scene after the murder but for some reason two of these recordings were deleted. These recordings show the people who aided Samast in committing the murder. Dink’s family demanded that these people be identified and for judicial and administrative actions to be launched against the people who deleted these recordings, but again someone presented obstacles to it. However, inspectors from the State Audit Institution (DDK) obtained the deleted video recordings, which clearly show the people who helped Samast. These recordings prove that Dink’s murder was masterminded by the deep state. Moreover, there has been a recent effort to twist the murder so that it is attributed to a so-called “parallel structure.” Also, the arrest of three people in connection with the murder will not be of any use for the solution of the murder.

Did the gendarmerie know about the plan to murder Dink?

Not only the police department, but also the gendarmerie authorities in Trabzon knew about the plan. The Trabzon Police Department prepared F3 and F4 reports about the plan and warned both the İstanbul Police Department as well as the Police Intelligence Department. But the gendarmerie did the opposite — discussion of the murder plan during the weekly intelligence meetings was not permitted. Here the silence of the gendarmerie commander and the intelligence branch director should be investigated. The most important point is that the gendarmerie misled the Gendarmerie General Command and public inspectors using fabricated documents. The question is why senior officers did this. By keeping silent about a potential murder, the authorities in Trabzon’s gendarmerie paved the way for Dink’s murder.

Did the gendarmerie use Coşkun İğci as an intelligence officer?

The negligence by the authorities in the Trabzon gendarmerie is not restricted to this. Three times efforts were made to infiltrate Hayal’s group, but these efforts failed. Then Hayal’s brother-in-law [İğci] was chosen. İğci provided important information ahead of the murder but this information was swept under the rug by the gendarmerie authorities. Here the important bit is that İğci’s assistant worked as an intelligence officer for the gendarmerie. While the gendarmerie authorities in Trabzon denied it, İğci was a major informant inside Hayal’s group, assigned by the gendarmerie. There is already a document in evidence showing that İğci was an informant.

In your book you say that many people had souvenir photos with Samast. What is that all about?

Neither the police nor the gendarmerie authorities can explain why their personnel took souvenir photos with Samast. Why did they pose for a photo with a murderer? Do they do the same with other criminals? These photos were later shown to the murderer [Samast]. Scandalously enough, these photos were taken in front of a Turkish flag and a picture on which Atatürk’s saying, “The territory of the homeland is sacred and cannot be abandoned to its fate,” was written.

How could the gendarmerie authorities know about the gun Samast used?

They fail to make a satisfactory explanation about it. Samast was apprehended at the bus station in Samsun. A 7.65 mm pistol with the phrase ‘MOB’ on it and seven 7.65 mm bullets were found inside a bag above the seat Samast was sitting in on the bus. When he was searched, eight 7.65 mm bullets, a white beret, gloves and a Turkish flag were found. But the scandal starts here. Two hours before Samast was caught, the gendarmerie authorities in Trabzon sent a comprehensive report about the guns and bullets seized from Samast to the Gendarmerie General Command. This document was dated Jan. 20, 2007 and undersigned by the Trabzon Regiment commander, Ali Öz, intelligence branch Director Metin Yıldız and Gendarmerie staff sergeant Gazi Günay. It indicated that the gun used by Samast in the murder was made in the Ardeşen district of Rize. It was sent to the Gendarmerie General Command at 21:32 on Jan. 20, 2007. However, the time of Samast’s apprehension was indicated to be 23:00 on the warrant prepared by the Samsun Police Department.

Did former President Abdullah Gül meddle with the DDK’s report?

As I noted above, the lack of investigation into MİT’s involvement in the murder is a major shortcoming. Therefore, MİT should be put in the spotlight as soon as possible. Meanwhile, there was an important development regarding the case. The inspectors who wrote the DDK report indicated that an in-depth investigation should be conducted into the police, gendarmerie and MİT officials. In this context, Gül issued the necessary instructions. But on Feb. 7, MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan, former MİT Undersecretary Emre Taner, his assistant Afet Güneş and two MİT officials were summoned to testify at another investigation [one into the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK)], and this led to certain modifications in the report. One of the inspectors who wrote the report was reportedly summoned to the DDK by Gül’s order and amended the report to the liking of MİT. Then some proposals, including putting MİT officials on trial as well as an investigation into the archives in Trabzon and İstanbul were altered. After these modifications, the report was re-submitted for Gül’s approval via a “special request” from Fidan.

Who made Tuncel an informant?

Former intelligence branch director Sabri Uzun argues that he was misled regarding Dink’s assassination. However, official documents refute his claims. This is because in a letter dated Nov. 17, 2004 and numbered 198283 that Trabzon intelligence branch director Engin Dinç sent to Provincial Police Chief Ramazan Akyürek, Dinç demanded that Erhan Tuncel — codenamed Metin Kurt — should be made an informant. Akyürek endorsed the demand and relayed it to Uzun. And in his letter dated Dec. 2, 2004 and numbered 207920, Uzun registered Tuncel as an informant. Uzun knows very well that Tuncel was an informant but tries to save himself from liability by feigning ignorance. If Akyürek was negligent, then Uzun, too, was negligent.

Why are Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer being put in the spotlight?

What matters is not Akyürek or Yılmazer. There was a war among cliques inside the police department during the time of the murder. At that time, the group including Reşat Altay, Cerrah and Uzun targeted Yılmazer and Akyürek. This was connected to the investigation into Ergenekon, a clandestine organization nested within the state trying to overthrow or manipulate the democratically elected government. They tried to undermine the Ergenekon investigation by putting these experienced police chiefs in the spotlight. Indeed, these perception engineering operations became successful, and Akyürek and Yılmazer were removed from office.

Profile:
Bayram Kaya graduated from the Communication Faculty of Marmara University. His journalism career began in 2003 when he started to work at the state-run Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT). He went to the United Kingdom in 2005 and returned to Turkey in 2007. He has been working at the Zaman daily since May 2007. He is currently working at the Zaman daily’s Ankara office, covering matters related to the Interior Ministry and the police department. His previous books are “Sakıncalı Bürokratlar” and “Babam Sağolsun.”

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