By Emre Uslu
It’s one of the most pressing questions when examining the phenomenon of terrorism: Why are Muslim youths living in the West nowadays getting caught up in terrorism? There are many answers to this question, but the most common ones are that these youths do not feel a sense of belonging in their countries, that terrorism networks are fast at work trying to attract new members and that the rhetoric of political Islam is spreading fast.
Feeling excluded from social and political arenas, facing difficulties in making it in daily life, family problems and even relationships: All of these can be significant factors in pushing youths towards terrorism as an outlet.
It seems, from these angles, that perhaps it’s no coincidence that Muslims and terrorism tend to mix more in France. After all, the French system is more rigid and exclusive in nature when compared to, say, the Anglo-Saxon system.
But Muslim youths’ connection to terrorism in Europe cannot be explained away by pointing to their unhappiness with those countries’ systems. What we need to do is re-examine the powerful rhetoric of political Islam and how and why it is that such rhetoric is still being produced by certain social and political entities.
For example, what about the anti-colonialist rhetoric that springs from earlier experiences in Algeria and Tunisia that still affects French Muslim youths? Does this rhetoric make it easier for those youths to be drawn into terrorism? What do countries like Algeria and Tunisia symbolize now for Muslim youths living in France? Are they far-off “homelands,” or just other countries?
And more importantly: How are the post-colonial narratives of Tunisian and Algerian youths in France refitted for modern times? The answer to this question might well shed some light on what really lies behind the jihadist tendencies of some Muslim youths living in Europe.
Answering these questions may also give some clues as to where the jihadis of the coming generations will spring forth from.
So long as Western states do not intervene in the reproduction of this powerful political rhetoric rising from Muslim society in Europe, the jihadist terrorists we are now seeing will continue producing this rhetoric.
Personally, I have observed the beginnings of a strong new jihadi rhetoric amongst the Turks living in Europe. And in this vein, no one should be surprised if we soon see some jihadis emerging from the ranks of the children of families close to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) living in places like Belgium, Holland and Germany.
The reason for this goes back to the AKP’s efforts to re-strengthen the discourse between Ankara and Turks living abroad. Though Turkey remained the homeland for Turks living in Europe until the 1990s, it’s now viewed more as a holiday spot for most Turkish youths in Europe. Worse is that while these youths view Turkey as a holiday spot, they also don’t view the European countries where they are living in as home. And it is this quandary that pushes them into an empty vacuum: being stuck between two worlds.
In the meantime, the global Muslim discourse wielded by the AKP, combined with its neo-Ottoman rhetoric, is finding more and more of a fan base amongst European youths of Turkish origin. Which in turn means we have an odd situation wherein these youths see Turkey as a holiday spot, while also envisioning themselves as descendants of the Ottomans.
But go and ask these youths what the Ottomans mean to them! The answer you will most often hear will involve references to a s strong, anti-Western warrior state. And this imaginary state is a critical arena that helps bring together Turkish youths with the jihadi terrorist groups that promise their followers some imaginary new caliphate.
And so it seems inevitable that we’ll see more and more Turkish youth in Europe — living with no real sense of homeland but caught up in an anti-Western rhetoric combined with visions of a distant neo-Ottoman state — becoming dedicated to jihadist movements.
Another critical point here is that many mosques in Europe funded by the Religious Affairs Directorate had not been politicized until now, but have been in the last few years. It is in these mosques that some of the youths in Europe are learning the powerful discourse and rhetoric of political Islam. All that needs to happen after this is for terrorist networks to then discover and pull in these youths.
The West needs to be sensitive to this reality unless it wants to see future generations of jihadis rising from the ranks of Turkish youths living in Europe.