Gagrule.net

Gagrule.net News, Views, Interviews worldwide

Don’t underestimate the ‘invasion of ants,’ says Islamic Gülen over Turkish protests

By

n_48374_4

No one knows how Ants work other than Gulen, have look how Gulen infiltrated United states of America cost to cost controlling all the public charter schools 135 so fare and 600 all over the world indoctrinating American children’s.

Takes one ant to know another one.

Daniel Dravot

The man isn’t a scholar. He was set up in the late 70s by the US to help spread Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia and Turkey for the purpose of combating “leftism”; that is, secular nationalism, and the influence of the USSR. Thus the war on secular nationalism began with the 1980 coup in Turkey, with the opening of the Imam Hatip schools, Ozal’s neoliberal policies, and the unleashing of Gulen on Central Asia.

 

A blueprint for Diaspora representation in negotiations with Turkey over reparations

By

Below, we present an article by Avedis Hadjian published in the Armenian Weekly.

In the course of almost a century, Armenian institutions’ and individuals’ various stances on Turkey and Genocide recognition have hardened into maximalist g_image444positions. For Armenian maximalists, anything short of a full and complete apology, full and complete restitution of the stolen and expropriated property, as well as full reparations, is to be dismissed as nothing but smoke screens or deliberate attempts by the Turkish state to mislead Armenians and non-Armenians alike. This maximalism is understandable and unsurprising in the face of consistent Turkish negationism. It also blinds to nuances in the extremely complex world of Turkish politics, reducing it to zero-sum games and black-and-white dualities. It prevents Armenians from seeing the subtleties in Turkey’s political scene that may still nudge the Turkish state towards coming to terms with the Armenians and the Genocide, a problem that has been nagging it acutely for the last 50 years, increasingly tarnishing its image and violently contradicting its own historical narrative.

Certainly, at this point it is not clear that this approach will push Turkey to acknowledge the Genocide. Denying the Armenian Genocide has become a recurring, growing embarrassment for well-read Turkish officials, including President Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and Culture Minister Ömer Çelik. So massive is the body of testimonies and evidence on the Genocide that the Turkish state is now resorting to petty technicalities and sophisms to deny it, much like embarrassed Catholic priests might today if they were still forced to reject the fact that the Earth orbits the Sun, or had Pope John Paul II not apologized for the persecution of Galileo 350 years earlier.

For reasons that are outside the scope of this article, Turkey has a number of compelling motives for settling the Genocide claims and reaching an understanding with the Armenians. There is a possibility that this may happen soon or at an unexpected moment, which would catch Armenians off guard; for, who would speak on behalf of Armenians should Turkey express readiness tomorrow–literally tomorrow–to engage in dialogue and negotiations?

Below is a very basic blueprint proposed only for negotiations with Turkey. It does not purport to set up a permanent Diaspora-wide representative body or some kind of pan-Armenian Congress. The Diaspora General Assembly outlined here would be empowered solely with establishing principles and a course of action for representing the diaspora’s interests at the negotiations with Turkey. Over the decades, there have been several proposals in this regard; this draft is an attempt to contribute to this pool of ideas, in the hope that eventually a structure along these lines will soon materialize.

Today, the Armenian Diaspora has a plethora of separate—and, for a long time, especially in the Cold War years, rival—organizations that, after a lifetime of service to the community, and free from the accountability as well as the checks and balances that come with democratic organizations, have often developed a sense of entitlement and self-righteousness, as they have helped build from scratch thriving communities after the Armenian nation came very close to extinction. Still, that does not help to create consensus, as every Armenian who has been active in the community knows.

An alternative scenario is one that came close to materializing, with Armenia—presumably under foreign pressure—negotiating directly with Turkey, in the now practically defunct protocols that would have compromised the Diaspora’s demands and interests in any negotiation on Genocide recognition and reparations. In this scenario, the Diaspora—and especially independent diasporan individuals, with no affiliation to any organization—would be excluded. Independent Armenians would also be left out in case of secret negotiations, which is another possibility.

In 1977, at the height of the attacks by Armenian militants against Turkish diplomats as well as ASALA’s terror campaign, there were secret conversations in Switzerland between a Turkish delegation, headed by then-Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, and a delegation of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, or the Tashnagtsagan Party. A person directly involved in these negotiations said the Turkish side had approached the ARF to propose a dialogue. To its credit, the ARF (according to this person) suggested that the two other main Diaspora political organizations, the Ramgavars and Hunchakians, be a party to conversations that might have critical importance for the Armenian nation. For a number of reasons, nothing came out of this meeting during which, in broad lines, the Turkish side asked the Armenians about their expectations on reparations. The Turkish delegation also warned the Diaspora Armenian political leadership to help stop the attacks on Turkish diplomats and targets, saying that if Turkey wanted, it could wipe out the entire party and community leadership.

Those were other times, with a Soviet Armenia deprived of sovereign rights. In this time and place, there would be no justification for secret negotiations. Every Armenian individual, regardless of affiliation, is entitled to have a vote and a voice in the matter of Genocide recognition and reparation negotiations with Turkey. If the Diasporan Armenian representation were limited to the Diaspora establishment, it would not be representative. It would further create the risk of traditional parties monopolizing negotiations in a matter of national importance, excluding independent voices within Armenian communities. Hence, a democratic model needs to be devised.

Armenians need to speak with one voice when negotiating with Turkey. That does not mean there should not be a diversity of opinions among Armenians. It means, by the time the Armenian delegation sits at the table with Turkey, the Diaspora should have reached a consensus on its stance through a democratic process. This article is the draft of a blueprint for such a process that aims to broaden representation as much as possible, giving voice to each individual Armenian in a matter of national importance, which cannot and must not be left only to Diaspora institutions and political parties.

General principles

1) Diaspora communities and individuals shall constitute a bicameral General Assembly—set up solely for the purpose of writing a Charter and electing a delegation to represent the Diaspora in negotiations with Turkey, as part of an Armenian delegation led by the Republic of Armenia—that will be independent of all existing Armenian organizations. The Diaspora General Assembly for Negotiations with Turkey on Genocide Recognition and Reparations will not have the power to address or discuss any other issue that is not strictly related to negotiations with Turkey on Genocide recognition and reparations. This means it will not have the power to address foreign policy issues, such as Turkey’s sanctions against Armenia over the Karabagh War, that pertain to the Republic of Armenia’s government, or any other issue that falls outside its narrowly defined purview.

As in most democracies, the bicameral structure is necessary to make up for the imbalances that would create an excessive bias for the larger communities—including the U.S., France, Lebanon, Argentina, and others—to the detriment of smaller ones, such as Chile, Ethiopia, India, Israel, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The peculiar case of the Armenian community of Istanbul needs to be addressed separately.

Armenian individuals and all Armenian organizations, including the churches—Apostolic, as well as Catholic and Evangelical—that functioned in the Ottoman Empire until at least 1915, and that still exist today, will be represented in the upper house of such a General Assembly.

The bicameral Congress model suits the needs of such pan-Armenian body perfectly. Each Diasporan Armenian community would be entitled to proportional representation according to its number of registered constituents in the lower house, or House of Representatives. A formula needs to be agreed on; for example, one representative per 1,000 constituents. Communities with fewer than 1,000 constituents (such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Ethiopia, for example) may automatically be entitled to at least two representatives. An upper house, or Senate, with two representatives each per community, plus two representatives from each Armenian organization that functioned in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, would make up for the heavier influence the larger communities would have in the lower house. The House and the Senate would roughly have the same faculties they do in representative democracies.

2) Every Diasporan Armenian would be authorized to vote and to run as a representative in the General Assembly. Age requirements, as well as all other voting requirements, should be universal for all Diaspora communities solely for the purpose of the Diaspora General Assembly. Citizens of the Republic of Armenia, including those who live outside of Armenia, will not be entitled to participate in any capacity in the Diaspora General Assembly, as they shall be represented by the Republic of Armenia in negotiations with Turkey over Genocide recognition and reparations.

Organizing the vote will require a joint effort by the community organizations, setting up all the necessary regulations and controls to ensure a fair vote.

3) The requirements to prove Armenian descent may be based on those required by the Armenian state to grant dual Armenian citizenship to persons born outside of Armenia. Given the difficulties that may arise for proofing Armenian descent in the diaspora four generations after the Genocide, proof of Armenian descent (with at least one great-grandparent of Armenian origin) should include at least one of the following:

a) a baptismal certificate from the Armenian Church or from an Armenian church of any denomination, stating the Armenian identity;

b) a baptismal certificate of one of the parents from the Armenian Church stating the Armenian identity;

c) a birth certificate from a country that states the Armenian nationality and/or identity;

d) a birth certificate from a country that states that one of the parents’ nationality and/or identity is Armenian;

e) proof of attendance and/or graduation from an Armenian school;

f) proof of participation or membership in any Armenian church of any denomination or any Armenian organization;

g) any other proof or testimony that demonstrates descent beyond reasonable doubt.

4) The Armenian delegation in negotiations with Turkey will be led by the Republic of Armenia, as the sole inheritor of the Armenian states that preceded it. The Diaspora representation would be subordinated to the Republic of Armenia delegation. While the Diaspora’s claims are equally important and deserve to be heard, Armenia has a critical stake in any negotiations with Turkey as a next-door neighbor, with vital interests at play, including defense. This is especially true when this next-door neighbor has common interests with another enemy-neighbor flanking Armenia on the east, Azerbaijan, with which the country is still in a state of war, despite a relatively fragile cease-fire.

No diasporan demand can or must compromise Armenia’s vital interests. The homeland’s interests override everything. Armenia will have the final say in any negotiations with Turkey. The interests and the security of the Republic of Armenia, as the surviving entity of the Armenian homeland, come first and foremost, and are of paramount importance.

5) The Republic of Armenia will have the last word on matters pertaining to territorial claims on the lands of Western Armenia and Cilicia; all decisions pertaining to treaties between Turkey and Armenia; as well as all other treaties that concern or affect relations between both states. All of the issues regarding sovereign territorial claims will be strictly outside the purview of the Diaspora General Assembly.

6) In close coordination with the Armenian state, the Diaspora General Assembly will draft a Charter establishing the principles of negotiations with Turkey and the matters to negotiate with Turkey, including but not limited to:

a) recognition of the Genocide by Turkey (and matters pertaining to wording and announcement, what is admissible and what is not);

b) reparations for each Armenian individual killed, displaced, or missing during the 1915 massacres and deportations from the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire as well as Istanbul and other locations in the Ottoman Empire (and how to account for them, and devise a formula to calculate reparations for the loss of life);

c) restitution of lost properties and compensation (and what to do in those rare instances where Turkish courts have returned properties to deed holders and already settled insurance claims).

7) Setting up a physical space for such a General Assembly will be costly. Armenian organizations are in no position to embark on such a costly endeavor. Thanks to available technology, it is more than feasible to make this a virtual General Assembly, with sessions carried out via video-conference.

8) This Assembly shall remain in session until negotiations begin with Turkey, when it would elect a deputation to represent the diaspora in the delegation of the Republic of Armenia. The Assembly shall enter into a recess at the start of negotiations with Turkey and for as long as the negotiations continue.

9) The Assembly shall be renewed every four years in worldwide general elections.

10) The Assembly shall dissolve itself when and if a final settlement is reached with Turkey on Genocide recognition and reparations.

As noted above, this proposal is just the draft of a blueprint. It is an individual initiative and it is presented here with the hope that it may set up the basis for a more thorough and comprehensive Armenian Diaspora-wide representative body that will help to negotiate a matter of vital importance to the Armenian nation.

Avedis Hadjian is a writer and editor born in Aleppo, Syria, and raised in Buenos Aires, Argentina, from an early age. He is the author of the forthcoming book A Secret Nation: The Hidden Armenians of Turkey. He has worked as an editor and correspondent in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, China, and South America, and has written for the Los Angeles Times, CNN, Bloomberg News, and other newspapers and news sites. He was educated in Buenos Aires and in Cambridge, England, and lives in New York.

Source: Panorama.am

Anonymous, Syrian Electronic Army hack Turkish govt networks, leak emails incl PM’s

By

Turkish government networks were hacked on Wednesday, compromising the private information of staffers in PM Tayyip Erdogan’s office, a source in PM’s office confirmed to Reut000_par7576351_siers. The attack was in support of the ongoing anti-government protests.

Staff email accounts were reportedly accessed after a phishing attack, and those affected were cut off from the network, a source said.

Anonymous hacked the Prime Minister’s official website (basbakanlik.gov.tr) and gained access to staff email addresses, passwords and phone numbers, the group said in a press release.

Iraqi Kurds criticize growing Turkish influence “Turkification of the Kurdistan Region”

By

Dr. Denise Natali — Ekurd.net 

“Turkey invades Iraqi Kurdistan with its businesses and not tanks”, Nawshirwan Mustafa says.

June 5, 2013

The ties that now bind the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Ankara are a welcome reprieve after decades of tension that destabilized the region and stunted economic growth. Alongside generous revenues from Baghdad and KRG pragmatism, Turkey has been a catalyst in rebuilding the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to a level unimagined just five state7113years ago. Economic development has led to political cooperation and mutual commitments to regional security.

Yet, as the Kurdistan Region moves deeper into Ankara’s orbit and away from Baghdad, particularly in developing its energy sector, some Kurdish populations worry that the KRG is substituting one form of dependency for another. These concerns are emerging alongside uneven economic development in the region and proxy wars in Syria. They are also feeding criticism of KRG policies, intra-Kurdish party struggles and nationalist sentiments within the Kurdistan Region and across its borders.

Indeed, since the creation of a federal Iraqi state, Kurdish officials have sought a commercial partnership with Turkey. In 2007, Nawshirwan Mustafa, now head of the Change Movement (Gorran), requested that Ankara “invade Iraqi Kurdistan with its businesses and not tanks” while also reaching out to Turkmen populations in Kirkuk. KRG business-friendly laws and opportunities for Turkish investment have been relatively successful. Today, in 2013, more than half (about 1,150) of the foreign companies in the Kurdistan Region are Turkish. Turkey also is helping to modernize the region’s socio-cultural milieu. Turkish music, clothes, educational institutions and food products allow Kurdish consumers access to better-quality goods and services that are helping to improve the quality of life, at least for some.

Yet, these trends also are having unintended consequences on local nationalist communities, some of whom are increasingly aware of the rapid and uneven nature of the region’s economic development and its perceived threats to Kurdish culture. In criticizing the absence of anything Kurdish and most things Turkish in the local markets, one Kurdish professional in Erbil opined, “We are becoming a banana republic for Turkey.” Other young professionals from Duhok province — the relatively wealthy Iraqi Kurdish–Turkish border area and stronghold of the Barzani family — have indicated that for them “things are going too far.” One specific criticism is of a new Turkish restaurant whose menu is only in the Turkish language.

Fueling this concern of the Turkification of the Kurdistan Region are the KRG’s energy sector development plans. As oil becomes the KRG’s strategic product, the KRG may find itself increasingly vulnerable to Ankara’s political will, particularly if it relies solely on Turkey as an energy transit route. The absence of alternative export routes and infrastructure — neither Iran nor Syria are viable options anytime in the near future — and overreliance on oil as a revenue source (about 95% of the KRG budget) compound this vulnerability. Instead of increasing Kurdish autonomy by circumventing Baghdad with “independent oil exports,” the Kurdistan Region could effectively become less autonomous as an economic vassal state of Turkey.

True, given its landlocked position, the Kurdistan Region depends on regional states, particularly Turkey, for its political and economic survival. Ankara’s role as the lifeline to the KRG was affirmed during the 1990s double embargo against the region, as lucrative profits from the oil-for-food smuggling operation at the Iraqi Kurdish–Turkish border represented about 85% of the KRG’s revenues. Turkey also is considered by some KRG leaders and populations a more dependable partner than Baghdad,www.ekurd.net particularly since it has vested interests in the KRG energy sector and needs cheap Kurdish oil and gas to help meet its rising energy demands. In fact, Turkey has much to gain from Iraqi Kurdish ambitions. At least from a financial perspective, it is unlikely that Ankara or its associated businesses would undermine this relationship given the economic stakes involved.

Still, dependency on Turkey as a sole energy-export route may give the Kurdistan Region less room to maneuver politically, particularly if Erbil’s policy choices or alliances challenge Ankara or if relations sour with Turkey in the future. Even though Turkey can benefit from cheap Kurdish hydrocarbons, this demand would represent a fraction of Ankara’s total energy imports while representing the entirety of the KRG’s exports and revenues. This dependent relationship could undermine the relatively extensive internal sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy the KRG has realized since 2003, despite the difficulties in dealing with the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

These trends are unlikely to alter the Erbil-Ankara alliance or the Iraqi Kurdish energy calculus, particularly as long as the KRG and Baghdad fail to resolve their resource and revenue-sharing disputes. Yet, they pose additional challenges to the KRG’s drive for autonomy and stability via Turkey by enhancing the gap between Kurdish economic and political aims and between KRG elites and local populations. Further, Turkey’s influence in the Kurdistan Region is occurring alongside a Kurdistan Workers Party-led Kurdish nationalist agenda in Syria, an unresolved Kurdish problem in Turkey and attempts to check Massoud Barzani’s power. Unless reconciled with Kurdish nationalist claims, it will continue to magnify divisions between Kurdish nationalists willing to be led by Turkey and those seeking to check Ankara’s influence.

 

 

 

Dr. Denise Natali is the Minerva Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies INSS, National Defense University and the author of The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post Gulf War Iraq. The views expressed are her own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

1st published on al-monitor.com


Constitutional crisis in Iraqi Kurdistan

By

A dispute over the presidential elections may indicate that clouds are gathering over Iraqi Kurdistan, writes Salah Nasrawi

Plans put forward by the president of Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan region, Masoud Barzani, for a referendum on a draft constitution have sparked criticisms that the 2013-635060450527836721-783_resizedveteran Kurdish leader is seeking a third term in office despite objections by opponents who say the controversial document imposes a two-term limit.

Barzani’s defiant move has also raised fears of a setback in the northern enclave that has been dubbed a paradise of political stability and economic growth in the sharply divided and violence-torn country.

On 23 May, Barzani announced that he would call for the referendum and accused the opposition of turning the issue into a political war. “If it’s a bad constitution, people are free not to approve it,” he declared to a huge, cheering crowd in Erbil, the Kurdistan provincial capital.

Opposition groups, however, were swift to blast Barzani’s suggestion.

The rising Change Movement, or Goran, and several Islamist parties demanded that the constitution be sent back to parliament for amendment before any referendum was held. Barzani’s long-term political ally, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, also did not agree with the call for the referendum.

The Kurds have been enmeshed in internal wrangling over the elections after Barzani announced plans last month for balloting in provincial, parliamentary and presidential races in September.

The dispute centres around the right of Barzani himself to stand for election for a third term in office, despite the Kurdistan region’s draft constitution which stipulates in article 64 that the president of the Kurdistan region “may be re-elected for a second term as of the date this constitution enters into force”.

Barzani has not declared his candidacy, but his supporters argue that term limits are not retrospective, so Barzani, initially appointed by the Kurdish parliament in 2005, and re-elected by in a public vote four years later, is eligible for re-election. Barzani will complete his two terms in July.

The opposition accuses Barzani, whose Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and family members have dominated Kurdish politics for more than half a century, of becoming increasingly authoritarian.

It argues that Barzani’s move is designed to circumvent the opposition’s efforts to reform Kurdistan’s political system and make it more democratic.

The draft constitution of the Kurdistan region was passed by the regional parliament in 2009, but the two parties, the KDP and the PUK, that share power over the region never put it to a referendum.

The opposition argues that the draft constitution was rushed through by the parliament at the time by a caretaker government that was controlled by the two ruling parties.

It also claims that some of the constitution’s articles were changed within a matter of days and presented for endorsement by the parliament while one third of its members were not present.

The opposition said that among the articles that were changed were those that made Iraqi Kurdistan region into a presidential system, whereas the document states in article 1 that the region enjoys “a parliamentary political system”.

Under the controversial draft constitution, the president wields absolute powers including the power to declare a state of emergency, issue decrees that have the force of law, dissolve the parliament and dismiss ministers.

Many of Barzani’s critics believe his insistence on holding a referendum has more to do with his autocratic tendencies and his intentions to stay in power for life than it does with any concern for democratic politics.

Now the wrangle is expected to deepen divisions between Barzani’s KDP and pro-democracy groups that have been trying to stifle Barzani’s overall control of the government and politics of the Kurdish region.

Since the uprising that took place in the Kurdish region following the defeat of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led Gulf War in 1991, the region has been ruled by Barzani’s KDP and Talabani’s PUK, though the two groups control two linguistically and politically diverse portions.

After the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds were able to convert their regional government into a semi-independent federal region.

The two parties, which had fought each other intermittently, entered a strategic alliance to run a government that many Kurds criticise for being authoritarian and corrupt. Critics say that the two parties have been using the 111-member parliament as a mere rubber-stamp assembly for executive actions.

But Kurdistan’s political landscape has been changing since the latest elections in 2009 when the Goran List won a total of 25 seats, making it the second-most successful list in the elections after the ruling Kurdistan List.

Since then the party has displayed a broader show of defiance against the two-party rule, and it is now leading opposition to Barzani’s decision to put the draft constitution to a referendum.

However, it is uncertain whether Barzani and his party will take a step back, and he is more than likely to be his party’s candidate for president in the general elections due in September.

Indeed, Barzani is the dominant figure in Kurdistan, and his past shows that he will stop at nothing to keep himself, the KDP, and his family in power in the region.

His pressure to put the constitution to a referendum seems to be an attempt to mobilise the Kurdish street against the opposition by portraying it as undermining stability and prosperity in the region.

Yet many believe that by trying to humiliate the opposition by forcing the referendum Barzani may be taking a gamble too far that will awaken the long-stifled resentment felt by many Iraqi Kurds about his authoritarianism.

In fact, it could be said that the constitutional brinkmanship could mark a turning point in the almighty image of Barzani, proving his greed for power and his using of democracy for his own purposes.

In addition, his move will have far-reaching consequences for Kurdish national unity, and it will underscore deep splits at a time of great challenges for the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

The fact that the next elections are now on the rocks means that Barzani’s desire to remain president threatens the future of his party’s partnership with the PUK which for years has remained the bedrock for peace in Kurdistan.

The PUK has already announced that it will participate in the upcoming elections on separate lists, despite the fact that the two parties’ strategic alliance stipulates their participation in the local and national elections on the same list.

Barzani’s success in winning the referendum is far from guaranteed. If he loses the referendum, opposition to his rule will be stronger, and it will be unlikely that he can secure more power under the new constitution. This will likely deepen the crisis and heighten tensions in the region.

In 2011, protests against the two parties swept the Kurdish main cities in what was called the “Kurdish Spring” to rival the pro-democracy uprisings that toppled three Arab dictatorships.

The brutal crackdown on the peaceful demonstrations, which left ten people dead, then tarnished the image of Kurdistan as an emerging democracy.

Thus far, Kurdistan’s powerful leader has showed no sign of changing his mind, and he has used his assertive style and the common touch that courts the Kurdish populace to manipulate national politics.

These days, his rhetoric is all about his strained relations with Baghdad, with hints that the Kurds will seek full independence from the rest of Iraq if attempts to resolve disputes over oil and land fail.

On Monday, Barzani warned that the current round of talks with Baghdad that started last month marked the final opportunity to end the feud. He said that Kurdistan would be forced to seek a “new form of relationship” with the central government in Baghdad if no deal was reached.

Such blustering, apparently aimed at distracting attention, is unlikely to convince the Kurdish opposition to give way to Barzani. Given the determination of the opposition to oppose a new term for Barzani in office, a new spectre could haunt Kurdistan soon.

Gezi Park is now a utopic ‘Freetown’ (There are lots of differences, but no conflict. There are no police, but it’s safe. No hierarchy, but a humane order.)

By

ISTANBUL- Hürriyet Daily News

Istanbul’s city center is now a timeless place after the police withdrawal. Closed by barricades, Gezi Park and Taksim now belong solely to people and ideologies previously deemed closed to the mainstream

n_48295_4Çetin Cem Yılmazcetincem.yilmaz@hdn.com.tr

At the entrance of Copenhagen’s famous Freetown Christiania, visitors are greeted with a hand-painted sign reading “You are now leaving the EU.” Right now, something similar can be said for the Gezi Park – it’s no longer Istanbul as you know it.

Since the police withdrawal from the city center on June 1 as a result of clashes with protesters, the Taksim district has been occupied as could never have been predicted. Closed with barricades, the central district now solely belongs to the people, and to ideologies that were previously deemed completely closed to the mainstream.

Bright lights and loud music coming from İstiklal Avenue are not there. Shops are closed, and graffiti fills their windows. On Taksim Square, it feels like the post-apocalypse has met the day after revolution. A wrecked NTV van and a crashed police car have been left like remnants of the Berlin Wall, open for photographing. The iconic Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) has been covered with flags: Legendary 1970’s revolutionary Deniz Gezmiş looks down on the area, while next to him are posters of left-wing groups and a “shut up” call to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Just a week ago, even the thought of such a scene was impossible. Now, with the occupation, it has become the reality.

Forty-nine percent

Make no mistake, even though it has a passing resemblance to the “Occupy” movement, this is not a “We are the 99 percent” action. It is more like, “We are the 49 percent.” It is the mobilization of thousands who do not find themselves represented in the Parliament. The protests were more about people, mostly youths, making themselves heard by a government that enjoys too much comfort from its majority and forgets to hear the concerns of the minority.

As a crowd that was complaining of discrimination, the Gezi people are embracing their differences beautifully. On June 1, slogans were silenced when a prayer call was heard. “From now on, respect for every belief will prevail,” one said. That approach was again used yesterday, when they asked people not to drink alcohol out of respect to the sacred night of Lailat al–Mi’raj.

Inside the Gezi Park, the utopian feeling is multiplied. There are open buffets for people feeding themselves, yoga sessions in the morning and now, a library. Every morning, after the police withdrawal, protesters got the area squeaky clean. People have fun in their own way and nobody intervenes: Kurds dance their halays, Laz people do their horon dance, and a group with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk flags chant their slogans – All this happens within a few meters’ distance.

There are lots of differences, but no conflict. There are no police, but it’s safe. No hierarchy, but a humane order.

For a country where the democratic tradition is about rights being given from the top to bottom, it is about reversing the order.

It is about sharing, kindness, and reasoning. So romantic, for sure; but it is there.

We know that it won’t be forever. Enjoy it while it lasts.

Armenian Scholars at the Center of Genocide Denial

By

The Turkish Coalition of America TCA backed by  the Turkish government  continues to invest millions to infiltrate academic circles in the US and elsewhere and the sad part is some of the Armenian scholars have been corrupted  too.

BY ARA KHACHATOURIAN

absolut-205x300The Turkish Studies Project of the University of Utah convened its fourth conference on on Wednesday in Tbilisi, Georgia. The conference is entitled “The Caucasus at Imperial Twilight: Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Nation-Building (1870s-1920s).”

The Turkish Studies Project at Utah, directed by Prof. M. Hakan Yavuz of the Department of Political Science, is funded by the Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), one of the most active U.S.-based groups promoting denial of the Armenian Genocide (the TCA is also specified as a sponsor of the conference). The Project was established in 2009 through the TCA’s financial support.

The Turkish Coalition of America has gained notoriety since its establishment in 2007 for its aggressive promotion of “the contra-genocide narrative” through funding scholarship that casts doubt on the facts of the Genocide, pursuing aggressive legal measures such as its lawsuit (which was dismissed) against the University of Minnesota and its Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, and working against U.S. recognition of the Genocide by the U.S. Congress and Executive Branch.

In light of the TCA’s support of the conference, it is not surprising to find such names as Norman Stone, Justin McCarthy, Michael Gunter, and Kemal Cicek among the participants. Each is well known for writings that attempt to undercut the veracity of the Armenian Genocide.

What is surprising, however, is the presence of a number of Armenian scholars, both from the Republic of Armenia and from the United States, including one member of the organizing committee.

Lately, certain elements in Armenian academia have been advancing the warped notion that by taking part in denialist or denialist-organized conferences they can counter claims by Turkey and its mouthpieces whose careers have hinged on historical revisionism. Yet we have seen no proof of that.

As these Armenian academicians gallivant around the world from one conference to another, the government of Turkey continues to invest millions to infiltrate academic circles in the US and elsewhere.

The participation of some of the Armenian scholars on the roster of the Tbilisi conference is not surprising as they “sold out” a long time ago. What is more disturbing is the participation of a younger generation of academicians who fervently argue that their presence at such conferences bolsters the Armenian position when, in reality, it goes a long way in advancing Turkey’s decades-long denialist policies.

The Armenian scholars’ participation in the conference does not end with presenting papers and includes Armenians who are listed as organizers on the program.

In the absence of efforts by Armenia to produce a new generation of multi-lingual Armenian scholars, coupled with the laissez-faire attitude of those who make it a point to be at the forefront of denialist scholarship, the academic pursuit of the Armenian Cause is taking a step backward.

Therefore, these Armenian scholars who are participating in these conferences should be accountable to the public and through the Armenian press must report on their efforts to “counter” Genocide denial in these forums. After all, the same scholars took great advantage of the arena presented by the Armenian press during their nascent days as burgeoning scholars.

Iranian presidential candidate calls for closer economic ties with Armenia

By

We should expand og_image33ur economic ties with Armenia, Iranian presidential candidate, Supreme Leader’s foreign policy adviser Ali Akbar Velayati was quoted as saying by ISNA.

The presidential candidate spoke about Iran’s foreign policy at a meeting with reporters on Tuesday, saying in part: “It is not right that ten visits are made to Latin America yearly while our neighbors are disregarded. Of our 15 neighbors, 13 are Islamic countries. Iran has much in common with Armenia and Russia in terms of history and therefore it should further develop bilateral relations with these countries. We should not rest on political relations but should also strengthen our economic ties.”

US Secretary of State pledges support to Karabakh settlement

By

The US secretary of state has promised to continue his country’s efforts towards supporting the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

At meeting with Armenian FM Edward Nalbandian, John Kerry said that the United States, as a co-chairing country of the OSCE Minsk Group, will continue its efforts Kerry and Nalbandiantowards reaching a reconciliation between the conflicting sides and promote regional development, stability and security, reports the Foreign Ministry’s Press Service.

The secretary said that as a native of the Massachusetts state (which has a big Armenian community) he is well-familiar with the problems of Armenia. He said Armenia and the United States have always been good allies, adding that Armenia always assists the security forces in Afghanistan and keeps playing a key role in the maintenance of peace in the South Caucasus region.

Mr Kerry told the Armenian FM that the United States attaches a major significance to the bilateral economic development, and the democracy and security strengthening of Armenia.

Thanking the secretary for the warm reception, Nalandian said that he is very happy to be in Washington and discuss with his US counterpart the possibilities of strengthening the friendship between the two states.

Armenia’s top diplomat added that both the United States and Armenia are unanimous on continuing the peaceful efforts towards reaching a negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the unconditional normalization of the Armenia-Turkey ties.
He said Armenia is thankful to the United States for providing assistance to Armenia since the country’s gaining independence. He extended his gratitude to the Obama administration for the significant contribution to the US-Armenia relations.

The sides further considered potentials of economic development, stressing the need of expanding the legal contractual cooperation. They also addressed the activities of a bilateral intergovernmental committee, highlighting the significance of the dialogue over visa facilitation and the re-launch of the Milennium Challenges program in Armenia.

Mr Kerry reiterated the United States’ commitment to keep supporting the Armenia-Turkey reconciliation process.

Accepting Nalbandian’s invitation to visit Armenia, he said he intends to realize the plan in the course of this year.